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The British Government announced its intention in July
19 80 to modernize its strategic nuclear deterrent with the
deployment of the Trident I (C4) submarine- launched ballistic
missile. The MIRVed Trident missile will have significantly
increased capabilities of range, payload and target numbers.
It also represents an enormous expense for the British to
bear and high political and military opportunity-costs for
capabilities which may not be vital to an effective and
credible national strategic deterrent. The political diffi-
culties likely to be encountered in bringing the Trident
program to fruition may portend the loss of all British
strategic capability, while resulting conventional weapons
reductions may even contribute to lowering the threshold of
aggression in Western Europe and increasing the likelihood of
the threatening circumstances a nuclear deterrent is designed
to avoid. Alternative strategic options, such as Polaris or
Poseidon SLMBs or cruise missiles, should be explored to
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On 15 July 1980, Her Majesty's Government published the
texts of letters exchanged between the President of the United
States and the British Prime Minister "providing for the United
Kingdom to buy from the United States the Trident weapon system,
comprising Trident I ballistic missiles and supporting com-
ponents for a force of British missile-launching submarines
to replace the present Polaris-equipped force." [Ref. 1: p. 1]
This long-awaited announcement marked the beginning of the end
in the tortuous decision-making process of the British govern-
ment over the controversial question of whether or not to
maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent into the 21st Century.
It is unlikely, however, to be the final word on the subject.
It remains a monumental task to sustain the political resolve
necessary over the next decade to translate this decision into
a deployed strategic capability.
The problem of insuring external security has always been
the primary task of states. The "raison d'etre" for British
defense policies is "to safeguard the sovereignty of the
United Kingdom and the British way of life under a democratically
elected government." [Ref. 2: p. 21] Without security, all
the other administrative and social functions assumed by
contemporary governments are for nought. Defense is inextri-
cably linked to national security and any action affecting

one must necessarily act on the other. The decision of the
British government to attempt to maintain an effective
independent strategic nuclear deterrent could be of paramount
significance in shaping that nation's course over the next
several generations. It will affect the sum of international
security calculations especially in the European theater,
and could also have substantial domestic repercussions that
may, in the long run, have a greater impact than any other
single facet of the decision.
The strategic environment is not static. The international
situation that influenced the British decision to seek Trident
changes continually. It is flexibility and fluidity which
seem to be the principal constants in domestic politics,
alliance relationships and military technology as well as
strategic planning.
The history of the strategic arms race over the past
thirty years reveals the tremendous amount of energy and
uncertainty that has been always present. Weapons systems
were bought even as they were being overwhelmed by new tech-
nologies; international alignments changed; domestic political
coalitions shifted ; national character and resolve were
redefined. The examples are almost endless, but the final
conclusion remains unchanged. No political decision of the
importance, complexity and controversy as that surrounding
the continuation of a strategic nuclear deterrent force will
ever be completely immutable.

It is interesting that the first open and relatively
frank consideration in twenty years of the role of the
ballistic missile submarine in British strategic planning
has been brought about by factors of material fatigue and
technical obsolescence in that very force. This discussion
will touch on strategic traditions in Britain since the
Second World War, and how any changes will affect Anglo-American
relations and relations with neighboring European countries,
particularly France and West Germany.
The principal objective of this thesis and its accompanying
research is to elucidate the rationales, expressed and
implicit, for the British decision to acquire the Trident
ballistic missile system with its attendent strategic capa-
bilities. From this analysis, personal conclusions are then
offered as to the soundness of the decision and the likelihood
that it can be brought to successful fruition, as well as
other alternative strategic options which might yet remain
open to exploration. The study of this complex and multi-
faceted decision provides insights into the decision-making
apparatus of the British government and of its allies, and
enhances our understanding of the "pulling and hauling" of
competing priorities and special interests that constitute
the reality of politics.
The ability of the British government to accomplish the
modernization of its independent strategic nuclear deterrent
force may well be measured in the opportunity cost to other

important political functions including both conventional
arras and social programs. This hypothesis, if true, could
portend serious consequences for the United Kingdom and might
even serve to promote indirectly the conditions of inter-
national instability which the Trident system under British
control is designed to guard against.
Chapter II provides an overview of the historical devel-
opment of the British strategic nuclear deterrent. It
examines political rationales for its existence and considers
the premises behind its potential employment. The military
hardware that has been the embodiment of the deterrent threat
is reviewed with particular emphasis given to the state of
current operating units and the timing requirements of the
British decision to purchase Trident.
Chapter III considers the various weapons systems and
their launch platforms proposed as replacements for Polaris
in terms of their utility to a medium power such as Britain.
It also reviews the arguments about relinquishing the nuclear
deterrent capability completely.
Chapter IV explores the background and dynamics of the
Conservative government's decision to proceed with the pro-
curement and deployment of the Trident I (C-4) ballistic
missile as a follow-on to the sea-based Polaris deterrent
force.
Chapter V deals with the domestic political variables of
maintaining and modernizing an independent strategic nuclear
10

deterrent. It considers the advantages and disadvantages
accruing from each and analyzes the key factors in the Brisith
government's decision to opt for Trident.
Chapter VI provides final reflections and concluding
observations about the Trident decision and its future
viability. This section will present the author's right
perception of the role the British strategic nuclear deterrent
will play in influencing the strategic balance, European




II. THE CONTEMPORARY STATUS OF THE BRITISH NUCLEAR
DETERRENT
In October 1977, Ian Smart, then Deputy Director of the
Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)
provided the first authorized analysis of the future of the
British strategic nuclear deterrent in the 21st Century.
In his article "Beyond Polaris" [Ref. 3: p. 557] Smart argued
that for reasons of impending material obsolescence and the
long- lead times in modern weapon system procurement require-
ments, a decision would have to be made in the early 19 80 's -
preferably in 19 80 - on whether to continue maintaining a
strategic deterrence force after 1995. Not doing so would
allow the credibility of the existing Polaris-equipped
submarines to gradually decline without any positive judgement
having been made about the utility of such action. Smart
focused primarily on the technical problems which required
resolution. His purpose was "to encourage and, as far as
possible, to inform a policy debate - not to conduct it."
[Ref. 4: p. iii]
Smart's analysis heralded the first public debate over
the function and future of the British deterrent since the
late 1950 's and early 1960 's when hundreds of thousands of
anti-nuclear protestors had been mobilized by the Campaign
for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) , and the question of nuclear
weapons had been at the center of British politics. The
12

divisiveness of the issue had placed enormous strains on the
internal structure of the British Labour Party, and politicians
had proved especially wary of raising it since. [Ref. 5: p.
XIV] Additionally, the nuclear force has done little to draw
attention to itself. It has been cheap in terms of operating
expenses, consuming less than 1.5% of the Defense budget and
0.8% of defense manpower annually. [Ref. 5: pp. 18 and 21]
In the absence of a superpower confrontation or any other
international crisis of the first magnitude involving Great
Britain, there has been little likelihood that the force would
be actually employed. The Head of Policy Studies at the Royal
Institute of International Affairs, Dr. Lawrence Freedman,
says:
In the absence of major decisions to be taken on nuclear
weapons policy, other issues came to dominate political
debate. The nuclear issue was kept hidden, with little
official comment on the matter, and secrecy unusually
tight even by British standards. [Ref. 5: p. XIV]
One feature that must be clearly understood in considering
the Polaris replacement question is the unique "British
strategic culture." Specifically this tends to be "a
reluctance to engage in theoretical analysis or to articulate
the major assumption of British strategy." [Ref. 7: p. 1]
What this means in terms of policy inquiry is that one must
look at what the British do, rather than what they say, to
develop an appreciation for their strategic thinking. The
British have an almost closed system of defence policy-making
comoared to the other Western democracies. Decisions are
13

arrived at in secret, with little public attempt made to
justify them. British defense policy is arrived at in an
evolutionary manner where a "very small group of men in the
Ministry of Defence and Cabinet formulate policy, which is
'imposed' upon the services, the opposition in Parliament,
and the party of the Prime Minister." [Ref. 8: p. 2] Robin
Ranger describes this salient trait of British politics in
commenting on the Trident decision:
The British have undertaken a major expansion of their
strategic nuclear forces without formally admitting they
are doing so, and without providing any political or
strategic justifications remotely comparable to the
importance, and cost, of this action. The result has
been almost a caricature of British strategic debate,
avoiding logic, regarding technical data as unimportant,
conducted in symbolic phrases, and mostly in secret.
[Ref. 7: p. 3]
To fail to appreciate this discreetly non-articulated
British approach to strategy is to fail to grasp its essence:
"it is something that the British government does... not some-
thing a bunch of intellectuals debate." [Ref. 7: p. 3]
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
To establish a basis for considering replacement of the
Polaris nuclear submarine force with one-armed with the Trident
I missile system, it is first essential to understand the
background of British nuclear weapons. Many of the early
assumptions made by the British about nuclear weapons are no
longer valid. Many of them still are, however, and will
continue to be offered as such, forming the milieu and
14

traditions which will certainly influence the shaping of
current and future British nuclear policies.
The United Kingdom came early to the nuclear field.
Though Britain's efforts are often forgotten in the face of
the massive American scientific and industrial investment in
the Manhattan Project, it can be reasonably argued that with-
out the British contribution, the successful development of
atomic weapons could not have been achieved in time to have
had an impact in World War II.
Prior to the outbreak of war in Europe in 19 39, Britain
became a refuge for large numbers of people from Hitler's
Germany. Among these were significant numbers of distinguished
German scientists who were immediately set to work on the
theoretical aspects of atomic research. A latent fear
developed in both the United States and the United Kingdom
that German research on atomic weapons was already far advanced.
Though this fear was later proved unfounded, it provided the
impetus necessary to spur allied efforts and later joint
cooperation toward the development of an operational atomic
capability. It is ironic that in Britain and later in the
United States, much of the initial research that eventually
resulted in production of an atomic bomb was conducted by
expatriates from Nazi Germany who had their own special
reasons for fearing German success in this area. [Ref. 9: p. 4]
Three major difficulties confronted early research in
the field of atomic weaponry and British programs were no
15

exception. By early 1940, though, British scientists had
made significant progress, especially v/ith regard to the
gaseous diffusion of U-235 and the determination cf critical
atomic mass. VJhen the Thompson or MAUD Committee made its
recommendation to the Prime Minister in July 1941 that the
production of the atomic bomb should be pursued on a large
scale, the crucial question had become not the feasibility of
building an atomic v/eapon, but whether it could be completed
before the war ended. It is a second irony that much of the
successful research accomplished in this field in Britain
during this period was done by foreigners who, because of
their nationality, were prevented from working on more
classified projects and were steered toward the less critical
area of nuclear research. [Ref. 9: p. 6]
In the United States atomic research was also going
forward, albeit not at the same pace as in Britain. It was
spurred in large part by a letter to President Roosevelt,
signed by Albert Einstein which warned of the serious dangers
associated with significant German advances in the field of
atomic weaponry. A Uranium Committee which had been formed
in 19 39 was brought under the direction of the National
Defense Research Committee in June 1940, while as many as
sixteen separate study contracts in nuclear research were
being funded under U.S. government auspices.
Overtures about the exchange of scientific information
began on both sides of the Atlantic soon after the beginning
16

of the war. The key event was the dispatch by the hard-
pressed British of a high-level scientific mission to the
United States in the summer of 1940, where its leader. Sir
Henry Tizard, proposed "to exchange any secret information
possessed by Britain in return for secret information
possessed by the United States." [Ref. 9: p. 12] While this
agreement provided an exchange of significant scientific data
to both sides, particularly in the area of microwave radar,
its real importance lay in the basis it established for further
scientific collaboration, especially in the field of atomic
research. [Ref. 13; p. 142 and Ref. 14: p. 107]
Early comparision showed that, although the United States
had devoted considerable energy to the field of atomic
research, these efforts were much more theoretical and long-
range than those of the British, whose seriously periled
national security clearly mandated the weapons-oriented atomic
research that was being aggressively pursued. The 'Tube
Alloy' program and the confidence of British scientists acted
as a catalytic agent for the American effort. It provided
"a promise that there was a reasonable chance for something
militarily useful during the war in progress. The British...
outlined a concrete program." [Ref. 12: p. 43]
As the atomic weapons program of the United States began
gathering momentum, it was immediately apparent that it
would enjoy significant advantages over Britain's and that a
combined effort by both countries promised the best results.
17

This was formalized by a joint agreement between the two
national leaders. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill, and was designated the Manhattan Engineer District
Project. Its director, Brigadier General Leslie Groves, USA,
assessed the initial British contribution in the following
light "...before the summer of 1942, the relative amount of
work being done on the development of atomic energy in the
United States and Britain was not greatly unbalanced." [Ref.
10: p. 125] General Groves believed that this situation of
general research parity established the basis for cooperation
and the exchange of information. Neither he nor most of the
other Americans associated with the Manhattan Project, however,
expected much from the proposed collaboration. They felt
that the U.S. would give up a great deal of information and
receive nothing but preliminary laboratory data in return.
[Ref. 10: p. 126]
The investment of the United States in the Manhattan
Project was enormous. In dollar amounts, it was estimated
to cost $2 billion in 1942. In terms of national support,
it was considered "an incalculable political risk in case of
failure." Both of these facts served to focus American
attention and energy on getting an operational weapon into
production rather than on exchanges of information which would
aid our allies in the postwar period. [Ref. 9: p. 19]
The British, with their own atomic weapons program
subordinated to the massive American effort, were acutely
18

aware of the political sensitivities involved. They were
nonetheless determined not to be left out in the cold by
American dominance of this collaborative effort. Early
indications of excessively tight compartmented research
assignments convinced the British of the need to more clearly
delineate this program of joint collaboration and exchange
in order to protect their own scientific and political
interests. This was formally laid out in the Quebec Agreement
signed on August 19, 1943 by President Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Churchill. Its main points are summarized below:
1. The atomic program would be carried out jointly
with a free interchange of information.
2. Neither government would use the results of the
research to attack each other.
3. Neither government would pass the information
produced to other countries without mutual
consent.
4. Actual use of nuclear weapons would require
common assent.
5. In view of its disproportionate share of the
development, the U.S. President might limit the
commercial and industrial uses of atomic energy
by Great Britain in such a manner as he considered
fair and equitable.
Additionally, a special Combined Policy Committee was set up
to resolve any problems arising in this joint weapons devel-
opment program. [Ref. 11: pp. 187-189 and Ref. 12: pp. 276-
279]
The British felt they had guaranteed a full exchange of
information in the Manhattan Project by their "grand gesture"
19

of accepting American postwar control over the potential
commercial and industrial applications of atomic energy.
Their principal objective was to secure access to the
information necessary to produce their own atomic weapons
promptly at the war's end. [Ref. 12: p. 273] In discussing
the Quebec Agreement, Prime Minister Churchill indicated that
"he never expected the United States to take unfair advantage
of it." [Ref. 11: p. 189]
Despite these formal understandings, a close collaborative
relationship was never effectively achieved. The British
contribution was restricted both in scope and in interactions
with the U.S. researchers, with only Sir James Chadwick,
technical advisor to the British members of the Combined Policy
Committee, being allowed access to all phases of the Manhattan
Project.
The U.S. attitude was not so much anti-British as it was
pro-American. The project administrators felt that British
scientists should be subject to the tight security restrictions
v/hich were applied to U.S. personnel. It was feared that
without universally applied strict controls, atomic secrets
would eventually fall into the hands of the Soviet Union, a
politically unacceptable situation.
In their concern over American determination not to
freely share nuclear information developed in the Manhattan
Project, the British raised the question of postwar
collaboration in the Spring of 1945. This was especially
20

significant because a new American President, Harry Truman,
had assumed office on the death of President Roosevelt. The
British produced a paper entitled "Hyde Park aide-memoire,"
which embodied an agreement drawn up between Roosevelt and
Churchill in September 1944, and which said in part:
Full collaboration between the United States and the
British Government in developing Tube Alloys for
military and commercial purposes should continue after
the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by
joint agreement. [Ref. 9: p. 25]
Despite this apparent official consensus over continued close
collaboration on nuclear research at the highest levels of
government, little action was carried out in the lower
echelons. In fact, shortly after Sir Henry Maitland Wilson
gave his approval on July 4, 19 45 to a proposal to drop the
atomic bomb on Japan, cooperation on nuclear matters decreased
even futher.
The Smyth report on atomic energy, approved by President
Truman and issued August 9, 1945, was accompanied by a War
Department bulletin which cautioned:
The best interests of the United States require the
utmost cooperation by all concerned in keeping secret
now and for all time all scientific and technical
information not given in this report or other official
sources... [Ref. 12: p. 407]
These events did not portend well for Britain to receive the
special nuclear data which she believed her due. The abrupt
cessation of Lend-Lease at war's end was also bitterly received
in Britain and did little to enhance the spirit of cooperation
necessary to sustain any close collaborative effort.

Ot±ier problems plagued U.S. -British collaboration on
atomic energy matters at the end of the war. Chief among
these were (a) concern about the establishment of international
controls on nuclear weapons especially with regard to the
Soviet Union, and (b) the avoidance of a "disastrous arms
race" in the postwar years. General Groves remained opposed
to the "full and effective" exchange of information with
Britain on the grounds that it would constitute an alliance
and would require registration under the United Nations
Charter. The inbred reluctance of the Americans to fully
'cut-in* the British to the Manhattan Project was further
exacerbated by the new American President's lack of under-
standing and of personal commitment to the collaborative
venture which had characterized his predecessor. [Ref. 9:
pp. 25-27]
H.A. DeWeerd notes in a RAND Corporation study that:
Roosevelt and Churchill went through the war on the
assumption that Anglo-American solidarity would
characterize postwar politics. Yet Roosevelt was to
die and Churchill be driven from office before the war
with Japan was over. Their successors, Truman and
Attlee did not look at things in the same way that
Roosevelt and Churchill did. [Ref. 9: p. 22]
This comment points up the improbabilities and uncertainties
in all political agreements. What the British believed to be
firmly set in terms of nuclear collaboration and exchange
turned out not to guarantee anything. The same sort of
misunderstanding would happen years later, and for different
reasons, over the Skybolt missile cancellation. Any joint
22

undertaking between sovereign governments is always subject
to political disruption. This has been true of the Polaris
program and will remain the case, if the Trident purchase is
concluded. It is a potential pitfall that must be borne in
mind when considering any cooperative political action,
especially in an area so sensitive and critical to national
security and sovereignty as nuclear weapons.
Two specific developments were to mark the end of the
collaborative research relationship that had grown between
the United States and Britain during the war years. On
February 16, 19 46 it was revealed that an espionage ring had
been uncovered in Ottawa, Canada, passing atomic information
to the Russian embassy. This incident eventually led to an
investigation which discovered that Klaus Fuchs , a British
scientist who had been deeply involved in the Los Alamos
research, had also passed atomic weapons design data to the
Soviet Union. The American fear that vital atomic secrets
would eventually leak into the hands of the Russians had
finally been realized, and the conduit had been British.
At the same time. Senator Brian McMahon was sponsoring
legislation in the U.S. Congress which would set up the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and bring the huge U.S. atomic
energy research program firmly under civilian control. One
of the provisions of this bill prohibited the transfer of
any nuclear information to other countries and was designed
to protect U.S. secrets from further compromise. This
23

provision was included without the legislator's knowledge or
understanding of the Quebec Agreement and the British
contribution to the development of the atomic bomb; but it
suited the purposes of the American military, who had been
against an open sharing of information almost from the very
beginning. With the signing of the McMahon Act by President
Truman on August 1, 19 46, all collaboration between the U.S.
and Britain on nuclear matters "withered away." [Ref. 9:
p. 27] Efforts of the new British government of Clement
Attlee to restore this special relationship were futile, and
the United Kingdom was left to its own devices to build
nuclear weapons.
It is difficult to establish the actual dates as to when
which British defense programs are launched. What can be
done is to develop conclusions based on inferences drawn from
visible actions, [Ref. 8: p. 6] This is true of the British
decision to produce nuclear weapons. Without fissile material
and denied access to American atomic weapons technology by
the McMahon Act, Britain was forced to embark on the long,
costly course of weapons research on her own. Her intention
of producing an atomic bomb had been clearly stated as early
as May 19 43, when Lord Cherwell (Professor F. A. Lindemann)
had frankly acknowledged it as the main reason for wanting
"free and complete" access to the technical information
developed during the Manhattan Project. [Ref. 12: p. 273]
24

A gaseous diffusion plant for the separation of uranium
isotopes had been established at Rhydmwyn in North Wales in
1940, but had been phased out during the Manhattan Project.
In the postwar years, the first concrete step taken in the
area of nuclear research was the decision in October 1945 to
set up an atomic research station at Harwell. The fact that
it was constructed under the auspices of the Ministry of
Supply suggested that its purpose was ultimately military.
[Ref. 15: pp. 371-372] Plants were started soon after at
Windscale and Capenhurst to produce uranium 235 and plutonium,
which had been shown to be a superior fissile material.
Another experimental atomic research facility was opened at
Aldermaston, which later became the Atomic Weapons Research
Establishment (AWRE) and produced Britain's first atomic
device, successfully tested at the Monte Bello Islands off
Australia's North West coast on October 3, 1953. [Ref. 16:
p. 433]
Having successfully demonstrated the ability to manufacture
nuclear weapons, Britain pressed forward to develop an
operational capability. A program to build medium-range jet
bombers was funded in the 19 54 defense program and by 19 56,
the Royal Air Force (RAF) was able to deploy atomic bombs on
the first of these V-series (Valiant, Vulcan and Victor)
bombers. [Ref. 16: p. 433] The decision to proceed with
the development of hydrogen (thermonuclear) weapons was
announced in the 19 55 Defence White Paper, although Sir
25

Anthony Eden indicated that the Conservative Party had
settled on that course of action as early as 1952. [Ref. 8:
p. 6] The successful test of a thermonuclear device in May
1957 brought Great Britain into full maturity as a nuclear
power. Air Vice-Marshal Stewart W. B. Menaul comments:
By 1956/57 Britain had designed, manufactured and
successfully tested operational atomic and thermo-
nuclear weapons which entitled her to full membership
in the nuclear club with America and Russia. The UK's
weapons were entirely British produced and controlled,
being wholly independent of the U.S. despite claims to
the contrary by politicians on both sides of the
Atlantic. [Ref. 16: p. 433]
At this juncture, the ability of Britain to field a
totally independent nuclear deterrent force had reached its
zenith, but events were already in motion that would change
the entire nature of international strategic competition and
render the British force of V-bombers vulnerable and obsolete.
Chief among these were the development and deployment by both
the U.S. and the USSR of reliable, nuclear- tipped, intermediate
range ballistic missiles (IRBM) ; the successful test by the
Soviets of the first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
;
and finally the launching in October 19 57 of the first
artificial satellite. Sputnik I. [Ref. 5: p. 10]
The maturation of Britain as a nuclear power was eventually
recognized by the United States, and convinced the U.S. to
once again open the door to nuclear cooperation. The McMahon
Act had been amended in 19 54 to permit "limited exchanges"
of nuclear information; but after the successful test of a
26

British thermonuclear device in May 19 57, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower was able to propose a greater exchange with
countries which had "made substantial progress in the
development of atomic weapons." The resulting legislation
passed the U.S. Congress in July 1958, and led to an Anglo-
American agreement "for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic
Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes." In 19 59, this agreement
was further amended, and Britain was placed in a "special and
elevated" position with regard to nuclear weapon cooperation.
[Ref. 6: p. 7] The special relationship which had charac-
terized Anglo-American collaboration in this area had been
renewed.
In spite of the cancellation of Lend-Lease aid and the
cessation of mutual atomic development efforts, Anglo-American
relations remained remarkably close during the postwar years.
The consolidation of Soviet power throughout the Eastern Bloc
countries; the Greek Civil War and the Truman Doctrine; the
Berlin Blockade; the Korean War and other Soviet political
pressures served to polarize the national interests of the
major countries of the world along distinctly separate,
ideologically estranged lines. In the face of communist
aggression in Western Europe and the Far East, massive Soviet
conventional superiority on the European continent and the
first successful test of a Soviet atomic bomb in 1949, Britain
found herself increasingly allied with the nations of western
Europe against the Soviet Union. She signed the Dunkirk
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Treaty and the Brussels Pact, and firmly committed herself
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1948,
prompted by the Berlin Crisis, the Labour Government began
the practice of allowing U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC)
bombers, armed with atomic weapons, to operate from British
bases. [Ref. 8: p. 4] This action was the first in a series
of allied decisions to rely on nuclear weapons that was to
characterize the strategic planning of the 19 50s.
No sooner had the RAF V-bomber force been deployed as
the mainstay of the British strategic deterrent than its
weaknesses and increasing vulnerability to surprise attack
were revealed by the advent of ballistic missile weaponry.
Never numbering more than 200 aircraft, the V-bombers were
described as possessing capabilities "equal to any in the
world." [Ref. 6: p. 13] The fact remained, however, that
altogether they only amounted to about 5 per cent of the bomb
lift capability attributed to SAC. Dispersal techniques,
accelerated scramble capabilities and a random mobility pro-
gram were instituted to reduce the vulnerability cf the
V-bombers to pre-emptive Soviet strikes, but with increasingly
sophisticated Soviet air defenses, it was felt that armed
with gravity-type nuclear weapons, they would not constitute
a significant deterrent threat much beyond the early 1960s.
The development of Blue Steel, a short range (400 mile)
,
subsonic, standoff missile armed with a one-megaton warhead
was undertaken to extend the penetration capability of the
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V-bomber force until about 1965. [Ref. 17: p. 814] Blue
Steel was eventually successfully deployed with front-line
RAF units in November 19 62 and remained in active service
until withdrawn with the abolishment of the RAF Bomber
Command in 196 8. [Ref. 16: p. 434]
In 19 57, an agreement between Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan and President Eisenhower authorized the deployment
of 60 U.S. Thor IRBMs with the RAF Bomber Command. This
system was in place by 19 58 and provided Britain with a fully
integrated bomber/missile force in the nuclear deterrent role.
[Ref. 16: p. 432] The missiles were deployed without any
attempt to harden or conceal them and were operated under two-
key control which required the presence of a U.S. officer on
every Thor base. [Ref. 8: p. 14] The Thor IRBM agreement
was designed to strengthen Anglo-American nuclear ties. It
took advantage of the favorable geographic position of Britain
in targetting IRBMs which were out of range in the United
States. It also acted as a stop-gap for the British to
develop their own IRBM and for the Americans to complete test
and evaluation of the ICBt's which were scheduled to come into
service in 1960.
The British had made the decision in 19 57 to develop
their own IRBM, named Blue Streak, as the next generation of
nuclear delivery vehicles, rather than producing a new model
supersonic bomber. The Blue Streak was to be a liquid-fueled
missile with a range of 2500 miles and designed to be launched
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from underground silos. [Ref. 17: p. 433] Although generally
thought at the time to be of British design, the Blue Streak's
motor and internal guidance system were actually derivatives
of an earlier American missile, the Atlas. [Ref. 5: p. 8]
As the development of Blue Streak proceeded, it became
apparent that the missile would be technically obsolete even
before it could become operational. The liquid fueling pro-
cess was slow and awkward when compared to the solid fuel
propellants which had been perfected. These allowed the
production of cheaper, more efficient ballistic missiles.
[Ref. 16: p. 433] Additionally, the missile itself in its
hardened, fixed launch silos would be increasingly vulnerable
to growing Soviet offensive missile strike capability.
[Ref. 5: p. 8]
By 1960, 65 million pounds had been expended on Blue
Streak and the final cost was estimated at 600 million pounds
to complete its development. [Ref. 5: p. 5] Faced with these
bleak prospects, the British government chose to terminate
the Blue Streak Project in 1960. The cancellation was
undoiibtedly influenced by the negotiations which the British
had begun with the United States in 19 58 for procurement of
an air-launched ballistic missile called Skybolt. [Ref. 16:
p. 433]
It is worth considering the position of Britain in the
strategic arena at this junction. Professor P. Jl. S. Blackett
describes it as follows:
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Britain. . .was not only the first medium power nation
to have her own atomic stockpile, but she was also
the first atomic power to find herself indefensible
against a potentially hostile and much larger atomic
power. [Ref. 14: p. 79]
Britain was also the first atomic power to admit that, even
with outside assistance, she could not hope to compete in
the strategic arms race with the super powers. The cancel-
lation of Blue Streak in 1960 led Professor Norman Gibbs to
comment:
The experience of Britain during the last five or six
years suggests that in the West no single nation other
than the United States can continue to afford to create
and maintain an effective deterrent of its own.
[Ref. 18: p. 24]
Britain's efforts to build and deploy an operational
nuclear deterrent capability between 1952 and 1962 are aptly
described by H. A. DeWeerd as:
a losing struggle against the rapid obsolescence of
first-line military equipment, against the spiralling
cost of such equipment, against the mounting require-
ments for penetrating the air defenses of a great
power with certainty, and against the difficulty of
maintaining a secure strike-second force in the face
of a great power threat. [Ref. 8: p. 2]
The decision to cancel Blue Streak marked a significant
turning point in British defense politics, for no British
government has seriously considered developing a land-based
strategic missile since that time. [Ref. 19: p. 103] The
independent strategic force has subsequently been strongly




Having experienced the costly, difficult and frustrating
task of trying to maintain an effective, domestically-produced
strategic deterrent during a period of advancing technology
and shrinking economic means, the British saw the procurement
of the Skybolt missile as the best remaining option to pre-
serve an "independent" strategic capability.
Skybolt was the U.S. Air Force's "Polaris of the Air."
A solid-fuel, air-launched ballistic missile, it was designed
to achieve pin-point accuracy at ranges of 800 miles to attack
and suppress enemy defenses for follow-on strikes by SAC
bombers. Although Skybolt' s accuracy was much greater than
that required for the PAF's counter-city deterrent strategy,
it otherv/ise meshed perfectly v/ith the British strategic
requirements of the day.
The Skybolt missile was relatively inexpensive because
the United States absorbed most of the development cost. It
would extend the useful operational life of the RAF ' s V-
bombers into the 1970s, thus deferring the costs and design
imperatives for a replacement. It also preserved the
delicate balance of bureaucratic interests among the military
services, a factor of no small consideration. The Royal Air
Force was affirmed as the custodian of the national deterrent,
while the Army and the Royal Navy were free to concentrate




The British considered and rejected the Polaris missile
system in opting for Skybolt, Although acknowledging the
impressive technical achievement that Polaris represented,
the British saw it "as too small to provide the range,
explosive yield, and air defense countermeasures that would
be needed in the future." [Ref. 19: p. 103] In addition to
the bureaucratic sensibilities alluded to above, the Chief
of the Naval Staff, Lord Mountbatten, was not convinced of
the absolute need to maintain a national deterrent force,
especially at what undoubtedly would be a cost to the already
stretched conventional resources of the Royal Navy. [Ref. 2:
p. 26] Polaris thus had no established constituency within
the British military hierarchy. In these circumstances and
given the relatively promising prospects for Skybolt, it is
hardly surprising that the British chose to ask the United
States for it.
Unfortunately for Britain, Skybolt was only of several
competing systems under development in the United States
nuclear arsenal. ^^en it experienced significant growth costs
and serious technical deficiencies, particularly with its
astro-inertial guidance system, Skybolt became a prime
candidate for cancellation. This was especially true in
light of the successes of other strategic development prog-
grams, notably Polaris and Minuteman. The importance of
Skybolt' s "defense suppression" mission also faded with the
realization that with the deployment of Minuteman and Polaris
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ballistic missiles, the dominance of manned bombers in the
strategic deterrent force would end.
The British did not enjoy the luxury of the United States
in being able to choose between several competing strategic
options. Great Britain had sufficient political and economic
capital to procure and operate only a single strategic
weapons system in the maintenance of her national deterrent
capability. For a variety of reasons outlined above, Skybolt
was chosen as the principal vehicle for that force. When
cost and technology factors finally culminated in the U.S.
Department of Defense's decision in 1962 to cancel the Skybolt
program, the resulting blow to British strategic planning,
political stability and international prestige was enormous.
The entire Skybolt Affair has been described as a "Pinero
drama of misunderstanding." [Ref. 22: p. 861] The reasons
for this major clash of national interests have already been
explored well by a number of authors. [Ref. 20] It is
relevant here to note the critical impact this decision had
on the British nuclear force. Only the continuing commitment
to maintain a deterrent force has remained the same since.
At the Nassau Conference between Prime Minister Macmillan
and President Kennedy which followed the Skybolt announcement
in December 1962, the British were able to extract promises
from the Americans to buy, on very favorable terms, the
Polaris ballistic missile system. This action provided the
equipment necessary to maintain a credible British deterrent,
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but it also completely restructured the entire basis of
British nuclear strategy in the space of a few short weeks.
The Royal Navy, much to its chagrin, became overnight the
possessor of the nation's nuclear striking force. The Royal
Air Force, long dominant in the strategic nuclear sphere,
was dramatically relegated to a second-class, tactical role.
Though several years would pass before HI4S Resolution would
begin her first operational patrol (1968) , the course of
British strategic policy had been clearly laid down in
January 19 6 3 and everything that followed was merely the
mechanics of carrying out this momentous decision.
The Polaris submarine- launched ballistic missile had
originally been considered for the British nuclear deterrent,
but had been rejected because it didn't have the strategic
characteristics desired nor would it have fallen under the
bureaucratic control of the Royal Air Force. Though the
British acknowledged its technical superiority and better
long-term prospects, they felt that the time required to
construct the submarine force would leave the United Kingdom
vulnerable to Soviet blackmail because of the increasing
difficulty its V-bombers would have in penetrating Soviet air
defenses. [Ref. 5: p. 16]
What had been logically and precisely rejected in 1960
was quickly accepted in 1962 because there was nothing else
available to Britain if it wanted to maintain a technically
competent deterrent force. The U.S. State Department was
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vigorously opposed to offering the British the Polaris A-3
missile, mostly for reasons of security and proliferation.
They initially persuaded the Department of Defense and the
President to offer the shorter range Hound Dog missile in-
stead. With characteristics similar to the Blue Steel, it
was hardly what the British had in mind for their strategic
strike force. Putting it succinctly, a British Defence
commentator pointed out in a typically brusque British manner
that it would be quite impossible for the "independence" of
the British people to rest on something called "Hound Dog."
[Ref. 20:p. 48]
Unprepared for the level and emotional trauma of British
dismay at the cancellation of the Skybolt missile and the
domestic ramifications which ensued, President Kennedy was
easily convinced to offer his friend, Prime Minister Macmillan,
the Polaris A-3 in its place and on very generous terms. The
missiles were to be sold to the British at cost, plus 5% to
help defray the heavy expenditure on research and development
borne by the United States. The only caveat attached by the
United States to the sale of Polaris was that the British
forces be committed to NATO and targetted in accordance with
NATO plans. This was the opening gambit of an American
attempt to corral Britain into a multilateral NATO nuclear
force that would both satisfy European demands for a voice
in nuclear-decision making and also reconcile accusations
that Britain was getting preferential treatment within the
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alliance. The final communique from the Nassau Conference
stated "these British forces will be used for the purposes of
international defence of the Western alliance in all circum-
stances." However, Prime Minister Macmillan, concerned as
have been all British governments before and since with the
question of the "independence" of the deterrent force, ensured
the insertion of a crucial qualifier into this NATO commitment
as follows: "except where Her Majesty's Government may
decide that supreme national interests are at stake." [Ref.
5: p. 18] Thus was set the material and strategic structure
of the British deterrent force for decades to come.
A force of Polaris-equipped submarines seemed ideal for
a smaller nuclear nation like Britain. They were excellent
"second-strike" weapons. Operating underwater and relatively
immune from hostile interdiction, they constituted a safe and
credible deterrent. They lacked the accuracy and size to
seriously threaten a superpower's strategic forces, but still
possessed a significant potential for crude retaliation against
its populations and social structure. They embodied the theory
of sufficiency and proportionality espoused by the French -
i.e., the ability to "tear off an arm" of a potential enemy.
The British originally planned to construct 5 ballistic
missile submarines, but the economics and the politics of the
occasion were eventually to limit to 4 the number built, and
was to prove a penny-wise and pound- foolish decision in the
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long term. HMS Resolution and her sisters Renown, Repulse
and Revenge were built by the British dockyards at Vickers,
Barrow-in-Furness and Cairunell Laird, Birkenhead. Based on
the successful American Polaris boats of the George
Washington and Lafayette class, they were designed and con-
structed by the British in an average time of 4 and 3/4 years.
The Polaris missiles and supporting systems were procured
from the U.S., but the warheads were of British design and
manufactured by the British Nuclear Weapons Research Estab-
lishment (NWRE) at Aldermaston. Cooperative agreements
existed between the United States and Britain on fissile
materials, but it is not known what part they may have played
in the operational beginning of the British SSBN program.
Some people would argue that the British Polaris program
marked the end of their real contribution to the defense of
the Western alliance. Vice-Air Marshal Srewart Menaul notes
that at the height of the Cuban missile crisis, the RAF Bomber
Command, with its V-bombers and Thor IRBMs, could deliver the
nuclear equivalent of 250 million tons of high explosive (250
megatons) to targets in Russia. 7 years later, after the
Royal Navy and its Polaris submarine force had assumed the
strategic deterrent mission from the RAF, the most which they
could theoretically deploy was 3 2 megatons and that required
2 boats on station. [Ref. 16: pp. 433, 434] These statistics
could not reflect the greater survivability which the Polaris
SSBNs brought to the British deterrent or the greater ability
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of their missiles to penetrate Soviet defenses. Lawrence
Freedman puts the situation in perspective in the following
manner:
After Nassau, the future of the British strategic nuclear
force was more secure than ever before, employing the
most advanced American technology, yet firmly under
national control. The general argument with the Americans
over strategy, and the publicity given to Britain's
dependence on American missiles with the Skyvolt affair,
exposed the underlying weakness of the rationale that had
been developed during the 19 50s to support the nuclear
force. [Ref. 5: p. 17]
The submarine- launched Polaris A-3 ballistic missile has
been the first-line weapon of Britain's nuclear arsenal since
it was first deployed in 1968. Concern over potential Soviet
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses led to the initiation
of a 1 billion pound warhead modernization program in the
early 19 70s. Known as Chevaline and completed and publicly
announced in January 1980, this up-date incorporated new
state-of-the-art technology into the existing Polaris design
to increase the ability of the warheads to successfully
penetrate potentially more sophisticated Soviet ABM defenses.
As the last of the British Polaris boats begin their second
decade of service, the question of their eventual replacement
has become the thorniest problem to face British strategists
for years. Not only does the question raise the material/
equipment aspects, but it also raises political and strategic
justifications, a subject successive British governments of
both parties have been quite content to leave alone. It is




Ian Smart first raised the issue of the continued effective-
ness of the Polaris deterrent force and its eventual replacement
in his publications in 1977 and 1978. Since then, much of the
general debate on the subject has focused on the technical
aspects of the problem, at the expense of scrutinizing the
basic premise that British national policy requires the main-
tenance of a credible strategic nuclear deterrent. Smart
understood the essentiality of this question and its need for
a positive affirmation when he remarked:
The mere habit of maintaining a nuclear deterrent, which
has been formed over the last two decades, is no sufficient
reason, by itself, for deciding that the Polaris force,
when it ceases to be operational in the early 1990s,
should hand on its task to a successor. [Ref. 4: p. 4.]
Expanding on this theme. Smart goes en to assert that
technical and economic considerations aside, there may be
very real ethical and political reasons for not seeking a
Polaris replacement and that, conversely, any decision to
procure a follow-on system, if it is to be rational, must be
based on the relative costs and benefits of doing so. [Ref.
5: p. 561] "The decision whether or not to replace the
Polaris force hinges, in the first instance, on the view
taken of the strategic role and utility of a British nuclear
deterrent, now and in the future." [Ref. 4: p. 4]
Lawrence Freedman divides the replacement question into
two parts: "whether it is worth having a nuclear force at
all; and the most appropriate force, if the answer to the
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first part of the question is positive." He goes on to remark
that he is "more confident in (his) views of the second of
these matters than on the first," [Ref. 5: p. xv]
Peter Nailor asks "the fundamental question. . .whether
nuclear weapons could or should have a place in the spectrum
of British power." The basis for this question is the
"continuing debate, sometimes active, sometimes dormant,
about why and how Britain should maintain a strategic nuclear
weapon capability." Nailor goes right to the heart of the
strategic and political implications when he comments:
•Why' is not confined to ethics, it is also about
purpose; and 'how' is not confined to engineering
capability, it is also about costs and politics.
[Ref. 30: p. 2]
Establishing the continued strategic and political need
for the British nuclear deterrent in a contemporary context
should be one of the critical requirements in moving foirward
to any replacement system, but it is not something which
constitutes a new decision. The British have possessed a
strategic nuclear strike capability since the mid-1950s.
Their delivery systems have changed with time and advances in
technology, but the capability and strategic goals envisioned
by the British have remained relatively constant since their
inception.
One of the factors complicating potential choices in this
area is the fact that the already existing system is both
effective and credible and has at least half its designed
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operational life still in the future. Lawrence Jreedman
maintains that the nere existence of the present strategic
nuclear deterrent force will be a major factor in Britain's
decision to continue as a nuclear power into the next century.
He states:
The politics of beginning or terminating some activity
are usually far more difficult than the politics of
carrying on as before. To add or subtract a nuclear
capability would command attention: to maintain it
would barely be noticed. [Ref. 5: p. 140]
If the Royal Navy's Polaris submarine squadron had not already
compiled an enviable record of operational reliability at
relatively small cost to the British defense budget, it would
be easier to consider phasing out the strategic deterrent as
a serious replacement option. Without this being the case,
existing strategic and bureaucratic interests will exert a
strong and perhaps decisive influence on the decision to
maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent into the 21st century.
Earlier in Chapter 1, the historical development of
Britain's nuclear arsenal was considered, together with the
difficulty of firmly establishing the strategical basis for
that force, given the lack of definitive governmental pro-
nouncements on the matter. If a logical rationale is to be
developed for the current and future utility of the British
strategic nuclear deterrent, the relevant methods and reasons
which have resulted from the distinctly British strategic
style used to date must be ascertained.
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As has been pointed out, Great Britain was early in the
field of nuclear weapons research and development. It was a
matter of the highest national priority to beat the Germans
to the bomb. Lawrence Freedman indicates that this absolute
requirement, pursued in the interest of protecting national
sovereignty, was the key variable in the British decision to
subordinate their significant atomic research efforts to those
of the Americans in the "Manhattan Project." [Ref. 5: p. 1]
British post-war efforts to acquire their own nuclear weapons
were:
determined by the assumption that a major power had
little choice but to develop the most modern weapons
available, and by the irritating fact the Americans
ended the post-war partnership in atomic research
somewhat abruptly. Aggrieved that the United States
was not willing to reward Britain's wartime selflessness
in assisting the American programme, it was felt that
the only option was to go it alone and become a self-
sufficient nuclear power. [Ref. 5: p. 1]
If British defense policy has not been particularly well
elucidated in the post-war era, there have, at least, been
several consistent strains of action which serve to sketch
a rough outline of what those policies have been. Dan Smith
enumerates these constants in the following manner:
- military withdrawal from the Empire.
- the commitment to NATO which over the years has become
its present, central and defining role.
- the search for, then acquisition and possession of a
major nuclear force. [Ref. 29: p. 65]
The withdrawal from empire has been partly a function
of economics. Britain, as a medium power, simply no longer
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had the wherewithal to support her traditional leadership role
in the world. In fact, this retrenchment was not simply
limited to the empire, it has permeated British defense policy
for the past thirty years. Smith calls it "a record of
constant chops and changes, a hodge-podge of adjustments made
here, promised there, and later countermanded everywhere, a
long-range planner's nightmare." [Ref. 29: p. 65] He sees
it as an invisible, but constant fourth factor affecting
British defense strategy, because the "chops and changes
themselves have become a constant theme" and are acquiring
an inertia of their own. [Ref. 29: p. 67]
The "unprecedented participation" by the British "in long-
term Western European defense arrangements" in the post-war
era is a recognition that the serious military threat posed
by the Soviet bloc nations of Eastern Europe could only be
adequately met by a truly functional system of collective
security. [Ref. 19: p. 75] No longer was Britain alone able
to provide the key weight of force needed to keep the European
balance of power stable and favorable to Britain. The bi-
polarity of the Cold War made the maintenance of large
British armies on the continent a necessary part of NATO
strategy, and drew heavily upon the increasingly scarce
conventional assets available to accomplish the task.
If the gradual withdrawal and concentration of British
conventional forces in the central European theater has been
a constant feature of current British strategy, the
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acquisition and deployment of an operational strategic nuclear
deterrent force has been the principal theme, pursued
aggressively and on an absolute priority basis. David Yost
points out:
a slowly increasing tendency to rely on deterrence of
Soviet military action by the threat of strategic nuclear
retaliation. . .has been in the background of all British
strategic planning since the early fifties, and the
object of policy adjustments has been to provide the
means to enhance or restore the credibility of this
threat and the stability of Soviet-American mutual
deterrence. [Ref. 19: pp. 75-76]
In March 1981, Robin Ranger cited the traditional reasons
given for the British development of an atomic capability
after World War II as follows:
- in the military-political setting existing between
1940 and 1952, it was inconceivable not to develop
them.
- doubt existed in 19 45, as to whether the United States
would commit herself to the defense of Western Europe.
- the assumed slow growth of the U.S. nuclear arsenal
meant that the British would have to have their own
weapons to hit their own priority targets, such as
submarine pens. [Ref. 7: p. 5]
Peter Nailor outlines his judgement of Britain's (and France's)
initial nuclear rationales in this way:
- a determination, in the earliest post-war periods, not
to acquiesce in the abandonment of a capability v/hich
they had helped to pioneer.
- a precaution against radical change in the diplomatic
alignments between East and West.
- a demonstration of their distinctive attributes as
major powers, at a time when other attributes, like
colonial possessions, were being cut away.
[Ref. 30: p. 7]
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Nailor underscores the lack of British declaratory policy
when he notes "by comparison with the United States and French
official explanations and legislative discussions, the material
about the objectives of the (British) policy, rather than the
capability to execute it, is thin." [Ref. 30: p. 3] He does,
however, reiterate the reasons the British commonly espouse
for being in the nuclear race at all. They were among the
first to have a serious development program and there was a
general consensus that a British bomb would make a real
contribution to the strength of the Western alliance while
the U.S. arsenal was being built. Not only would uniquely
British targets be accommodated, but there would be a joint
burden- sharing along the lines developed during wartime
cooperation. The British force would thus "embody a specific
military utility and a wider political utility, both within
the alliance and vis-a-vis the major adversary." [Ref. 30:
p. 3] Lawrence Freedman discusses this aspect in the
following manner:
The assumption of the mid- 19 40s, that the construction
of large, reliable and impressive stockpiles of nuclear
weapons ivould be a slow and tortuous development had
proved to be false. By 19 52 (the year of Britain's
first A-bomb test) , the United States was accumulating
an imposing arsenal and was rapidly developing the
relevant technology in all directions. [Ref. 5: p. 2]
Freedman goes on to chronicle the rapid progression of the
United States and the Soviet Union from atomic fission to
thermonuclear fusion and notes subtly that "Britain's capacity
to continue to play a major world role was coming to be doubted."
[Ref. 5: p. 2]
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In spite of these systemic changes in the acknowledged
world order, a crucial point that dominated British strategic
planning was the highest priority which successive British
governments of both major parties have given to the acquisition
and maintenance of a strategic nuclear deterrent force. Dan
Smith emphasizes in "contrast to the general tangle, the
constancy with which the nuclear weapon dimension. . .has been
pursued." He goes on to say that "there must be something
special about the possession of a major nuclear force for it
to have survived. .. through all the chops and changes, against
all the pressures which have made themselves felt elsewhere
in the military budget and force structure." [Ref. 29: p. 57]
Robin Ranger points out that actual force expenditures confirm
the top priority assigned to the strategic nuclear deterrent.
He notes that "the British have spent very significant
resources, given their poor economic performance, on making
their nuclear force as effective as possible. .
.
(these)
expenditures suggest an absolute priority for the British
nuclear force." [Ref. 7: p. 7]
Dan Smith goes further in alluding to a point which pre-
viously surfaced in a discussion of the Polaris replacement
question, when he asks whether
this 'something very special' may simply be the durability
of the theme: after years in which all else has been in
question apart from the fundamental commitment to NATO,
there must be a great temptation simply to hang on to
whatever clear strands have emerged. After all these
years of successfully protecting nuclear weapons
capability against all-comers, why question it now?
[Ref. 29: p. 67]
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Peter Nailor illuminates a basic tenet of this replacement
debate when he once again underscores the differences between
acquiring a new capability and continuing an already existing
one. His consideration of the reality of strategy and politics
is correct when he "highlights the fact that specific and
positive reasons will have to advance in order to justifiy
discarding it." [Ref. 30: p. 7]
The British government's explicit decision to proceed
independently in the manufacture of atomic weapons was not
made until January, 19 47 under a special six-man committee
chaired by Prime Minister Attlee. This decision was announced
with a minimum of fanfare during a parliamentary debate in
May 1948. [Ref. 40: pp. 182-185, 212] Lawrence Freedman
reminds us that "this decision was taken at a time of great
uncertainty over the shape of world politics." [Ref. 5: p. 1]
In the time intervening between this decision and the
actual first successful British bomb test in the Monte Bello
islands in October, 19 52, the international scene had become
much clearer. The Soviet Union was established as the explicit
threat in 19 4 8 following the Soviet- inspired coups in Rumania
and Czechoslova-ia. The Brussels Treaty or Western European
Union for collective self-defense had been signed in March
1948 and had preceded the Soviet Berlin blockade by a scant
several months. Great Britain had joined the United States
and the other Western European nations as formal allies with
the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 19 49.
[Ref. 19: pp. 78-80]
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David Yost has established three particular phases of
British defense strategy in the wake of the Second World War.
The first, conducted by the Attlee government between 19 45
and 19 51, was characterized by an extensive military demobi-
lization program and a great hope in the collective security
potential of the United Nations. [Ref. 19: p. 162]
The recurrent theme, for Britain at least, was a return
to normal peacetime conditions. War in general, and speci-
fically with the Soviet Union, was certainly not seen as
inevitable or unavoidable and if it were to occur, "it was
assumed that it would be much like World War II— a struggle
lasting for years between huge armies and navies. American
and Soviet nuclear weapons were thought too few to be decisive."
[Ref. 19: p. 162]
The single event that significantly shaped British defense
policy in the early 1950s and heralded the end of this initial
phase of post-war strategic planning was the invasion of South
Korea in June 19 50. Although there had been a creeping
cynicism and mistrust of the Soviets since 19 48, the Korean
"police action" was viewed by the British as a prelude to war
in Europe. It spurred extensive rearmament programs begun
under Attlee and pursued by his successor, Winston Churchill,
to train reserves, build thousands of tanks, ships and planes
and amass the stocks of food and raw materials that would be




The implication to be drawn from the British participation
in and commitment of significant material and personnel
resources to the United Nations effort on the Korean peninsula
was the premise that this would obligate the United States to
the defense of Europe, should the need arise. [Ref. 19: p. 81]
Under the Attlee government, however, there remained a basically
anti-nuclear bias, despite its decision in 19 47 to proceed
with the development of its own atomic weapons. Prime Minister
Attlee' s long, consultative visit to the United States in the
fall of 19 50 "apparently was motivated by concern about the
(Korean) war's widening to Europe and... by anxiety about the
American use of nuclear weapons in Korea." [Ref. 19: p. 81]
Prime Minister Attlee apparently perceived a dilemma in
his ultimate goal of wanting "a Western world strong enough
to resist aggression, and therefore to prevent aggression
and to preserve the peace," The problem that presented itself
was that "the United States would use British bases to strike
the Soviet Union and thereby open Britain to nuclear retaliation,
At the same time, Attlee did not wish to weaken the assumed
probability of this American retaliation." [Ref. 19: p. 82]
When Churchill returned as Prime Minister in October, 19 51,
he was even more preoccupied than Attlee had been with the
imminence of war and of the conventional dangers posed by the
Soviet Union. He had after all delivered his famous "Iron
Curtain" speech in March, 19 46 and his resolve had not
weakened when in his 19 52 Statement on Defence he indicated
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that Britain "should suggest to the mind of a potential para-
trooper the back of a hedgehog rather than the paunch of a
rabbit." [Ref. 19: p. 84]
During this second major phase of post-war British strategic
thinking, two major concepts seemed to dominate defense planning.
The first of these was what might be termed "broken-backed
warfare." Succinctly described, this conceived of initial,
almost decisive nuclear strikes in the first month or even
week, after which "it would be a broken-back war in which no
great armies could be moved over long distances." The battle
to victory would be fought by troops rapidly mobilized behind
the front lines in Germany. [Ref. 19: p. 85]
Accompanying this "broken-backed" concept was what can
properly be identified as the British "New Look." The
realization that their conventional "rearmament would have to
be spread over a longer period and held to a lower peak," in
order to pursue the twin objectives of "financial solvency
and military security." [Ref. 19: p. 84] This concept
closely paralleled that of the American defense "New Look"
being advocated by President Eisenhower and was an acknowledge-
ment that what was anticipated was a "long cold war against
communist subversion" and what was required was "not a violent
jerk, but a prolonged pull" against this serious and potentially
crippling threat. [Ref. 19: p. 34]
Beginning about 19 52, Yost catalogs a fundamental but
almost imDerceotible shift in Churchill's views on defense
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strategy taking place, with a greatly increased emphasis on
the use of nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression. This
change closely parallels the shift that was occurring during
the sane period in U.S. defense planning and for generally
similar reasons. Although it would be several more years
before this change in British policy became well-defined, the
increased reliance it placed on nuclear weapons beginning in
the early 1950s represented a basic transformation of British
national defense policy which even in contemporary terms
remains essentially unchanged. [Ref. 19: pp. 83-94]
Lawrence Freedman notes that "with a change to a Conservative
Government in 19 51 the nuclear aversion in British defence
policy became transformed into a nuclear bias... very much
favoured by the Prime Minister Winston Churchill." He goes
on to note that Churchill's principal motives seem to have
been "the strides that had been taken in the development and
production of nuclear weapons in the United States since 19 45"
and the fact that "Britain was still incurring a heavy
financial burden in building up its conventional forces."
[Ref. 5: p. 3]
Three central themes were factors in the Prime Minister's
gradual but certain shift in policy that constituted the third
and most important phase of British post-World War II military
strategy. First, he perceived a change in the nature of the
threat and an increased possibility of accommodation following
the death of Stalin. Secondly, he viewed the advent of
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thermonuclear weapons, as contrasted to fission bombs, as •
portending a lasting qualitative as well as quantitative
change in the nature of war. Lastly, the Prime Minister drew
what he believed to be the inescapable conclusion that for
Britain what would be required then and in the future was a
policy of "peace through strength" with avenues of possible
accommodation being explored through expanded channels of
communication. [Ref. 19: pp. 85-86]
Probably the single factor which most impressed Prime
Minister Churchill and became the focal pivot for his change
in direction was the immense destructiveness associated with
theiTnonuclear weapons. Although the subject had previously
been referred to, the British government apparently "did not
take much notice of the hydrogen bomb's development until the
American tests had taken place." [Ref. 19: p. 86] Dan Smith
has examined the argument that nuclear weapons were only but
one aspect along a continuum of force in this respect and he
concluded:
Elegant though these arguments may be presented, they
disguise problems rather than confront or solve them. .
.
the immensity of destruction which would be possible
in a nuclear war, on a scale which has wide reach both
geographically and temporally. . . (indicates) at some
point along the continuum of force quantitative change
becomes qualitative. [Ref. 29: p. 74]
The 1955 White Paper on Defence, authored by the Churchill
government, reports that "overshadowing all else in the year
1954 has been the emergence of the thermo - nuclear bomb,"
which had "significantly reduced the risk of war on a major
scale." [Ref. 19: p. 87]
53

David Yost outlines Churchill's keystone to the entire
concept of "peace through strength" as to the commitment of
the United States strategic nuclear weapons to retaliation
against Soviet aggression. [Ref. 19: p. 88] The Prime
Minister originally envisioned a three-fold program to support
this fundamental policy change, consisting of increased civil
defense preparedness, a significant British strategic thermo-
nuclear capability and the acquisition of tactical nuclear
weapons for use on the continent with a resulting reduction
in manpower and increase in local firepower. What these
would provide would be the time to bargain for a political
settlement on the brink of nuclear war - a concept today
closely resembling that of "crisis management." [Ref. 19:
p. 90]
Probably the single most vocal advocate during this period
for a shift to nuclear weapons as the principal deterrent to
Soviet aggression was Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John
Slessor. In his book, the Great Deterrent, he argued that
nuclear weapons completely revolutionized warfare, making the
methods of World War II obsolete. The immense destructiveness
of high-yield thermonuclear weapons has minimized the
possibility that anyone will ever again resort to major war
as an instrument of policy and their possession is a major
guarantor of peace. [Ref. 41: pp. 262-265]
A Global Strategy Paper produced in 19 52 by the British
Chiefs of Staff argued that "much more reliance should be
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placed on nuclear threats in containing the expansion of
Soviet power." [Ref. 5: p. 3] This recommendation, however,
contained a number of assumptions as follows:
- the destructive power of nuclear weapons was so great
that no nation would dare provoke a war in which there
was the slightest risk of it becoming the victim of
them.
- there was no real defense against nuclear weapons.
- although significant resources would have to be devoted
to developing a "credible" nuclear capability, it would
be far less than that required to match the vast
conventional forces at the disposal of the Kremlin.
[Ref. 5: p. 3]
David Yost's analysis of the assumptions behind the
increasingly nuclear bend of British military strategy in
the 1950s, attempts to combine the political hopes as well as
the military realities of the period. He sees Churchill's
government perceiving first:
that the Soviet threat is not directly military as much
as it is political and ideological, and that the Soviets
may in time change their views to ones more favorable
to the survival of Western values. The second and
related assumption is that outright Soviet attack can
be deterred indefinitely by the threat of strategic
nuclear retaliation, even (or particularly) in conditions
of mutual assured destruction. [Ref. 19: pp. 164-165]
Yost summarizes the British strategic thinking in this
manner: "the threat of war is minimal. Only a Soviet mis-
calculation could result in an attack at any level. If the
attack were small, conventional forces could readily contain
it. If the attack were too great to be contained by con-
ventional forces, crisis management would be attempted
—
bargaining under threat of escalation to strategic nuclear
war." [Ref. 19: p. 164]
55

The United States, British and NATO strategies in the
19 50s all shifted toward reliance on nuclear weapons as the
principal deterrent to Soviet aggression. Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles called it "massive retaliation," which was
something of a misnomer. The 19 57 British Defence White
Paper, as presented by Minister of Defence Duncan Sandys'
emphasized the "commitment to nuclear weapons as the most
effective deterrent to war and means of waging it, should it
occur." This, he said, meant "large conventional forces were
no longer required. .
.
(and) allowed for the termination of
national service and a cut in the defence budget." [Ref. 5:
p. 4] In 19 58, Sandys went even further in declaring that
the West now had little choice, but to rely on nuclear deterrence.
He said:
...it must be understood that if Russia were to launch
a major attack on (the Western powers) even with con-
ventional forces only, they would have to hit back with
strategic nuclear weapons. In fact, the strategy of
NATO is based on the frank recognition that full-scale
Soviet attack could not be repelled without resort to
a massive nuclear bombardment of the sources of power
in Russia. [Ref. 5: p. 4]
Although the theory of strategic deterrence and nuclear
warfare as conceived by the United States has undergone a
series of permutations since Eisenhower's "New Look," the
same theories and concepts have remained relatively unchanged
through a number of British governments down to the present
day. The three Conservative governments in power between
19 55 and 19 6 4 shaped the definitive policy as conceived by
Winston Churchill. The Labour victory in 1964 resulted in
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minor touches to the strategy but no radical revisions or
departures as many had expected.
Michael Howard, a contemporary commentator on defense
affairs, has reported what he terms Healey's Theorem, named
after the Labour Secretary of State for Defence in this
government. It states the strategic deterrent effect of even
an uncertain nuclear threat such as Britain's: "if there is
one chance in a hundred of nuclear weapons being used, the
odds would be enough to deter an aggressor even if they were
not enough to reassure an ally." [Ref. 42: p. 262] The only
substantive change made during this Labour regime was the
cancellation of the planned fifth Polaris SS3N for supposed
reasons of economy. Though this had a significant material
and operational impact, it in no way altered the fundamental
strategic concept on which the force was established.
Since 19 70, both Conservative and Labour governments have
continued what David Yost calls the "Establishment Doctrine."
[Ref. 19: p. 141] The fundamental concepts of strategic
nuclear deterrence while seeking accommodation were not
changed at all. The concept of preventing war by threat of
nuclear punishment became deeply embeded in the British stra-
tegic heritage. The idea of fielding a war-fighting capability
that is, preparing to win or even survive a thermonuclear
conflict - was rejected as passe and even absurd. The plans
formulated under Denis Healey to meet minor threats with
conventional weapons and major ones with crisis management
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were formal rather than substantive policy shifts. [Ref. 19:
p. 141] Denial strategies have been accepted only to the
extent that they deny the Soviets an easy victory. Adoption
of a larger denial strategy "would entail a shift away from
the keystone of British defense policy which has been deter-
rence through the retaliatory threat of nuclear punishment."
[Ref. 19: p. 165]
Yost summarizes as follows: "except for equipment changes
and budget cuts, the policy has remained in its essence as
Churchill described it... the changes in policy since which
have received the most attention are comparatively superficial,
the acquisition of Polaris submarines, for example, was simply
a change in equipment." [Ref. 19: pp. 164-165] The British
"theme has been movement away from the expectations of a
conflict similar to World War II toward consolidation of
confidence in NATO policies calling for forces capable only
of crisis management," [Ref. 19: p. 166]
Having discerned from the ambiguous declaratory informa-
tion available, what the implied British strategic nuclear
policy has been since the mid-1950s, it is possible to
examine how they have consistently and rigorously tailored
their limited resources to insure support for these NATO and
Western strategies and insure the protection of their own
ultimate national sovereignty. Lawrence Freedman points out
that "it never seriously occurred to responsible British
politicians and officials that any special rationale was
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needed to justify staying in the (nuclear) business." He
goes on to say that "if the West was going to reiy on the
deterrent effect of nuclear power, then it seemed only proper
that a country of Britain's status should participate fully
in the construction and implementation of that strategy."
[Ref. 5: p. 5]
Freedman quotes the then British Minister of Defence,
Harold Macmillan, arguing in 19 55 against the "dangerous
doctrine" of relying solely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent to
the exclusion of the British contribution:
Politically it surrenders our power to influence American
policy and then, strategically and tactically it equally
deprives us of any influence over the selection of targets
and the use of our vital striking forces. The one,
therefore weakens our prestige and our influence in the
world, and the other might imperil our safety. [Ref.
[Ref. 5: p. 5]
In 19 58, Duncan Sandys made clear the proposition that
although it did not compare in total size to the U.S. force,
"when fully equipped with megaton weapons, the British bomber
force will in itself constitute a formidable deterrent."
[Ref. 5: p. 4]
There was a fear in the early years cf the Cold War that,
if Britain became excessively dependent on the United States'
strategic deterrent, she would be left dangerously exposed
if there was a dramatic change towards a modern version of
American isolationism. [Ref. 5: p. 4] Robin Ranger goes
much further in this area in describing what he feels has
been the British central concern since 1945:
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the ultimate, irreducible, uncertainty as to the
validity of the U.S. nuclear guarantee, especially
after the passing of the World War II political
leadership in both countries. The British know that
political change in the U.S. could combine with a
failure to maintain her military forces to produce
the danger of an American failure to safeguard their
interests if the Soviets invaded Western Europe.
The British must therefore be able to compel them
to— as they put it— live up to their best instincts.
The British are also acutely aware, from experience,
that in real crises, self-preservation tends to win
out. .. the argument is neo-Gauilist but it has none
of the anti-Americanism of de Gaulle; it is a
recognition of the way things are in politics between
states, and of the extraordinary reversals possible.
[Ref. 7: p. 6]
This accords with Denis Healey's 1959 comments on the impli-
cation of the "independent deterrent" aspect of the British
nuclear weapons program when he said that "there is little
doubt that the main aim of the British thermo-nuclear striking
force is to provide passive deterrence for Britain in case
America drops her present policy of active deterrence for
NATO as a whole." [Ref. 43: p. 225]
Lawrence Freedman follows up these basic rationales with
the conclusion that "the British... in the 1950s were aiming
for an "independent" nuclear deterrent only in the sense of
national control over its use. There was no pretence that
there was to be complete self-sufficiency in its development."
[Ref. 5: p. 7] If this was true in the 1950s, it is
certainly so today when considerably more interdependence
exists between the United States and Britain in the area of
nuclear weapons research and delivery vehicle production.
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what we can conclude is that the main purpose of any
British strategic nuclear deterrent is to prevent Soviet
aggression by threat of retaliatory strikes, either in
combination with the Western alliance or as a weapon of last
resort in the protection of Britain's national sovereignty.
Peter Nailor is fairly emphatic in this vein when he comments
that "thermo-nuclear weapons made small deterrent forces
inherently more capable of dealing a politically significant
blow to an adversary." [Ref. 30: p. 4]
Nailor goes further in saying that this fact has allowed
Britain to maintain her nuclear capability "pretty much at
the level conceived" even though the United States and the
Soviet Union have developed much larger and more diversified
arsenals. This has allowed them to keep "the cost of main-
taining a strategic nuclear capability .. .within reasonable
limits, in scientific and production terms, as well as in
money costs." [Ref. 30: p. 4] As medium powers, both
Britain and subsequently France have concluded that the
nuclear "capability needed to maintain a policy of mutual
deterrence that is credible to an adversary is relatively
small." [Ref. 30: p. 4]
Even though ^7ailor finds that "the British programme
has been developed and sustained against a background of
political ambiguity," something of a "British pattern" has
emerged that assumes "that a relatively small armoury was
sufficient to achieve national objectives." [Ref. 30: p. 4]
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This doctrine of nuclear sufficiency or proportionality seems
to accord with the British concept of a more conservative
analysis of their deterrence requirements than the Americans
who have as their objective, the crippling of Soviet industrial-
military power. Nailor suggests the British have an attitude
of "what they can afford will do," and explains their national
objective in this sort of syllogism:
If you ever attack us, we have the capacity to punish
you, even after the event, by destroying many of your
cities, and consequently part of your industry and
population. This would not only be a grievous blow
in itself, but would materially weaken your capacity
to successfully withstand an attack from the United
States which, for the purposes of this argument, you
would have to assume to be a separate actor.
[Ref. 30: p. 4]
Neveille Trotter, in a memorandum submitted to Parliament
in March 19 79, puts things in perspective when he says: "it
cannot be too strongly emphasized that the main targets for
the deterrent are the minds of the potential opponents and
not their military bases or cities. If we have to use the
deterrent, then we have lost. While we cannot win a nuclear
war, we must be in a position to cause our potential opponents
great harm so that they are not prepared to take the risk of
starting a nuclear engagement with an attack on this country."
[Ref. 26: p. 119] In underscoring the need for a Polaris
replacement program, he goes on to address the contemporary
situation in this manner:
In earlier years the Americans had such a superiority in
the strategic nuclear field as to make a nuclear attack
by the Soviet Union unthinkable. With the Soviets now
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in a position of equality, however, it seems much less
likely that a U.S. President would be prepared to
commit his country to the horrors of major nuclear
attack if Britain rather than America was the subject
of an initial nuclear assault. We must therefore
continue to possess our own capability for nuclear
retaliation. [Ref. 26: p. 119]
In establishing the rationale behind any decision to
continue in some fornm, the British strategic nuclear deter-
rent beyond the service-life of the present Polaris submarines,
one must consider the reasons for abandoning this capability
altogether. Peter Nailor adduces that there have been three
major lines of argument offered for opting out of the nuclear
arena, all of which overlap, but do not easily integrate.
The first of these is that possession of nuclear weapons
themselves is not only morally and ethically wrong, but makes
Britain more vulnerable to nuclear attack than she would be if
she did not possess them; secondly, the time is past when
Britain's power and interests required a strategic nuclear
capability in support, or as a manifestation of the role that
she should seek to play in the Atlantic Alliance; and lastly
is the utilitarian concept that, given her restricted
resources, Britain would do better to employ the monies and
skills she has to enhance her conventional forces, rather
than to divert them to maintain a marginal increment to the
nuclear strength of the United States. [Ref. 30: pp. 2-3]
Dan Smith raises many of the philosophical concerns of
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) movement when he
says that "it is unlikely that the basic moral and ethical
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issues surrounding nuclear weapons will be given a prominent
place in the debate about the replacement of the Polaris...
yet it ought to be clear that possession of, use and
threatened use of nuclear weapons raise profound moral and
ethical questions." [Ref. 29: p. 71]
He goes on to indicate only two practicable solutions to
this question. The first is that "there is an end of the
matter; here is a moral imperative and it must predominate."
Nuclear weapons must be given up. His alternative argument
is that "the world is more complex than that and that there
may be other grounds with different reference points, but
ones which are also important, which mean that Britain must
have nuclear weapons. If these other grounds, political and
strategic, over-ride the moral imperative, then one has a
moral dilemma, with which one lives." [Ref. 29: p. 72] Smith
then suggests that "if there is a case for Britain extending
or replacing the Polaris force, it must be based on clear
political and strategic priorities, of enough clarity and
weight to over-ride the moral considerations." [Ref. 29: p.
72] He personally does not see them existing.
In considering the status which is supposed to accrue
with the possession of nuclear weapons, Ian Smart points out
that there does not "seem to be much rational force left in
the argument that a nuclear deterrent enhances Britain's
general international status, quite apart from the danger
that such an argument, if pressed, may tend to offer a general
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license for nuclear proliferation." [Ref. 4: p. 5] Lawrence
Freedman goes further when he says:
whether or not nuclear weapons may be necessary for
great power status, they are certainly not sufficient.
Britain has managed to combine its nuclear status with
a general decline in its international position. In
the various crises and conflicts of the past years, a
British nuclear force has been barely relevant. .. for
the moment it brings no diplomatic advantage.
[Ref. 5: pp. 139-140]
Whereas previously, being a nuclear power was thought to
guarantee a say in important international decisions, Freedman
now points out, "with no surplus (weapons) for negotiations,
Britian is attempting to stay out of SALT (Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks) rather than participate."
One of the additional implications of British possession,
procurement and potential use of nuclear weapons is the effect
it has on other states in terms of nuclear weapons prolifera-
tion. Critics such as Dan Smith suggest that, if Great
Britain were to renounce her nuclear weapons program, she
would "set an example for the rest of the world that. . .would
provide effective moral leadership." [Ref. 29: p. 86]
Jonathan Alford comments on this argument as regards threshold
(those with or close to having the ability to produce nuclear
weapons) nations:
there are no grounds for believing that a British example
would affect the decision of a threshold state one way
or the other - there will be far more compelling reasons
for a state to decide for or against embarking on a
nuclear weapons programme. Britain's example would be
applauded by the converted and ignored by the determined. .
.
in any case it is impossible to unlearn what was once
well known. [Ref. 30: p. 35]
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One of the peculiar political problems in this regard
associated with the potential selection of the Trident
missile system by Britain as a replacement for its Polaris
force is the fact that it constitutes, as Robin Ranger puts
it, "a massive jump in British nuclear capabilities, to those
needed for LNO (limited nuclear option) , and so offers a new
spectrum of influence on U.S. targetting and release policies."
[Ref. 7: p. 8] This "vertical" nuclear proliferation will
most likely undermine any serious attempts the British might
make to influence the nuclear decision-making process of any
potential threshold state.
While it is true that abandoning, relinquishing or failing
to modernize her strategic nuclear deterrent force might save
Britain significant military procurement and operating funds,
this does not mean that this money would necessarily be
redirected to improve the combat readiness of Britain's con-
ventional forces. These are the very forces which have been
the principal focus of all the "chops and changes" that Dan
Smith has described as one of the implicit constants in
post-World War II British military planning. Because they
are not "special" in the sense that nuclear weapons are, there
is no guarantee that the conventional arms of the various
services would receive any additional funding or consideration
in the normal pushing and tugging that constitutes national
politics. This could be particularly true if a change of
government brought to power a party much more concerned with
social reform than with national security.
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There are several additional aspects of the rationale
behind the British nuclear force which Peter Nailor addresses
and which are worthy of note:
the possession of nuclear weapons may be of particular
importance relative to the perceptions of the
superpowers. Both the United States and the Soviet
Union self-evidently place great emphasis on nuclear
weapons. For a nuclear state to renounce possession
might affect superpower perspectives more sharply
than those of the rest of the world community.
[Ref. 30: p. 9]
He talks of the "sense of special danger" which has been an
important element in the development of mutual deterrence,
which he further describes as "both a situation and a policy."
[Ref. 30: p. 9]
Nailor goes on to emphasize the fact that the British
Polaris strategic nuclear deterrent force is a political
animal, all the technical discussions aside. Cost will be
an important factor, but as he points out, "finding the
money is a problem, but wanting to find the money is at
least as important." [Ref. 30: p. 13] "The deterrent," as
he sees it, "is a political phenomenon, as deterrence is a
political value, and to that extent it must be judged by
political criteria as much as cost or opportunity cost."
[Ref. 30: p. 13]
Nailor concludes that for Britain "the future is no less
dangerous or uncertain, than it was when she originally
acquired a nuclear capability, and having shown persistence
in maintaining it, there are no major political reasons for
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her to renounce it." [Ref. 30 p. 13] Nailor's colleague,
Jonathan Alford, reaches much the same answer in arguing for
Britain to maintain her capability for strategic nuclear
deterrence against the Soviet Union. He comments:
If there ever was a case for giving up this capability,
it has been seriously weakened by two developments:
the new emphasis in Soviet military programmes on
weapons systems which cover targets in Western Europe
including Britain; and a general trend towards nuclear
proliferation, which a decision to opt out of the
nuclear game will not arrest. [Ref. 30: p. 36]
Having examined many of the arguments advanced about the
maintenance of the British strategic nuclear deterrent force,
we must look to official pronouncements to see if we can
discern anything further about the government's declaratory
policy.
On 24 January 1980, Francis Pym, then Secretary of State
for Defence, delivered a major speech to the House of Commons
on the "Role of Nuclear Weapons in Britain's Defence." In
this presentation, he reminded members of the House that,
horrendous though nuclear weapons are, "the fact of their
existence is built into the entire structure of security and
deterrent balance between East and West" and that this regime
has made a "crucial contribution to keeping the peace in the
NATO area for half a lifetime. And it has kept the peace,
not just nuclear peace." Pym goes on to consider the Soviet
threat in this manner: "a potential adversary who has built
up and is continuing to build up a vast - and offensively
structured - apparatus of military power at all levels and
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in all fields." He emphasizes that "its possible use against
the West has to be inhibited. . .by deterrence: that is by
fear." [Ref. 44: p. 676]
With all British nuclear forces, both theater and strategic,
fully committed to NATO command authority. Secretary Pym
reiterates its basic position when he states that what "NATO
seeks to do is to work upon the minds of the Soviet leaders.
Deterrence is primarily about what the other side thinks, not
what we may think." He goes on to indicate that "they (the
Soviet leadership) do not think in terms of restraint or
defensive strategies or minimum force" and that the job of
NATO deterrence is to convince these men that "the alliance
will always have within its reach effective options for
retaliation rather than accepting defeat." [Ref. 44: p. 677]
Speaking to the direct British contribution to NATO
nuclear deterrence. Secretary Pym underscores the point that
all the systems owned or fielded by the British and in their
exclusive operational control, "are fully committed to the
alliance and its deterrent strategy ... and conform to the
concepts worked out in the highly successful joint forum of
the Nuclear Planning Group." [Ref. 44: p. 677] Pym then
considers and rejects a number of the themes which over the
years have been argued as a justification for the British
nuclear capability, including political prestige; status in
the alliance or in comparison to France; and the concept of
Fortress Britain, i.e., an insurance policy against the
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return to isolationism of the United States. The Secretary
of State for Defence stresses "what is for me, and for this
government, the main point - the decisive consideration. We
think that Britain needs to be a nuclear power primarily
because of what this contributes to NATO's strategy of deter-
rence and, through that, to our own national security."
[Ref. 44: p. 678]
At this point in his speech to the House, Secretary Pym
provided what Lawrence Freedman calls "the most complete
statement of the theory of twin decision-centres" that is the
heart of current British declaratory policy on its nuclear
strategic deterrent force. [Ref. 5: p. 128] Freedman points
out that it is worth quoting at length as follows:
Our strategy seeks to influence Soviet calculations
fundamentally and decisively. It seeks to guard
against any risk of Soviet miscalculation. The United
States, by their words and deeds, have constantly made
clear its total commitment to come to the aid of Europe,
and to help defend Europe by whatever means are necessary,
without exception. No words or deeds in advance could
make that more crystal clear. But we are dealing with
possible situations that would be without precedent in
history, and of unique peril.
The decision to take any nuclear action, at any
time, would be vastly hard for any President of the
United States to take. In recent years I think it has
become even harder, if that is imaginable, because of
the fact of super-power nuclear parity. The British
government have the greatest confidence in the weight
and reality of the United States commitment. We cast
no shade of doubt upon it. What matters most is not
what we think, but what the Russians think...
The Russians cannot be assumed to look at the world
as we do... In a crisis, Soviet leaders - perhaps beset
by some pressures of tuinnoil in the Soviet empire,
perhaps looking out upon a NATO Alliance passing
through some temporary phase of internal difficulty -
might conceivably misread American resolution. They
might be tempted to gamble on United States hesitation.
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The nuclear decision, whether as a matter of
retaliatory response or in another circumstance, would,
of course, be no less agonizing for the United Kingdom
than for the United States. But it would be a decision
of a separate and independent power, and a power whose
survival in freedom might be more directly and closely
threatened by aggression in Europe than that of the
United States. This is where the fact of having two
decision-makers instead of one is of such significance.
Soviet leaders would have to assess that there was
a greater chance of one of them using its nuclear
capability than if there were a single decision-maker
across the Atlantic. The risk to the Soviet Union
would be inescapably higher and less calculable. This
is just another way of saying that deterrence of the
Alliance as a whole would be the stronger, the more
credible and therefore the more effective.
[Ref. 44: pp. 678-679]
Francis Pym's Labour predecessor as Secretary of State
for Defence, Fred Mulley, made the same point when he told a
Parliamentary Committee: " (the deterrent) provides a second
centre of nuclear decision-making within the Alliance, This
would complicate the calculations of a possible aggressor...
our allies welcome a situation in which the United States is
not expected to bear the entire burden of nuclear decision-
making." [Ref. 26: p. 6] Even before his speech to the
House, Secretary Pym had endorsed the twin decision-centre
theory. Addressing his party conference, he said: "our own
deterrent will enable the United States, whose contribution
is, of course ,... crucial, to share the burden of nuclear
decision-making. .. it will powerfully increase the uncertainty
in Soviet planning." [Ref. 45]
The origins of the twin decision-centre theory are not
clearly known but they were revealed in a Ministry of Defence
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document in 1974 which stated that the Polaris force: "gives
NATO a separate centre of decision-making in Europe which the
Soviets must take into account; it increases the credibility
of the overall NATO deterrent; and it provides an element
of insurance, and reassurance to our European allies, against
any weakening of the United States nuclear guarantee."
[Ref. 46: para 32] The 19 7 5 NATO Ottawa communique expressed
a similar sentiment.
Lawrence Freedman believes the attraction of the British
twin decision-making center argument lies as much in its
political utility as in the rigor of its strategic logic.
It allows Britain to maintain an independent force, while
claiming that it does so for the greater good of the alliance;
it covers doubts about the validity of the American guarantee,
but it does so implicitly; and it doesn't make nuclear
retaliation a certainty, only that it is no certainty that
retaliation will be withheld. He puts it in the form of a
simple syllogism: "uncertainty improves deterrence; the
outcomes of two sets of decisions are more uncertain than
one; therefore a condition involving two sets of decisions
improves deterrence." [Ref. 5: pp. 129-130]
I have already outlined Robin Ranger's basic rationale
for the British strategic nuclear deterrent force, namely
doubt about the validity of the U.S. nuclear guarantee in a
crisis situation reflecting the realities of current world
politics and self-preservation. Ranger goes further in
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considering the thesis that "Britain's minimuin deterrent has
to destroy enough Soviet cities, and people, to deter a Soviet
attack on Britain, even if the Soviets (wrongly) thought that
the U.S. would not retaliate. It is designed to avoid
Soviet misjudgements." His conclusion on this approach is
that "the reason the British can rely on the U.S. is because
Britain can release nuclear weapons on her own... the British
may be prepared to go first release much earlier than the
U.S.. Given that British forces are an integral part of
British society, especially its officer corps, they are likely
to get nuclear support if they are undergoing Soviet attack."
[Ref. 7: p. 8]
Ian Smart, in his generally brief consideration of the
strategic purposes for continuing the British nuclear deter-
rent force, reaches the following conclusion:
My own view is that there is no purpose, for the fore-
seeable future, in contemplating the need for Britain
to deter any power except the Soviet Union by nuclear
means, that it is only the contingency of a Soviet
nuclear threat to British territory. . .which can usefully
be considered, and that the only credible justification
for a British nuclear deterrent must assume that an
effective American nuclear guarantee may not, in some
plausible circumstances, be available. [Ref. 3: p.
561-562]
Smart goes on to say in a later article that "the only
plausible conclusion is that the British Polaris force may
be legitimately regarded, in the first instance, as a small
and inessential "contribution" to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) deterrence, but that, all else failing,
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it is intended, in the "last resort" and by itself, to deter
Soviet attack, and especially nuclear attack, upon the
United Kingdom." [Ref. 36: p. 22]
From the numerous declaratory pronouncements and critical
observations outlined above, the conclusion may be reached
that there are a number of legitimate rationales for the
continued maintenance of the British strategic nuclear
deterrent force. Briefly stated they are:
- the substantive contribution it makes to the credible
deterrent capability of the Atlantic Alliance.
- the second-center of decision-making it provides with
its attendent effect on the minds and calculations of
potential aggressors.
- the ultimate insurance policy it provides to the
national security and sovereignty of Great Britain
at a time of political 'last resort.'
Francis Pym, in announcing the British decision to proceed
with procurement of a Polaris replacement system, stated that
"the long-term issue is not whether to acquire a strategic
nuclear deterrent capability, but whether to give it up in
the 1990s after having possessed it, through the decisions
of both Conservative and Labour Governments, for nearly forty
years." [Ref. 1: para 3] It seems abundantly clear from
official statements, academic debates and informed public
discussions that the strategic rationales offered for main-
taining a credible British strategic nuclear deterrent are
generally accepted and that, barring the intervention of other
dominant factors, the political and public determination
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exists to continue this capability in one form or another.
An editorial in the Sunday Times published in the wake of
the government's decision to proceed with the Polaris
replacement program puts the arguments in focus:
There is no sense in starting from where we are. We
do have a nuclear deterrent. There is a case for
keeping it: it is a military contribution to NATO,
although marginal; it helps to confuse the Russians
by providing a second decision-making centre in the
Western camp; to abandon it now would nourish talk
about splits in Atlantic solidarity; it is a bargaining
counter which can come in useful in future disarmament
discussions with the USSR. These bits and pieces add
up to a respectable total in favour of prolonging the
deterrent. .. it seems wise to retain - economics
permitting - the means to outface threats which could
be far commoner in the next generation than they are
now. [Ref. 47]
C. EQUIPMENT AND flATERIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The strategic deterrent capability of Britain currently
resides in the four ballistic missile submarines of the
Resolution class. These Polaris boats have a surface dis-
placement of 7500 tons, a submerged displacement of 8500
tons, are 425 feet long with a maximum submerged speed of
30 knots and a crew of 14 officers and 130 men. They are
armed with 16 Polaris A-3 ballistic missiles as a strategic
deterrent and six 21-inch torpedo tubes for self-protection.
The SSBNs are fitted with one British NR2 pressurized water
reactor and are equipped with the latest electronic gear
necessary to successfully complete their missions. Each hull
was designed to last 20 years, but in practice can be
reasonably expected to have a 25-year operational life.
[Ref. 4: p. 25]
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The Polaris A-3 missile carried by the British SSBNs is
a 2-stage, solid-fuel ballistic missile which became opera-
tional in the Royal Navy in 1967. It is over 31 feet long,
4.5 feet in diameter, grosses about 35000 lbs and has a throw-
weight of 1000 pounds over a range of 2500 nautical miles.
In its initial Royal Navy service configuration, the Polaris
was fitted with a British-designed warhead section capable of
carrying three (3) separate raanueverable reentry vehicles
(MRV) , each with a 200 kiloton fission- fusion (thermonuclear)
warhead. This 'triplet' reentry program means the individual
warheads are distributed over a single target like a large
footprint, but cannot be directed to more widely separated
targets like those with a MIRV (multiple independently tar-
getted reentry vehicle) capability. [Ref. 4: p. 26] The
missile's front-end was significantly improved by a major
Polaris Improvement Program carried out during the 19 70s.
[Ref. 23]
Chevaline was the eventual codename given to this major
warhead up-date which began in 1969 under the title Antelope.
Its purpose was to insure the continued ability of the Polaris
A-3 missile to penetrate the Soviet anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) defenses around Moscow. For a nation with a nuclear
capability as small as Britain's and which has as a basis
for its deterrent strategy threatening hostile cities and
populations, the ability to attack a potential enemy's capital
is essential. In the case of Russia, Lawrence Freedman says:
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those ruling the Soviet Union value Moscow far above any
other city not only because this is where they reside,
but also because in a society as centralized as that of
the Soviet Union the disruption caused by the loss of
Moscow would far outweigh the loss of any other centre.
[Ref. 5: p. 47]
Faced with the sixty-four missiles of the Galosh ABM
system deployed around Moscow and the tactical limitation of
only being able to deploy at times a single SSBN, the British
threat is severely diminished by the real possibility that
the Soviets could stop or seriously blunt an unsupported
British strategic strike against Moscow. To overcome this
perceived limitation, two approaches were seriously considered.
The first involved purchasing the Poseidon missile with its
12-14 warhead MIRV capability from the United States. The
other was to redesign the Polaris A-3 warhead itself to employ
state-of-the-art technology to increase the probability of
penetration.
The latter course of action was eventually chosen primarily
for political reasons: "it would not require a major - and
public - purchase of (new) missiles from the United States
and would not involve MIRVs," with their attendant problems
of vertical proliferation. [Ref. 5: p. 50]
Chevaline was first officially described by the British
Defense Secretary, Francis Pym, in a speech to the House of
Commons on 24 January, 19 80, as:
a very major and complex development of the missile
front end, involving also changes to the fire control
system. The result will not be a MIRVed system. But
it includes advanced penetration aids and the ability
to manoevre the pay load in space. [Ref. 23]
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The technical details of how Chevaline changed the Polaris
A- 3 warhead remain shrouded in the official secrecy endemic
to British strategic systems. The most commonly mentioned
configuration is that of six warheads of 40kt each, although
three warheads of that yield with additional penetration aids
are as likely a possibility. [Ref. 5: p. 49] The Chevaline
warhead remains a MRV but with a larger 'footprint.' Employing
a maneuvering post-boost bus similar to those used with MIRVed
systems, the Chevaline releases its warheads at the same target.
These then descend toward the target along a spiral path
achieved by either displacing the center of gravity of the
reentry vehicle or by adding gas generators and control
surfaces to it. This manuevering and corkscrew ability is
designed to complicate the task of the limited anti-ballistic
missile defense around Moscovr. [Ref. 27: p. 5] Lawrence
Freedman cites the following as technical details of Chevaline:
1) The ability to change course, angle of reentry
into the atmosphere and the speed of descent so
as to confuse the defence.
2) Early separation before arriving within the
range of defences.
3) Inclusion of penetration decoys in the reentry
package.
4) Hardening of the warhead's electronics against
the effects of close-in nuclear bursts.
These improvements to the Polaris A- 3 are generally believed
to greatly enhance its viability into the 1990s.
[Ref. 5: p. 49]
78

The first British Polaris SSBN, HJIS Resolution, began
her first operational patrol in June 1968, after a 4 year
building and work-up period. [Ref. 4: p. 25] Her sisters
Repulse, Renown and Revenge joined her over the succeeding
two years. A fifth planned ballistic missile submarine was
cancelled in 196 5 by the Labour government, partly in response
to national economic pressures and partly in deference to
the party's prior campaign rhetoric about abandoning the
British nuclear deterrent. [Ref. 24: p. 25] This sop to
domestic political pressure was to have a significant impact
on the ability of the Royal Navy to maintain a credible
national deterrent at sea over the following decades.
The original force figure of 5 SSBNs was decided on to
guarantee that at least 2 Polaris ballistic missile-firing
submarines with a total of 32 missiles (16 x 2) would always
be at sea. This would allow 32 separate targets to be
threatened by 96 warheads with a collective destructive yield
of some 1.9 megatons. With only 4 units finally constructed,
there are now periods, given scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance requirements, when only a single missile boat is
available on station to carry out a strategic deterrent
patrol. [Ref. 3: p. 558]
LiJce their American counterparts, each British SSBN has
two crews enabling it to be on patrol for 7 weelcs in any 12.
[Ref. 4: p. 27] What prevents the attainment of a higher
percentage of deployed strategic assets is that each of the
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boats must be withdrawn in rotation, for long refits in the
naval dockyard at Rosyth, where the nuclear power core must
be renewed. Originally thought to take about 6 months to
accomplish, it became apparent that a longer period, typically
12-13 months, was needed to complete this extended refit.
[Ref. 4: p. 27] This 'fueling' has proven to be the critical
constraint on the availability of British SSENs. Present
experience shows that the useful life of the reactor cores
in the British Polaris boats is about 4 years. Thus for 1
year in every 5, each SSBN will normally be out of service.
It is also apparent that unpredictable disruptions to
this normal maintenance cycle could have a disastrous effect
on the ability of the Royal Navy to keep a credible deterrent
at sea. It is not inconveivaible that one of the British
SSBNs could be lost while at sea through clandestine hostile
action, an accident or equipment failure, or even through
an error in judgement. Domestic turmoil could also affect
the deterrent force, although to a lesser and more temporary
degree. Commenting on strained working conditions in naval
dockyards, primarily related to pay disputes and the loss
of skilled labor to private industry, a senior officer called
the situation "extremely serious." The Navy's refitting
schedules for general purpose forces have fallen badly be-
hind at times. Even the Renown, one of the Polaris boats,
was delayed completing Rosyth for six weeks. This was the
first time that the efficiency of the British strategic
deterrent had been so affected. [Ref. 25: p. 5]
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In short, the loss of a single British SSBN, for whatever
reason, will mark the end of that force's deterrent sufficiency,
The present deployed British deterrent has no margin for
error. Without 4 operational units there will eventually be
periods when no SSBNs are on patrol. Although extraordinary
efforts in men and material might overcome such a catastrophe
in the short-term through 'surge' capacities, these can at
best be stop-gap, ad hoc measures. British governments have
been gambling against the hazards of the sea for seventeen
years since Harold Wilson's decision to cancel the planned
5th ballistic missile submarine. [Ref. 4: p. 560] There is
apparently no action contemplated to change this situation
during the projected life of the present fleet.
The basis of the present British nuclear deterrent is
the maintenance of a sufficient number of constantly deploy-
able units. While this force remains subject to the un-
predictabal vagaries of the sea and the domestic and
international political environments, it remains in British
eyes a credible threat so long as a single SSBN can be
maintained constantly on patrol.
What is more evident and no less threatening to the
maintenance of this nuclear retaliatory capacity is the
period of useful service life built into the submarines them-
selves. The principal concerns in this area must be the
resiliency of the submarine pressure hull and the reactor
core of its nuclear propulsion plant.
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Most of the major components of a submarine are relatively
easy to replace in whole or in part. Pumps and motors,
turbine assemblies and even larger parts of the reactor it-
self can and must be removed for inspection, repair or
replacement. Ship and weapons control equipment, main shaft
bearings and even propellers can be worked on without signi-
ficant impact on the life expectancy of an operational unit.
This is not true of a submarine's hull. It is a single,
integral unit to which all the other components are fixed
and which must protect them from the hazards of the environ-
ment in which they operate. A single weak point can threaten
the safety of the entire boat and all its onboard systems.
Two essential factors in evaluating the limits of hull
life expectancy are static collapse pressure and cyclic
loading. Submarine hulls are designed to withstand hydro-
static loads in a stable condition at depths greatly exceeding
those in which they normally operate. Additional dynamic
stresses are placed on a pressure hull during its operational
service due to the changes in depth required by local
circumstance and mission requirements. These stresses are
known as cyclic loading and vary greatly with different speeds,
depths, angles of dive, etc. While determining the 'crush'
depth of a pressure hull design is a relatively straight-
forward calculation, development of its cyclic loading
requirements presents different problems. With a submarine
subject to perhaps 10 million different cyclic loads during
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20 years of operational service, it is necessary to maintain
an accurate depth profile for comparison to determine the
extent of hull fatigue caused by this phenomenon. [Ref. 26:
p. 187]
Submarine design criteria maintain wide margins of safety
in engineering standards. The methods used to measure cyclic
loading stresses were insufficiently advanced at the time to
have any valid input into the construction of the British
Polaris fleet. It may be reasonable to assume that the
original estimates of hull fatigue problems due to cyclic
loading have been very conservative and that given the rather
rigid refit schedule and high level of material maintenance
conducted, the four ballistic missile submarines could easily
exceed their estimated life span of twenty years by 25 to
50% (5-10 years) . Ian Bellany talks of "the undemanding
patrol schedules which extend the hull life of the SSBNs but
which reduce on-station times below what could be achieved."
[Ref. 29: p. 8] It is generally acknowledged that the
Polaris force will exceed its hull life expectancy by a
minimum of five years. It is quite possible that this
expectancy could be extended even further, depending on the
number, frequency and severity of the hull fatigue problems
uncovered and the type and quality of the remedial, corrective
action taken on these defects. [Ref. 26: p. 18 8]
In this vein, deployment patterns could be modified to
minimize the metal fatigue induced during operational patrols.
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SSBNs could establish patrol areas closer inshore to the
British Isles where ASW protection would be more readily
available and the depth and transit speed requirements of
North Sea and North Atlantic operating stations would not be
as great.
Problems with hull welds, equipment vibration and metal
irradiation can also be anticipated when discussing the long-
range aspects of pressure hull fatigue. To date, however,
inspection and monitoring techniques have enabled these
potential trouble areas to be easily identified, isolated
and corrected. There is no reason to suspect that any of
these areas will seriously jeopardize the operational life
of any submarine. As Neville Trotter puts it, "there is
unlikely to be any dramatic hull failure. . . but systems can
be expected increasingly to cause trouble." [Ref. 28: p. 1]
The requirement to renew nuclear reactor fuel cores
each four years is the determining factor in the Britain
Polaris boats refit schemes, but there is no evidence to
suggest that in the long run, this area v/ill be the critical
variable that will determine useful service life. The Royal
Navy is developing a new submarine reactor due to be avail-
able around 19 85 which can be fitted into the existing
Polaris boats during a normal refit cycle. At the 18-20
year point of service the presently installed nuclear reactors
may have to be replaced; but this can be done on all the
Polaris boats for less than half the estimated cost of one
new missile submarine. [Ref. 27: p. 5]
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The question of material obsolescence is not limited to
the submarines themselves, but applies equally to the
delivery vehicle, the Polaris A-3 submarine- launched ballistic
missile. The Royal Navy apparently procured between 102 and
120 of the Lockheed-manufactured missiles from the United
State. Around a dozen launches have been made from British
SSBNs utilizing the facilities of the U.S. Atlantic Test
Range (ATR) in the waters of the Atlantic and Caribbean off
Cape Canaveral, Florida. These were generally conducted
following each submarine's service acceptance and during the
Chevaline Polaris Improvement Program of the 1970s.
One of the problems the British face with the Polaris
A-3 missile is that it was purchased from the Americans, and
remains dependent to a large extent on that source for its
continued political and logistical support. The U.S. Navy
plans to withdrav/ the last of its 10 remaining Polaris missile
boats from service in the 19 84-1985 time- frame. At that
point this leg of the U.S. deterrent Triad will be made up
exclusively of Poseidon and Trident-equipped SSBNs. The
Polaris assembly line was closed down in June 1968 after a
total production run of 1409 missiles of all three variants
(A- 1/2/3) [Ref. 26: p. 195] A large stockpile of replace-
ment missiles and major component parts is already in the
United Kingdom and an agreement exists between the U.S. and
Britain regarding logistics, routine maintenance and cycle
overhaul of the Polaris missiles.
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While there appear to be sufficient quantities of the
major components needed to sustain the Polaris in active
service for the foreseeable future, there is a good deal of
concern about the continued reliability of the missile's
rocket motors after the U.S. Navy's requirements expire. The
Polaris A-3 is a two-stage, solid propellant ballistic missile.
The first stage motor developed by Aerojet consists of a
polyurethane/ammonium perchlorate propellant, while the second
stage, manufactured by Hercules, uses a nitrocellulose/
nitroglycerine/ammonium perchlorate mixture. In both stages
the propellants are cast into annular sections which are
packed inside the rocket motor casing. These solid propellant
motors have to be purchased from the United States since
facilities to manufacture propellant castings of the size
required by the Polaris do not exist in the United Kingdom.
[Ref. 26: p. 195]
Under normal operational conditions, the shelf- life of
the rocket motor propellants is estimated to be about 5 years;
after this period there is an increasing probability that it
may deteriorate rapidly or other\-/ise become unreliable. There
is also evidence to suggest that storage of the missile pro-
pellants at a stable refrigerated temperature of 5 degrees
(Centigrade) can more than double their shelf-life. [Ref. 26:
p. 19 5] If this were the case, the Polaris A-3 missile rocket




Several other options are available to maintain a satis-
factory supply of reliable rocket motors for the British Polaris
missiles. One would assume that the British could purchase
the latest components produced for the U.S. Polaris A- 3s when
those missiles are taken out of service. It might also be
possible to keep open the rocket motor production lines after
the U.S. requirement ceases. This would undoubtedly be a
costly proposition for which the United Kingdom would have to
bear the entire expense. It might also require the political
assistance of the United States government as the manufacturers
are American. Having offered Poseidon and then Trident, and
with its own concerns about modernization, standardization,
targetting and unit costs, the U.S. government's reaction to
this request is unpredictable.
The other alternative is for Britain to build her own
rocket motor production facilities, cost being the paramount
drawback. Britain possesses the technical and industrial
capacities to accomplish this task if cooperation can be
effected with the U.S. manufacturers. Until now it has been
more advantageous to procure from the Americans, but that
source will probably end production in the early 1980s. If
the British were to produce their own propellants, they would
also need to establish a more vigorous testing program to
insure reliability, which would at once increase the cost and
probably require the cooperation of the U.S. for the use of
its ATR facilities. While either of these options is certain
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to be costly, each is much less so than any of the other
strategic alternatives presently being considered. Additionally,
the construction of a domestic munitions facility capable of
casting rocket propellants large enough for Polaris would help
to furnish greater independence for the British strategic
deterrent.
If there is a limit when irreplaceable components of the
British Polaris force will reach material obsolescence, there
is also a point where this deployed strategic deterrent will,
for technological reasons, no longer be able to adequately
perform the missions assigned to it. Ian Smart puts it this
way:
it would be extraordinary to expect any major strategic
weapon system, in the modern world, will retain its
effectiveness, in the face of countervailing technical
improvements, for longer than a quarter of a century.
[Ref. 4: p. 2]
This technological threat primarily concerns delivery platform
survivability and pay load penetration and effectiveness.
How vulnerable is the British ballistic missile submarine
force to hostile interdiction? At present there is no reason
for serious concern. The vastness of the ocean continues to
offer more shelter to the hunted than to the hunter. [Ref.
3: p. 559] In addressing this question in rationalizing the
Trident decision. Defense Secretary Francis Pym said:
The sea is vast and opaque, and only a dramatic break-
through on a large scale could give the Soviet Union
realistic hope of being able to count on destroying our
submarines on patrol at a time of Soviet choosing. The
likelihood of this is remote. [Ref. 1: p. 12]
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Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) combines the use of aircraft,
ships, submarines and shore-based command and control and
intelligence processing facilities to achieve its maximum
effectiveness. The Soviet investment in ASW forces is massive,
and it continues to grow. Farook Hussain suggests that Russian
ASW operations against NATO submarines would be successful
only about 10% of the tine, whereas NATO forces might find the
the Russians three times that often. [Ref. 26: p. 188] This
evaluation may be a piece of mirror- image deception on the
part of Western analysts v;ho see in Soviet ASW groups the same
criteria and patterns of operation that characterize Western
procedures. Russian ASW forces appear to be optimized for
the localization and attack phases of ASW operations and
appear to be excellent at this task. To be effective, however,
they need accurate, time- sensitive initial datum information
on which to respond.
The Soviet Union has demonstrated vital concern over
threats to its territorial sovereignty and political control.
The development of an effective Soviet anti-carrier warfare
(ACW) doctrine, centered around long-range Soviet naval
aviation and large surface combatants like the Kynda and
Kresta I class rocket cruisers, was clearly linked to the
deployment of U.S. carrier-based strategic strike aircraft.
This same type of linkage can be inferred from the construction
of substantial numbers of large Soviet ASW ships to counter
the deployment of Western ballistic missile submarines.
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Included in this category are the Kara and Kresta II class
cruisers, the large ASW ships of the Moskva and Kiev class,
the Krivak class destroyers and several classes of nuclear
and diesel-powered submarines. It is realistic to argue that
the strategic striking power deployed by Western navies, first
in carrier strike aircraft and later in ballistic missile
submarines, was directly responsible for the dramatic growth
of the Soviet Navy, which v/as required to assume a larger
role in the damage- limiting strategy of the Soviet Union's
armed forces.
While the Russians clearly attach a high priority to
achieving an effective ASW capability, the forces required
to carry it out are generally large and observable. The
command and control links involved in such operations are
considerable and are subject to intercept and analysis. These
factors allow various countermeasures to be initiated to off-
set the potential risks posed. Patrol areas for SSBNs can
be adjusted without interfacing with the deterrent mission.
Friendly assets can be used to interdict Soviet forces
threatening our own. Additionally, even when in close proxi-
mity, submarines have a natural advantage in avoiding
detection. [Ref. 29: p. 8] ,
This does not imply that the field of ASVJ is static. In
fact, Jonathan Alford argues that "there will be a slow,
though possibly marginal, shift in favor of the ASW forces."
Submarines will become quieter and be less susceptible to
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active sonar detection because of improved anechoic hull
coatings. The use of decoys and escorting surface ships and
submarines to deceive hostile units will be increased and the
use of improved degaussing equipment will make magnetic anomaly
detection (MAD) by ASW aircraft much more difficult. [Ref. 30:
p. 23]
On the other hand, the tools available to ASW forces will
also increase in numbers and effectiveness. Sonars will
improve, especially in the passive area. Command and control
functions will continue to be streamlined, helped especially
by increasing trends toward miniaturization and computerization,
The biggest potential for a significant ASW breakthrough, how-
ever, lies in the area of non-acoustic sensors. The use of
satellite detection systems with infra-red capabilities is
presently being explored to see if it is feasible to track
SSBNs by measuring the difference between the temperature of
a submarine's wake and the surrounding water. [Ref. 30: p. 23]
Although Neville Trotter notes that "the present (British)
boats, with their relatively high levels of noise, will be at
an increasing disadvantages in avoiding detection," he goes
on to say that "a breakthrough in (ASW) technology during the
life of the next generation of submarines is regarded as
unlikely." [Ref. 28: p. 7] In spite of the considerable
research and development energies which continue to be
funneled into the area of ASW by both the Soviets and the
West, there appears to be little evidence that any
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technological breakthrough is likely in the near term that
would turn the oceans into merely a 'glass of cloudy water,*
stripping away the best weapon a submarine has - concealment.
Even though the survivability of the British SSBN in its
strategic deterrent role is high indeed, there are some
actions which the Soviet Union could take to increase the
probability of successfully neutralizing them. This is
particularly important to a nation such as Britain which can
not afford the loss of even the smallest portion of it with-
out the loss of its entire strategic deterrent credibility.
The principal threat is the trailing nuclear attack submarine
(SSN) . [Ref. 26: p. 192]
Trailing a ballistic missile submarine means that poten-
tially hostile enemy units, usually a submarine but possibly
surface ships or a combination thereof, pick up an SSBN as it
leaves its operating base for a strategic deterrent patrol
and remain v;ith it for the duration of that on station period.
The 'trailer' is prepared to destroy or disable the SSBN on
orders from higher command, or in the case of any distinct,
theatening actions before it can launch a preemptive or
retaliatory strike on the Soviet mainland. Theoretically
straight- forward, the tactical accomplishment of this mission
is difficult.
A surface ship in the trailing role, subject to the
vagaries of the elements, would be hard-pressed operating
independently, to keep up with an SSBN determined to lose her,
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A hostile submarine is subject to "de- lousing" techniques
carried out by friendly forces to insure that departing SSBNs
are 'clean' of any unwanted escorts. Evasive action and inter-
ference maneuvers can serve to free British Polaris boats from
sonar surveillance if it is achieved. Active sonar puts the
trailing enemy units just as much at threat as the 3SBN they
are tracking. The problem of maintaining command and control
links to headquarters ashore is the same for the trailing
submarine as it is for the SSBN. Once contact is lost on a
ballistic missile submarine, it much more difficult, even
impossible, to regain again.
The major problem the Soviets have in establishing an
effective SSBN trail program is their number of nuclear-
powered attack submarines. They simply do not have enough
to cover all the potentially deployable French, British and
American units; and although they have a vigorous on-going
construction program, it will be a long time before they can
deploy the numbers necessary to effectively counter all the
Western ballistic missile submarines. They do retain the
capability, however, to attempt to selectively trail a
smaller number and possibly could do so effectively. This
could have potentially disastrous consequences for the British
ballistic missile force.
Given the nature of the superpower strategic balance and
European doubts about the credibility of the American nuclear
guarantee, it seems likely that the Soviet Union will continue
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its attempts to drive a wedge into the question of 'linkage'
between actions in Western Europe and the U.S. strategic
retaliatory force. As a result, there may very well be an
increase in Soviet ASW directed against the European strategic
deterrent forces, especially after the new long-range American
SLBMs quadruple the area and the problem for the Soviets to
achieve effective ASW capabilities. If a political 'de-coupling'
ever occurs, the ballistic missile forces of the French and
the British are in substantially more jeopardy than when they
were more convincingly tied to the American response. Given
the small margin by which the British deterrent maintains its
credibility, it is uncertain that the American political pro-
cess would allow a retaliatory response to the sinking of a
British SSBN, no matter how blatant the manner. This possible
scenario should not be overlooked by those who argue that the
submarine-based deterrent is the key to Britain's national
security.
If the currently deployed British SSBNs remain relatively
immune to the massive Soviet investment in ASW and if their
continued ability to employ Polaris SLBMs is assured, the
credibility of this deterrent force will be minimal unless a
reasonable certainty can be achieved that those missiles can
penetrate to their targets with sufficient numbers and




The Polaris A- 3 is a proven weapons system with an
estimated degree of reliability in excess of 80%. [Ref. 26:
p. 195] Except for the as yet undetermined potential impact
of the rocket motor and testing program difficulties alluded
to previously, the Polaris A- 3 SLBM is going to launch success-
fully and strike its assigned target four out of every five
times it is fired, unless an effective defense can be mounted
against it.
The technology for building a successful anti-ballistic
missile (ABM) defense presently appears to exist. Jonathan
Alford states:
It is not so much a question of what each superpower
could do as to what each will do... there is little
doubt that technology has now reached a stage (mainly
as a result of rapid advances in computers and micro-
circuitry) where an effective close-in defence against
ballistic missiles could be deployed by about 1990.
[Ref. 31: p. 22]
Both the Soviet Union and the United States, the only
countries realistically capable of fielding an ABM system
given the cost and technology involved, have chosen not do
deploy this capability to any great degree. The Soviets have
the Galosh system protecting Moscow, while the Americans
built and de-activated ABM installations near its ICBM silos
in Grand Forks, North Dakota. The 19 72 ABM Treaty limits both
sides to only two sites, each with 100 missiles. Both sides
accepted a further limitation in the 19 7 4 Protocol which only
allowed a single national ABM deployment site. In addition
to these official agreements on ABM limits, there seems to
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exist a strong mutual interest for both countries to avoid
engaging in unrestrained competition.
The reasons both nations continue to abide by the ABM
accords are multiple, but inherent in the situation is the
fact that they both see them as being clearly in their best
national interests. The Soviet Union apparently perceives
itself at a technological disadvantage to the United States
in this area, although the gap is probably diminishing. The
Americans want to avoid the enormous expense which would be
associated with the construction and operation of any anti-
ballistic missile system. Both countries are equally cognizant
of the tremendously unstabilizing impact a truly effective,
deployed ABM system would present to the current strategic
balance.
As long as the superpowers remain committed to maintaining
the existing ABM treaties, smaller nuclear powers like Britain
will continue to get a 'free ride' on the back of this ABM
restraint. As their deterrent effectiveness depends on the
ability to threaten targets of 'value' to the enemy, the lack
of an effective Soviet anti-ballistic missile defense will
increase confidence that a retaliatory strike would be
perceived as being able to successfully penetrate to its
targets. [Ref. 31: p. 22]
The ABM treaties have limited the deployment of ABM sys-
tems but have permitted research and development to continue
in this area. In April 19 80, the Soviet Union announced that
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it was dismantling 32 of the 64 ABM launchers in its Galosh
system around Moscow. Why exactly, remains unclear, but
Western military analysts believe the Soviet Union "is likely
to replace all 64 of its anti-ballistic missile launchers with
something equally effective if not better." British Ministry
of Defence officials have indicated that the Soviets are
"continuing substantial research and development on anti-
ballistic missiles." U.S. Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown,
in his 1981 Defense Report states:
the Soviet Union's main concentration appears to be on
improving the performance of their large phased-array
radars, and on developing a rapidly deployable anti-
ballistic missile system which includes a new
interceptor. [Ref. 32: p. 1]
It is evident that the subject of ABM defenses is still
a fluid one of high priority to the Soviets. There is evi-
dence to suggest that their SAM- 5 air defense launchers may
be effective in a terminal anti-ballistic missile defense
against nuclear attack. [Ref. 26: p. 201] Development is
also going forward in areas of exotic technology, such as
lasers and charged-particle beam weaponry, but it is unlikely
that an effective and comprehensive ABM defense based on
these principles can be deployed in this century. [Ref. 31:
p. 229]
A minimal ABM system such as Galosh presents a significant
threat to as small a deterrent force as the British deploy,
if threatening Moscow is considered essential. An updated,
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modernized installation could easily cripple any isolated
strategic attack by medium powers on the capital. The British
Polaris A- 3 with its original warhead configuration would
probably still be able to penetrate present Soviet defenses
around Moscow. The Chevaline modernization program with its
sequential warhead release system, developed at a cost of some
1 billion pounds Sterling, is designed to insure that capability
is retained against any new defenses the Soviets might deploy
in the near term. [Ref. 30: p. 18]
D . SUMMARY
The United Kingdom currently possesses one of the four
most powerful nuclear deterrents in the world. The fact that
it constitutes only a small portion of the capability deployed
by superpowers like the United States and the Soviet Union
makes it no less impressive in terms of absolute power. Like
the French, the British can still inflict "sufficient"
retaliatory damage to the Soviet Union in a countervalue strike
to give its deterrent credibility. This doctrine of pro-
portionality, the "ability to tear off an arm," is the raison
d'etre behind the British force and despite all the rhetoric
given to alliance considerations and American nuclear
guarantees, is likely to remain so as long as the British
capability continues to exist.
The Royal Navy's ballistic missile submarines of the
Resolution class, armed with Polaris A-3 SLBMs remain today
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as competent and effective deterrent platforms as the day
they were launched. The Polaris Improvement Program (Chevaline)
recently completed was designed to ensure the ability of the
missile warheads to penetrate existing and planned Soviet anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) defenses for the life of the weapon
system. If we assume that this is sometime in the 1990s as
advertised, it probably will be a successful modernization.
Although Soviet ASW capabilities have increased substantially
and the age of the Polaris SSBNs is beginning to show, there
has been no significant degradation in the level of
invulnerability enjoyed by the British boats.
After being initially shut out of the nuclear arena by the
United States in the aftermath of World War II, the British
have managed to build, maintain and operate an effective
nuclear deterrent since. In the 1950s, it was found in the
V-bombers and Thor IRBMs of the RAF; in the 19 60s, it was
still with the V-bombers airmed with the Blue Steel stand-off
missile; and in the 1970s and 80s, it is carried in the
pressure hulls and ballistic missiles of Royal Navy SSBNs
constantly on patrol in the far reaches of the North Atlantic
and Arctic oceans and the North Sea.
Although always constituting an "independent" national
deterrent as regards potential employment, the British force
has become increasingly dependent on U.S. transfers of
technology to maintain a viable delivery capability. This
was highlighted by the cancellation of the Blue Streak IRBM
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and Skybolt ALBM projects in the early 1960s. It should be
noted that Britain, this delivery vehicle hard spot notwith-
standing, has always maintained and continued to advance its
ability to domestically produce high quality weapon-grade
fissile material; to design and manufacture nuclear weapons of
superior technical merit; and to construct suitable types of
delivery platforms capable of functioning effectively under
vastly different operating conditions, including nuclear-
powered submarines and supersonic strike aircraft.
Britain has the intrinsic capacity to completely support
her ovm nuclear weapons establishment, just as France is
continuing to do. The opportunity costs of doing so are
significant, however, and continue to grow, given the lack
of vitality in the British economy. Privy to a 'special
relationship' with the United States in the area of nuclear
weapons, Britain has chosen to capitalize on this resource to
maintain the effectiveness and credibility of her deterrent,
rather than devoting other already scarce assets to this task.
Although there are always risks associated with international
cooperative agreements, the relationship between the United
States and Britain on nuclear armaments has been particularly
cordial. There is no real reason to suspect this will change
as it is still considered in America's best interests to
support the British deterrent as an adjunct of that maintained
by the United States-
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The Polaris ballistic missile is the principal piece of
hardware supplied to the British to help maintain their
deterrent capability. Its chief drawback is the impact which
it has on deterrent strategy. The Polaris, in its A-3 version,
is primarily a countervalue weapon, with neither the accuracy
nor number of v/arheads necessary to effectively threaten
Soviet strategic forces. Although this strategy would seem
to suit a medium nuclear power like Britain, which doesn't
have the wherewithal to deploy an extensive multiple warhead
system, it v/ould seem more appropriate for the strategy to
primarily determine the weaponry, rather than the other way
around. This should be a fact of considerable influence in
the selection of a more strategically capable system as a
replacement for the Polaris.
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III. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC OPTIONS
The dilemma facing British strategists when they consider
the Polaris replacement question is two-fold. First, whether
sustaining this strategic nuclear deterrent capability is
really in the British national interest and secondly, if it
is, to conceive the most efficient method of doing so, given
naturally competing bureaucratic interests and national
resources.
It is arguable that all too much attention is paid to the
mechanics of the British deterrent and not enough to the
rationale for it. It is equally true that the best reasons,
conceived without the wherewithal to successfully execute them,
are useless. If one is to maintain a national deterrent force
at all, it must be one which has a reasonably successful
chance of carrying out its assigned mission under the conditions
for which it was designed to be used. In this age of rapidly
advancing technology, to divert increasingly scarce national
assets to the maintenance of a capability which is either too
much or not enough to achieve the desired result, is a
dereliction of the grave responsibilities which governments
are embodied to carry out.
If one accepts the premise that the existing force of
British Polaris submarines constitutes an effective deterrent,
but that its continued viability is limited by approaching
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conditions of both material and technological obsolescence,
then it becomes a critical necessity to identify, procure and
operate an effective replacement system. This section will
consider the various strategic options currently available to
Britain to sustain her strategic deterrent capability.
A new weapons system rarely embodies state-of-the-art
technology by the time it becomes operationally deployed. The
time spent in the design and construction of these complex
programs cannot keep up with the advancing pace of science
and technology. Thus new systems must be constantly projected
into the future to enhance their potential viability. What is
effective today may still be so tomorrow, but the reverse is
equally likely. By the time the British Polaris boats were
beginning their first operational patrol, concerns had already
surfaced about their ability to penetrate the more sophisticated
Soviet ABM defenses then being constructed. This concern
eventually culminated in the Chevaline program with its
modernized warhead capability. Any new strategic system con-
sidered by Britain must also take into serious account
what the future might bring, for the option chosen must remain
effective well into the 21st Century. Britain does not possess
the economic substance nor the political capital necessary to
be constantly updating her strategic deterrent force over the
period of its likely useful service. What she eventually
decides on will mostly likely have to suffice, almost regardless
of the changes in technology. Thus the choice becomes that
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much more critical with Britain's deterrent capability in the
balance. While it may be possible to argue about the rationale
of a British deterrent force in the future, if the system
chosen to maintain it proves technically unfeasible or
obsolete, there is a strong probability that the maintenance
of a credible deterrent will be permanently foreclosed.
A British strategic nuclear deterrent force must possess
certain systemic features in order to be considered credible.
It must be survivable, reliable, effective and affordable, the
last feature by no means the least. It is neat and concise to
talk in terms of absolutes rather than relatives, but such is
not always the case in the political marketplace. Eventually
the crucial decisions on deterrence and force levels must be
political ones, at least in democracies like Britain. As Lord
Palmers ton argued in the mid-nineteenth century, in inter-
national relations Britain has no permanent friends or permanent
enemies, only permanent interests. Little did he realize how
widely the range of definition of those interests would be.
The point is that in the give and take, pulling and hauling
that is national strategy and politics, no way is always the
best, even if it eventually is the one chosen. Each has its
advantages, but each is likely to subtract something from
another aspect of the solution.
In considering strategic alternatives, we must limit our-
selves to systems which can strike at a potential enemy's
heartland, disrupt his social order and threaten his intrinsic
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national values. In the case of Britain, it must be remembered
that the actual employment of the deterrent force in a strategic
role will mark the failure of that force in its primary mission,
to deter the use of nuclear weapons against British national
interests. As a weapon of 'last resort,' the deterrent must
be able to influence the perceptions of a potential enemy and
persuade him not to threaten national sovereignty. The British
force should not be scorned at because of its size. It has
always been of relatively high quality and its potency is con-
siderable. In evaluating the threat posed by the aging Polaris
force Lawrence Freedman points out:
It should not therefore be thought that because of the
comparative size of the arsenals of the superpowers, the
missiles contained in even one (British) Polaris submarine
do not present a serious nuclear threat. They could
inflict a catastrophe of immense proportions on the
Soviet people. [Ref. 5: p. 36]
This feature will likely be accentuated in any replacement
program adopted by the British. The qualitative aspects will
undoubtedly be preserved and the technological advances made
should allow a 'bigger bang' for the resources expended.
This section reviews the new strategic options for the
British nuclear deterrent and concentrates primarily on the
delivery vehicles and launch platforms. Although there are a
number of other important, even crucial aspects, we must first
understand the hardware involved before we can attempt to
analyze the British decision to purchase the Trident I.
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A. THE MANNED BOMBER
Although the ability to develop and deploy orbital boinbing
systems is probably within the technological grasp of the
United States and the Soviet Union, it is an area of competition
which has thus far been avoided for a number of compelling
political and international reasons. Weapons systems generally
considered v/ithin the scope of international strategic deter-
rence are those associated with manned aircraft, ballistic
missiles; and, in recent times, the cruise missile. Common
criteria can be established to measure the effectiveness of
each of these different delivery vehicles. Although there may
be minor disagreements among individual analysts, the major
critical assessments considered are survivability, reliability,
penetration, effect and cost. [Ref. 3: p. 564]
In many measurable ways the ideal nuclear delivery vehicle
remains the manned aircraft. Its reliability is excellent; it
can carry and place on target with precision, huge weapons
loads of either gravity-type bombs or short range air-to-ground
missiles; and it retains an onboard decision-making capability
unmatched among other delivery behicles, which allows them a
flexibility of purpose and mission responsiveness that would
be otherwise unattainable. The major shortcoming of manned
aircraft as a strategic delivery vehicle is its limited
potential for survival.
Conventional Soviet air defenses have achieved a level of
sophistication that would seriously impair the ability of any
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nation to effectively threaten strategic Soviet assets. These
consist of first-line interceptor aircraft, interlocking short
and long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and an
integrated command and control netv;ork that exists throughout
the Soviet Russia and its Eastern Bloc satellites. The likeli-
hood that an unsupported attack by manned aircraft could
penetrate this air defense umbrella and strike targets of
significance is small indeed.
This is particularly true of medium power nations like
Britain that no longer enjoy the superiority in aviation tech-
nology they once did. While new, sophisticated developments
are constantly being made in the aviation industry, like the
Stealth bomber in the United States, it is unlikely that
Britain will be in any position in the near term to reap any
strategic advantage from this progress. She will be unable
to commit either the capital or industrial resources to turn
such advances to her own purposes, even if they are not
quickly overtaken by defensive countermeasures.
If the survivability of manned aircraft in the attack is
suspect, so is their ability to ride out a pre-emptive strike
by the Soviet Union. Even with the Ballistic Missile Early
VJarning System (BMEWS) in operation at Fylingdales since 19 6 3
and the close coordination that exists between Britain and
the U.S. in this field, there would be little reaction time
available for manned aircraft to avoid a calculated, crushing,
premptive attack designed to disarm the British deterrent force
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and possibly de-couple it from the American strategic guarantee.
In this instance, the close geographical proximity which the
UK enjoys to the continent works to her distinct disadvantage
in cutting down the time available to scramble a manned air-
craft retaliation force. If depressed trajectory SLBM firing
paths are used, this disadvantage is even further exacerbated.
The Soviet Union also deploys considerable numbers of capable
ballistic missile submarines. With British early warning sys-
tems oriented to the East, the possibility of a 'back door'
strike from the North Atlantic must also be considered.
Jonathan Alford of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies diss) puts it well when he says:
Britain can expect only six to eight minutes of warning
of ballistic missile attack from the Soviet Union and,
given the lack of all-round early-warning radar coverage,
virtually no warning of attack by depressed- trajectory
SLBM fired from the Atlantic. [Ref. 30: p. 21]
It is possible to avoid the pitfalls of a surprise pre-
emptive Soviet strike by maintaining constantly airborne
nuclear-armed strategic aircraft in sufficient numbers to
deter the probability of such a strike. This is, however, a
very costly alternative and is particularly hard on the life
of the aircraft and support equipment which will be required
to sustain the credibility of the deterrent. It also signi-
ficantly increases the possibility of nuclear accidents, a
matter of no small concern in a nation as geographically con-
fined as Great Britain. The potential repercussions of such
an incident, given the underlying strength and emotion of
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anti-nuclear groups in Britain, could be politically untenable
for a government committed to the maintenance of a competent
strategic nuclear deterrent. Manned aircraft are not presently
viable delivery vehicles for the British strategic nuclear
deterrent force and have not seriously been considered in that
role.
B. THE CRUISE MISSILE OPTION
A cruise missile is a pilotless aircraft with continuous
propulsion and an internal guidance system. [Ref. 3: p. 69]
It is descended from one of Hitler's "revenge" weapons, the
V-1 'buzz' bomb of World War II. Development of this type of
weapon was continued in the 19 50s by both the Soviet Union
and the United States. The U.S. Navy's 'Regulus' missile
program showed promise until it was overtaken by the Polaris
successes of the late 19 50s. Another U.S. version, the Bomarc,
was deployed in remote Canadian locations but differences
between the countries over strategic policy prevented it from
ever being armed with a nuclear weapon.
It has been suggested that the U.S. cruise missile program
of the 19 50s was the victim of bureaucratic special interests;
and had it been pursued more vigorously, it might have
eliminated a crucial deficiency that became apparent in the
area of surface warfare during the 1960s and 70s. The fact
that the cruise missile was introduced as a strategic system
hindered its eventual successful development. With only a
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medium range capability, it was first overshadowed by other
IRBMs and then by the ICBMs which became the backbone of the
U.S. strategic arsenal. Employed in a sea-launched tactical
mode, it was touted as a replacement for piloted aircraft,
rather than as an extension of the over-the-horizon warfare
capability of surface ships. This was clearly a bureaucratic
handicap in a Navy dominated by carrier admirals and probably
spelled its end under the increasingly tight fiscal constraints
of the Eisenhower presidency.
The Soviets, on the other hand, never really attempted
to develop a strategic cruise missile. They did design and
deploy an impressive, especially for its time, tactical
cruise missile capability centered initially on submarines
and small surface combatants. This was later extended to
the Kynda and Kresta I class 'rocket' cruisers and long-range
elements of Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA)
.
Although crude by today's standards, the Soviet cruise
missiles of the 1960s and 70s posed a serious threat to
opposing forces. One is credited with sinking the Israeli
destroyer Elath during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, while an
even more convincing demonstration occurred during the 19 71
Indo-Pakistani conflict when several large Pakistani combatants
and merchant ships were sunk by small Indian Navy patrol
craft armed with Soviet cruise missiles. The aging technology
of these weapons, however, was becoming evident when, during
the 1973 Yom Kippur War, missile-equipped Israeli gunboats
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successfully countered large coordinated attacks by Egyptian
surface craft armed with cruise missiles and then sank most
of the attacking forces.
The sudden interest that has been rekindled in the cruise
missile as a strategic delivery vehicle is primarily the
result of two complementing reasons. First, the technology
has finally become available to make the cruise missile a
truly viable nuclear delivery system. Secondly, and perhaps
more importantly, the cruise missile was not included in the
provisions of the SALT I aggreement on offensive arms; and
thus when successfully developed would represent a substantive
advantage over the Soviet Union, both in terms of actual
deterrent value and as a bargaining chip in future arms
limitation talks. [Ref. 5: p. 70] The impetus these reasons
gave to cruise missile development in the United States were
to provide a weapon system that was something considerably
more than a conceptual model for British theorists to
consider utilizing as a strategic delivery vehicle.
Several new technologies are responsible for overcoming
the past disadvantages associated with cruise missiles,
notably high fuel consumption, navigational inaccuracies and
small explosive pay loads. [Ref. 5: p. 69] The strategic
versions of the cruise missile incorporate three significantly
new technologies - "high efficiency, small (130 lb) turbofan
engines; modern guidance systems with raicro-minaturized on-
board computers and associated terminal guidance systems;
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and the new W-80 nuclear warhead, designed to weigh 240 lb,
fit into a 10.6 inch diameter casing, and have a 200-250 KT
yield." [Ref. 31: p. 243) These advances in munitions,
propulsion, high energy fuels and guidance systems allow a
cruise missile to pack an effective and potent punch at long
ranges. The cruise missiles existing today constitute a step
change in capability.
Two versions of the cruise missile are currently produced
in the United States - the Boeing air-launched cruise missile
(ALCM) and the General Dynamics Tomahawk designed for both
ground and sea/subsurface launch. These production models
were continued after exhaustive research and development
efforts were concluded with a series of fly-offs between
competing missiles. The British Secretary of State for
Defence, Francis Pym, described their characteristics as
follows:
These can fly long distances - typically over 1500 miles -
at very low altitudes (around one hundred feet) and
navigate accurately to an aim point, while presenting
an exceptionally small target for enemy defences to
detect, locate and attack. They do not travel at very
high speed - around 400-500 knots - but rely for pro-
tection mainly on low altitude, small radar cross-section
and evasive routing to avoid known defence concentrations.
[Ref. 1: para 35]
Much of the interest in the new cruise missile seems to
center on its guidance system which is an integrated combi-
nation of inertial navigation and a terrain contour matching
grid system (TERCOM) which compares "terrain information,
obtained by satellite and stored in a computer on board the
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missile, with the terrain detected by sensors on the missile."
[Ref. 30: p. 18] Utilizing this system, it is practicable
for cruise missiles to achieve an extremely high degree of
accuracy over the entire range of their capability. Estimates
of how precise this might be vary, but are generally in the
50 to 100 meter range suggested by Jonathan Alford and
Desmond Ball, [Ref. 32: p. 15], although James Bellini and
Geoffrey Pattie argue that at a range of 2500 miles, a CEP of
30 yards can be achieved. [Ref. 33: p. 39] While this
capability is an impressive technical triumph, only the
hardest potential targets will justify the lethality of a
200 KT weapon delivered literally to their doorsteps. It
may serve to enhance the counterforce capabilities of a
superpower li}:e the United States but given the relatively
slow speeds of the existing cruise missiles, is unlikely to
have any pre-emptive ability. For a country with a counter-
value strategy, such as Great Britain, the full spectrum of
cruise missile technology available is probably more than is
reasonably required to carry out its deterrent mission. The
qualitative step increase that new cruise missile weaponry
represents may actually lower the nuclear threshold for
medium power nations such as Britain, by threatening hard
Soviet targets which were previously outside the scope of
their capability.
The cruise missile is a serious contender in the British
debate over strategic alternatives to the present Polaris
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deterrence force. Its principal recommendation seems to be
its 'apparent' cheapness and employability, while its supposed
vulnerability to Soviet air defenses is seen as a potentially
damaging weakness. These general characterizations and their
associated offshoots need to be examined in greater detail to
develop a better appreciation for the capability which cruise
missiles could provide to a British deterrent force.
A broad generalization can be made that if estimated
cruise missile costs are approximately one-sixth those of an
equivalent ballistic missile/ then systemic comparisons should
run roughly along the same lines. [Ref. 5: p. 70] This
thesis deliberately omits consideration of the manner in which
the weapons might be deployed or the number of cruise missiles
which would be required to achieve the same effectiveness as
a comparable ballistic missile force.
Cruise missiles themselves have the potential to become
much more expensive. Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed
Services Committee in March 19 77 was "categoric that the
cost of the acquisition of topographic data and the digitizing
of maps for the TERCOM system was 'extraordinarily greater'
than that of the cruise missile itself." [Ref. 31: p. 245]
Jonathan Alford of the IISS points out that the costs associ-
ated with first generation cruise missiles will rise sharply
for subsequent generations. [Ref. 30: p. 19]
If we examine the cruise missile in the light of
established criteria, we find it an exceptionally hard system
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to categorize, primarily because of its novelty. Ian Smart
sees strategic cruise missiles having distinct advantages
over ballistic missiles (except in submarines) in terms of
survivability and employability. They can be operated from
almost any type of launch platform; trucks, surface combatants,
fast patrol boats and hovercraft, submarines, and large and
small aircraft. But they also have an as yet imprecise
operational reliability and a significantly lower ability to
penetrate Soviet defenses than their ballistic counterparts.
[Ref. 3: p. 566] These facts must be taken into account when
calculating how many more cruise missiles must be launched to
achieve a given effect.
In a Memorandum prepared for the Defence and External
Affairs Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee of the
House of Commons in March 1979, the International Institute
of Strategic Studies assessed the survivability of the cruise
missile at 25%. That is, Soviet defenses would knock down
three out of every four strategic cruise missiles before they
could penetrate to their targets. Given a generally accepted
figure of 80% launch reliability for cruise missiles, the
resulting combined reliability/survivability factor for the
missile after launch is of the order of 20%. Five cruise
missiles must be flown in order to get one through. [Ref. 26:
p. 89] IISS goes on to assess the survivability of the




a. submarine (SSCN) 0.3
b. fast surface craft (SLCM) 0.8
c. ground- launched systems (GLCM) 0.8
d. major surface combatants (MSC) 0.6
e. aircraft (ALCM) 0.4
If these assessments are combined for the survivability of
the missile and the vulnerability of its launch platform, the
following numbers of cruise missiles must be deployed to
cover the minimum twelve targets (given an 80% missile
reliability factor) presently threatened by the single Polaris
submarine maintained on patrol:
a. SSCN, SLCM and GLCM 75
b. MSC 100
c. ALCM 150
The figures cited above are only theoretical calculations,
but do present a relative picture of the problems which face
a strategist considering the deployment of cruise missiles
as the basis of a national nuclear deterrent force. In a
subsequent Memorandum, this one to the Defence Committee of
the House of Commons in June 19 80, the II3S modified its
position regarding cruise missile vulnerability in the
following way:
In the case of radar detection and intercept, we have
tended to understate the difficulties of detecting and
engaging a low-flying missile with a very small radar
cross-section over land. We understand that American
tests have shown that, even with the most advanced
look-down airborne radar, it is extremely difficult to
discriminate between a cruise missile at very low
altitude and ground clutter.
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The memo goes on to state:
We may have been somewhat high in our estimates of the
attrition to which a cruise missile attack would be
subjected. We assessed. .. the attrition of a British
attack (because the enemy defences would be less
saturated) at 7 5%. It would now appear sensible in
making calculations of force size and relating those
to a given target array to reduce the attrition rate
to 60% for the British force... this will have the
effect of reducing the number of cruise missiles that
would have to be deployed by the United Kingdom and
so the capital outlay involved. [Ref. 34: p. 3]
Writing in the Times, RAF Air Vice-Marshal Stewart Menaul
says of the cruise missile "its power of penetration cannot
be calculated with precision and those who claim that 40 or
50 per cent of cruise missiles attacking targets in the Soviet
Union would be destroyed are indulging in pure guesswork."
The point is that cruise missiles represent a new tech-
nology. British strategists are reluctant to explore beyond
the bounds of familiar territory, like SLBMs. They have the
experiences of the Blue Streak and Skybolt to consider, as
well as the recently completed Polaris Improvement program
(Chevaline) which suffered significant cost overruns. If the
British were to opt for the cruise missile, they would be
selecting an operationally untried system and one which does
not constitute the main battery of the U.S. strategic nuclear
arsenal. The procurement and operation by Britain of more
than a single successor system to Polaris is highly improbable
for reasons of cost as well as strategic efficiency. [Ref.
4: p. 9] Ian Smart argues that, because Britain must choose
only one deterrent system, she "cannot afford the options for
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technical experiment." She must chose a 'tried' system of
technical reliability - i.e. ballistic missiles. [Ref. 36:
p. 23] Cruise missile systems could be easily dismantled by
the United States either because of their ineffectiveness or
as a result of future arms limitation agreements. To a
British deterrence strategy intimately linked to American
cruise technology, this could be a devastating blow, one
likely to spell the end of any deterrent, independent or
otherwise.
There are several undecided issues in determining the
feasibility of deploying British cruise missiles as successors
to the present Polaris system. David Greenwood hints at the
first of these, in noting that "guessing at the terms,
financial and otherwise, upon which the Americans might make
the missiles available to the United Kingdom is the toughest
nut to crack." [Ref. 29: p. 130] Having indicated a willing-
ness to sell the Trident system, the U.S. might be under-
standably less enthusiastic about doing the same with cruise
missiles or their technology. The problems associated with
arms limitation talks are real enough, but their immediate
relevance appears to have faded somewhat, along with the
spirit of detente in which SALT I and II were conceived.
The U.S. would undoubtedly like help in absorbing the burden
of the Trident system. British participation would help
defray those costs and further lower the unit price of each
missile. The standardization that would be achieved with
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the deployment of similar missiles would assist in targetting
and command and control functions. It would also strengthen
immeasurably the technical and professional bonds which exist
between the United States and Britain and which are the real
basis for the continued material and technological support
that sustains the existence of an effective British deterrent
force.
Studies by both the British government and British Aero-
space industries indicate that production of cruise missiles
is entirely within the capacity of British industry. The
only caveat attached to this judgement is cost. More funds
would be required than if cruise missiles and their technology
v/ere purchased from the Americans. Development efforts would
cost more because British industry will be expanding on a
lower technological base, while production costs will be
higher because the UK would not be able to achieve any economies
of scale with their smaller deployment requirements. [Ref.
26: p. 91] One of the British companies asked to undertake
a feasibility study in this area, British Aerospace Dynamics
Group (BAeD) , comments:
On the basis of existing UK technology and resources...
we are confident that we can develop a cruise missile
acting as a prime contractor in a national programme.
[Ref. 26: p. 241]
Interestingly, in response to a question as to the type of
system which should be considered as a successor to Polaris,
BAeD responds "on the information available to us at present.
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we would expect that a ballistic missile system would be the
one more appropriate to the needs of the UK." [Ref. 26: p.
242] It should be noted, however, that 3AeD is heavily
involved in providing the technical support required to main-
tain the effectiveness of the Polaris system and may anticipate
the same role in a successor ballistic missile sys-cem.
Another problem with the deployment of a British cruise
missile force is the extent to which it would be dependent
upon the United States for the topographical data to be
attributed to the TERCOM terminal guidance system. If this
information flow were obstructed for whatever reasons, the
effectiveness of the British cruise missile force would be
seriously impaired by the lack of vital targetting data. It
also creates "an unwelcome degree of dependence, .. that does
not ride easily with an assumption of ultimate independence."
[Ref. 26: p. 83]
This thesis assumes that the British version of the cruise
missile will use the terminal guidance features of TERCOM,
rather than relying on the accuracy of the on-board inertial
system. The question of how useful TERCOM is to a British
countervalue strategy has already been raised. The IISS
questions whether there is actually a need to rely on
satellite information for the targeting of cruise missiles.
In a Memorandum submitted in June 19 80 to the House of Commons,
the IISS suggests that accumulated errors of guidance in
inertial systems will allow a drift of no more than 8 nautical
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miles per hour of flight. [Ref. 34: p. 3] Speaking less
than a month later to the Defence Committee, Jonathan Alford
of IISS expanded on this possibility:
I am now informed that probably I have erred on the side
of inaccuracy and simply with inertial guidance, given
the technology presently available, one should be able
to achieve inaccuracies of as low as one mile per hour's
flight and possibly lower than that.
Alford goes on to explore the strategic implications of this
possibility:
In that case you free yourself entirely from satellite
information and you could indeed, given the kind of
information which we already have available. .. in terms
of mapping, then be able to deliver a warhead close
enough - that is a rather qualified statement, but
close enough to a desired ground zero at the centre
of a Soviet city. [Ref. 32: p. 12]
If an inertial system were to prove satisfactory for cruise
missile guidance, it would also generally eliminate the need
for the use of the radar altimeter, TERCOM's most important
sensor, but also the one which is most detectable by enemy
defenses and which would be vulnerable to degradation by
electronic countermeasures (ECM) . [Ref. 30: p. 18]
There are other disadvantages associated with any projected
deployment of British cruise missiles. The availability of
sufficient quantities of fissile material to support the
increased requirement for warheads will have to be considered.
So will the difficulties of retargeting cruise missiles
equipped with either inertial or TERCOM guidance systems and
assigned to the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP)
directed from SAC headquarters in Omaha. The low level flight
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patterns demanded by the typical cruise missile mission pro-
file could be potentially politically embarassing to the
British government because they would generally have to over-
fly the territory of other allied nations who might not be
in total support of this particular type of strategic deter-
rent system.
The major disadvantage of cruise missiles, however, is
their supposed susceptibility to enhanced Soviet air defenses.
Just as Britain benefits from the American research and
development efforts on cruise missiles, Britain will be dis-
advantaged by the Soviet Union's predicted heavy investment
in an air defense system to protect itself from an American
cruise missile attack. The U.S. presently plans to start
the deployment of 464 GLCMs throughout the European theater
in late 19 83. The Soviets will probably concentrate on a
perimeter defense based on elevated radars and a combination
of 'look down - shoot down' interceptor aircraft and a SAM
system with very high rates of initial acceleration. It is
believed that the SA-10 SAJ!1 system is being optimized for this
task. [Ref. 30: p. 20]
If Soviet air defenses have been erected against the
threat of a massive U.S. attack with thousands of cruise
missiles, they could expect to effect a much higher degree
of attrition against a smaller force like the one the British
would presumably deploy. Britain can not afford to saturate
Soviet defenses v/ith large numbers of cruise missiles like
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the United States. Nor is Britain likely to be able to
afford the constant updates that may be required to keep the
cruise missile's penetrability ahead of cruise missile defenses,
The cost to the Soviet Union for such an air defense capa-
bility will be enormous and the absolute cost of continuing
to guard against a cruise missile threat will be much greater
than that required by the United States to sustain it. The
Economist, in an editorial titled "Don't Forget the Cheap
One/' points out that one can deal with improved Soviet air
defenses by simply buying more cruise missiles: "the core
of the matter is that, with cruise missiles, the cost-benefit
advantage lies with the attacker: it is cheaper and easier
to improve the missiles than the defensive system that has to
swat them off." [Ref. 37: p. 20]
Cruise missile technology is in its infancy and will likely
advance to later generations. These newer models will have
higher, even supersonic speeds; greater 'ground-hugging'
capability; improved terminal guidance packages; and advanced
penetration aids and electronic counter-counter measure-
abilities (SCCM) . [Ref. 26: p. 19] New anti-radar coatings
and minor design changes have reduced the radar-reflecting
surface of the Tomahawk missile to roughly the size of a
soccer ball. [Ref. 37: p. 20] Even further advances in the
area of anechoic coatings are likely, as is the incorporation
of 'Stealth' technology in the design and production of
future versions of the cruise missile. As the Economist
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editorial concludes, "a cruise missile travelling at treetop
height at 3000 mph - a speed within technological reach -
bids fair to be at least as tough a target as a ballistic
missile." [Ref. 37: p. 20]
Ian Smart has argued that, if cruise missiles are deployed
as successors to the Polaris force, they should be carried
on submarines to maximize their chances of survivability. Given the
factors generally attributed to cruise missiles, a force of
17 boats, each armed with 24 SLCM would be required to provide
the deterrent capability of 5 SSBNs, each armed with 16
ballistic missiles. He concludes that "cruise missile sub-
marines, cruise missiles themselves and their warheads would
be cheaper to develop than their ballistic missile counter-
parts." but "the total construction costs for the SSCN/SLCM
force would exceed those for the SSBN/SLBM option as would
annual operating and maintenance costs (because of the larger
number of submarines involved)." [Ref. 29: p. 142]
One aspect of cruise missiles not often considered is
their ability to function in a tactical as well as a strategic
role. With guidance systems capable of virtually 100%
accuracy, they could play an effective, perhaps even dominant
role in a theater nuclear force (TNF) . Stewart Menaul argues
that this is one area where the 'dual' theater and strategic
strike capabilities of the cruise missile give it clear
ascendency over ballistic missile systems in general, and
the Trident in particular. [Ref. 38] Bellini and Pattie
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make much the same argument in their 1977 work on medium
powers, going so far as to call the cruise missile, Western
Europe's strategic option. The important difference is that
they see the cruise missile armed with a conventional warhead
(but employed in a strategic mission) as bridging the gap
between conventional and nuclear warfare. [Ref. 33: p. 40]
The strategic cruise missile option is not an ideal
solution to Britain's problem of Polaris replacement, but it
is a relatively cheap one, an increasingly crucial factor
when considering the maintenance of sufficient numbers of
balanced general purpose forces to support the level of
conventional and TNF deterrence required. Of equal importance
is the fact that the manufacture of cruise missiles is
entirely within the capacity of British industry. Henry
Stanhope, Defence Correspondent for the Times, reports that
"secret trials of a cruise missile, fitted with an all-British
terrain- following navigation system which could guide the
missile to its target without depending on American satellites,
are understood to have been successful." [Ref. 39: p. 1]
The cruise missile is not a panacea to the British strate-
gic dilemma. It has many disadvantages, chief among them its
potential vulnerability to sophisticated air defenses, a
problem exacerbated by the small size of any future British
force and the huge Soviet air defense investment in response
to U.S. plans to deploy thousands of ALCMs , SLCMs and GLCMs
over the next decade. If the enhanced Soviet air defense
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capability is not totally effective against the American
threat, it certainly will effect a much higher attrition rate
against an unsupported attack by British cruise missiles.
In spite of this, the cruise option does present a viable
strategic alternative, especially when paired with relatively
inexpensive launch platforms such as mobile lorries with
transporter/erector abilities (TER) , hovercraft and fast
patrol boats. Higher probabilities of survival can be attained
with more secure launch platforms, such as submarines, but
the costs escalate proportionally. In choosing a successor
system, one must look at its potential for effective service
during the period of its intended employment. The present
Polaris force will suffice into the 1990s, so what we are
contemplating is a capability that will retain its deterrent
effectiveness well into the 21st Century. Cruise missile
technology is still young and there is every reason to believe
that it will continue to advance with time. To foreclose the
possibility of employing a potentially competent system, in
favor of one currently possessing superior strategic charac-
teristics but which will be increasingly vulnerable by the
time it is deployed, may prove to be a 'penny-wise, pound-
foolish' concept. This is particularly worrisome, given the
enormous expenditure that deployment of a replacement
ballistic system will entail and which may, in fact, prove
fatal to balanced defense spending as Britain attempts to
maintain an effective national deterrent force into the
forseeable future as well as credible conventional forces.
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C. BALLISTIC MISSILES AND SUBMARINES
As has already been established, the cruise missile, one
of the principal strategic delivery vehicles presently being
developed and deployed, is a direct descendant of Germany's
World War II V-1 'buzz' bomb. It was the V-2 ballistic
missile, however, the second of Hitler's 'revenge' weapons,
that was to spawn the progeny that came to occupy the central
place in the arsenals of the superpowers in the post-war era.
[Ref. 5: p. 69]
A brief comparison of these two early German rockets
provides a revealing insight into the merits of each as they
are being argued at the present time. The V-1 was comparatively
unsophisticated and therefore less expensive and more efficient.
In actual operation, however, it proved to be highly sus-
ceptible to an effectively integrated air defense network.
[Ref. 30: p. 20] The V-2 ballistic missile, on the other
hand, could easily penetrate British defenses, but because
of its complexity was an enoirmously expensive weapon to
procure and use. [Ref. 5: p. 69]
Today's cruise missiles, while hardly unsophisticated,
are being touted for their 'cheapness.' Their perceived
weakness remains, as it was in the latter stages of the
Second World War, their supposed vulnerability to active
enemy defenses. The intercontinental ballistic missiles
currently being deployed by the superpowers are able to
penetrate to their potential targets with near impunity, but
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their expense and complexity places an enormous burden on
the scarce monetary, technical and personnel resources of
even the wealthiest of nations. Although the V-1 and V-2
rockets utilized conventional high explosives which can't
really be compared to the effects of the huge thermonuclear
warheads in today's nuclear arsenals, the lessons which they
provide should not be overlooked in the contemporary context.
Ian Smart describes ballistic missiles as: "powered by
rocket motors burning liquid or solid fuel. .. designed to send
a module containing a nuclear warhead into a ballistic tra-
jectory, commonly reaching its apogee outside the atmosphere,
from which the module (known as a reentry vehicle) returns
to the atmosphere on a path which will bring the weapon (known
as a warhead) to a predetermined target." [Ref. 4: p. 43]
Smart considers several pertinent points in determining
the suitability of a ballistic missile for use as a nuclear
delivery vehicle. The first is reliability. Because of
their complexity, ballistic missiles demand the establishment
and maintenance of higher production control standards, but
as he puts it, "the corollary is that, given such high
standards, they may be very reliable indeed." This fact is
reenforced by the rigorous testing and monitoring procedures
being carried out for operationally deployed systems. The
Polaris missile has reportedly achieved a 99% readiness rate
for combined American and British operational patrols. [Ref.
4: p. 47] While the basic rocket motors and guidance systems
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of long-range ballistic missiles only have to perform satis-
factorily for about five minutes before the reentry vehicle
is released into its free ballistic flight, the very speeds
associated with ballistic missiles are likely to amplify even
minor malfunctions in the propulsion motor or guidance
system and produce dramatic deviations with little time or
room for correction. [Ref. 4: p. 47]
Penetrability is the second of Smart's salient attributes
and probably the single strongest point favoring ballistic
missiles. They have a "high penetration capability ,... are
currently only vulnerable to specialized anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) missile systems (deployment of which is strictly limited
by SALT agreements) and, even against such defences, offer a
significant probability of reaching their targets." [Ref. 4:
p. 47]
Another point which Smart makes in his consideration of
the ballistic missile is its effect. A ballistic missile
because of its size and throw-weight may carry several nuclear
warheads and, if it is sufficiently sophisticated or MIRVed
(multiple independently- targetted reentry vehicle) , direct
them towards an equal number of widely separated targets. In
terms of the number of targets on which an effect may be
produced by a single delivery vehicle, ballistic missiles, as
a type, have a potentially greater advantage than others
which can only carry a single warhead, or in most circumstances,
attack a single target. [Ref. 4; p. 48] The British Polaris
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missile for example, even though of the ballistic type and
amed with more than one warhead, lacks the sophistication to
attack more than a single, area target.
Neville Trotter outlines some of the specific advantages
of British submarine- launched ballistic missiles as follows:
they take only a few minutes to reach their targets; are very
difficult to intercept; can be fired in very fast sequence;
can carry a number of warheads which can be both independently
targetted and manuevering; and generally when on operational
patrol are located far from centers of population and thus,
in themselves, do not invite a first strike on Britain.
Specific disadvantages which Trotter indentifies with SLBMs
include the greater inaccuracies associated with sea-based
navigational positioning systems, which has a minimal impact
on Britain's counter-value targetting strategy, and the
command and control difficulties inherent in establishing
reliable undersea communications. [Ref. 26; pp. 121-122]
1. Launch Platforms
The reliability, penetrability and potential destructive
effect of the ballistic missile and its associated reentry
vehicle and weapons package, make it almost the 'perfect'
delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons, once it has been
launched. The principal disadvantage of ballistic missiles
is the vulnerability of their launch platforms to damage and
destruction by a pre-emptive first strike. To any nation
whose national security strategy is ultimately based on its
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ability to successfully conduct an unacceptably damaging
retaliatory second-strike on potential aggressors, the ability
of its own nuclear strike force to survive a pre-emptive
attack is the real measure of the credibility of that
deterrent.
Ballistic missiles are generally speaking larger,
heavier, bulkier and more awkward to move around than other
types of nuclear delivery vehicles. These facts tend to
make them harder to hide and therefore protect, given the
state of intelligence technology and nuclear strike capability
that is currently available to the superpowers. In considering
the technical requirements for a British replacement for the
Polaris, Ian Smart cites only five types of launch platforms
worth considering: static land bases; mobile land bases;
manned aircraft; naval surface vessels; and submarines.
[Ref. 3: p. 564] In any consideration of these launch plat-
forms, the same advantages and disadvantages do not necessarily
accrue regardless of the type of delivery vehicle being dis-
cussed. There are differences in scope and application and
these salient points will be emphasized.
Ian Smart considers the alternative launch platform
options available in the following manner:
Land-based systems are always likely to rank relatively
low in terms of survival. .. they are difficult, if not
impossible, to conceal from aerial or satellite sur-
veillance or to protect from a pre-emptive nuclear
attack. Mobile launch platforms mitigate that weakness,
but only to a limited extent. .. land-based ballistic
missiles, whether or not in underground silos, are likely
to be more vulnerable than land-based cruise missiles.
131

because of their larger size and lower potential mobility.
.
.
Manned aircraf t. . . and their land bases are, in many
respects, the most vulnerable targets of all. Unless
they are kept in the air, on 'airborne alert' (which is
very expensive) , their ability to survive depends upon
their being able to get enough warning to get them off
the ground and away from their bases before the attack
arrives. .. Sea-based launch platforms generally tend to
have a higher survival potential, because of their
mobility and their opportunities for concealment.
Clearly, this advantage reaches a maximum in the case of
submarine launch platforms. [Ref. 4: pp. 4 5-46]
Writing in a different publication, Smart is more
specific: "ballistic missiles in static land bases, in manned
aircraft or in naval surface vessels are not. . . worth serious
attention in the British case, largely on the grounds of
survival, but, especially in the case of manned aircraft,
also on the grounds of cost... if the delivery vehicle is to
be a ballistic missile, therefore, the chances are that, like
Polaris, it will have to based on a submarine." [Ref. 3:
p. 565]
In the early years of the Cold War, Britain, by virtue
of her geographical proximity, enjoyed a distinct strategic
retaliatory advantage in being able to strike with her bomber
forces at the heart of the Soviet homeland. In the contemporary
context that advantage has now been reversed and it is Britain
which lives in the shadow of Soviet missiles. In a Memorandum
submitted to a Parliamentary sub-committee, Neville Trotter
pointed out that "although the Russians continue to talk of
detente their strategic nuclear arsenal continues to grow and
they now outstrip America both in the number of delivery
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vehicles and in destructive force." [Ref. 26: p. 119]
Speaking directly to the British threat, Trotter says:
The huge Russian strategic force is aimed at America
but part could be targetted on Britain and undoubtedly
we are the target for some of the 690 IRBMs and MRBMs
whose range would not enable them to reach America.
Recently Golf class SSBs have moved for the first
time from the Northern Fleet to the Baltic and from
there Britain is within the 700 mile range of their
missiles. The Soviet Long Range Aviation force has
a growing number of formidable supersonic Backfire
bombers armed with AS4 or AS6 missiles. From bases
in the Arctic these aircraft can attack Britain from
the Western Approaches. In the last few years there
has been a dramatic increase in the range and payload
of the tactical aircraft of the Soviet Frontal Aviation. .
.
it now possesses for the first time the capability to
strike Britain from its bases in East Germany.
[Ref. 26: p. 119]
Concluding he stresses "we could thus be attacked with
tactical rather than strategic weapons. If there was no
likelihood of a retaliatory attack one could envisage circum-
stances when as part of the battle for Europe, such an attack
on Britain could take place." [Ref. 26: p. 119] Implicit
in this statement is the fact that in the event of a full-
fledged European conflict, Britain would be a major staging
area for conventional reenforcements and thus a high priority
target.
Trotter does not even address himself to the serious
threats posed to Britain by the SS-20, a highly accurate,
MIRVed IRBM currently being deployed in Eastern Europe or
the 'depressed- trajectory' submarine- launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) which is optimized for a no-warning strike
against a vulnerable British strategic retaliatory force.
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Lord Peter Hill-Norton, former First Lord of the
Admiralty, Chief of the British Defence Staff and Chairman
of the NATO Military Committee discusses the retaliatory
credibility of the British strategic deterrent force in the
following manner: "the Soviet Union must have a realistic
fear and Britain must have a realistic assurance, that British
weapons can penetrate the defences of the target and that
British delivery vehicles cannot be eliminated by counter-
measures. This must affect consideration of the type of
system that Britain should seek to acquire." [Ref. 48: p. 25]
In his technical assessment of the situation, Ian
Smart comments: "for a small deterrent, such as Britain has
deployed, the survival criteria must be of unique importance."
[Ref. 4: p. 50] Without the almost guaranteed ability to
survive a pre-emptive first strike attack, the thin margin of
credibility of a strategic national deterrent is quickly lost.
Given these requirements and the relative strike capability
of the Soviet Union, Smart argues that there are really only
five potential launcher-delivery vehicle combinations which,
in the British case, could be considered realistically sur-
vivable. Specifically they are cruise missiles mounted on
mobile land-based platforms, in surface vessels, in submarines
or in manned aircraft, and ballistic missiles in submarines.
He singles out the ballistic missile in submarines as having
the probable advantage because of its greater nuclear 'effect,*
while the cruise missile options vary only in the degree of
survivability they offer. [Ref. 4: p. 50]
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Speaking of the importance of this quality in de-
terrent terms, Smart leaves no doubt as to which basing mode
he considers the most secure: "so important is (survivability)
that in the case of a deterrent force of very small size,
with little if any margin of redundancy, there must be some
real doubt about selecting a cruise missile based on land,
in surface vessels or in manned aircraft - at least if it is
to be the only kind of deterrent deployed." [Ref. 4: p. 50]
On this subject, Peter Nailor "highlights the relation-
ship between the size of the armoury and the ability to
stretch the minimum assessment of credible deterrence, which
in the case of a medium power may depend more upon the
relative survivability of the launch vehicle, than upon the
proven ability of the system to penetrate effectively to its
target. If this is the case, then it remains important for
a medium nuclear power to have delivery systems that are, by
general repute, up to date." [Ref. 30: p. 12]
The focal point of all these arguments is that for a
medium nuclear power, such as Britain, to base its ultimate
national security on the threat of strategic retaliation, its
nuclear deterrent force must first, possess the ability to
survive under the most adverse and hostile conditions of
attack and secondly, be able to deliver its weapons in a
reliable and effective manner. No land-based systems can any
longer be considered totally secure. Nailor says "hardening
is no longer capable of providing security for any fixed
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land-based ballistic missile" and further, "it would be unwise
for any nation now to rely exclusively on fixed assets for
nuclear deterrence." [Ref. 4: p. 23]
Britain abandoned the concept of land-based ballistic
missiles when it terminated the "technically-promising Blue
Streak silo-based ballistic missile as... too vulnerable to
surprise attack." [Ref. 1: pp. 10-11] The British Secretary
of State for Defence Francis Pym judges that the situation
remains the same today and that even mobile launchers do not
make a marked change for Britain because she is "such a small
territory within a very short flight time of Soviet land-
based and sea-based missiles." [Ref. 1: p. 11] He goes on
to lay out the Conservative Government's dictum on a land-
based deterrent:
No ground- launched force based in Britain could achieve
the special standard of invulnerability to surprise
attack appropriate for our ultimate strike capability.
[Ref. 1: p. 11]
Pym's examination of alternative launch platforms
revealed aircraft to be a viable option, but rejected it on
several grounds including: vulnerability of aircraft and
airfields; cost of maintaining a permanently airborne de-
terrent force and of the potential hazards associated with
crowded airspace, over a small country; and the fact that
choice of an aircraft as a launch platform would almost
necessarily mean cruise vice ballistic missiles as the
delivery vehicles because of the lack of technical expertise
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available in the air-launched version of the latter category,
and cruise missiles, mainly for reasons of penetrability,
were not the government's first choice. [Ref. 1: pp. 11-12]
In the sea launch category, the Thatcher Government's
position is that "surface ships compare poorly with submarines.
They are not markedly cheaper for a given missile-carrying
capacity, speed or endurance; and they are much easier for an
enemy to find and track." [Ref. 1: p. 12] The conclusion
that is drawn is that submarines are clearly the best plat-
forms for Britain's future strategic force. The reasons are
straight foirward; they are what the British presently have
with its attendent expertise and experience; and the West
still enjoys a technological and operational advantage over
the Soviets in ASW. In short, "the sea is vast and opaque"
and likely to remain such in the foreseeable future, with the
clear advantage lying with the submarine, especially with
one which doesn't wish to be found, like an SSBN on operational
strategic deterrent patrol. [Ref. 1: p. 12] In opting for
submarines. Secretary Pym does not exclude smaller diesel-
powered units in several different deployment schemes, but
concludes that "it v;ould be at best hazardous for Britain,
which cannot afford several kinds of strategic force, to rely
on pioneering so untried a concept." Additionally, "it is
far from clear that these would cost less than nuclear
submarines for a given degree of assurance of a given level
of striking power." [Ref. 1: p. 13] Pym firmly states the
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Government's decision simply: "for all these reasons,
nuclear-propelled ocean-going submarines remain the best
launch platforms for a British missile force." [Ref. 1: p. 13]
2, Ballistic Missile Options
If one accepts the argument that submarine- launched
ballistic missiles are the crucial element of the most secure
strategic deterrent force which the British could deploy,
the question must still be asked, what is the best Polaris
replacement missile for British purposes projected into the
21st Century. There is no clear-cut answer to this question,
rather it will be an amalgam of the current flow and pressures
of technology, politics, and economics. Interestingly, the
decision, when it is made, may be less relevant to the stra-
tegic requirements perceived than to the political realities
encountered as Lawrence Freedman indicates:
^fhile we may think responsible policy on the nuclear
programme requires some attempt to anticipate the
strategic environment of the twenty-first century,
it is more likely that, as in the past, the relevant
decisions will reflect current pressures and interests
rather than speculation over the future. [Ref. 5: p. 1]
Ballistic missile replacement options which have
been seriously considered in the case of the British strategic
nuclear deterrent include the following: continued use of a
refurbished Polaris A-3 with the Chevaline warhead moderniz-
ation; upgrade to the MIRVed Poseidon C-4; development and
production of a solely British-made ballistic missile;
collaboration with the French on a joint ballistic missile
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development project; or purchase, on hopefully favorable
terms, of the new American long-range, submarine- launched
Trident C-4 ballistic missile.
The idea of French-British nuclear collabcration
never received much serious consideration because of the
practical and political hurdles in the way of actual technical
cooperation. The British nuclear deterrent force is so
intimately connected to the American program "that any attempts
to graft on a French missile would face problems of compati-
bility in related systems, as well as possibly contravening
the regulations governing the supply of infoirmation from the
United States to Britain." [Ref. 5: p. 64] The Americans,
many of whom are not in favor of sharing with even Britain
the secrets of nuclear and ballistic research and development,
would certainly view with alarm, any British shift toward the
French, who have been viewed with distrust ever since dropping
out of formal military participation in the NATO Alliance
in the 1960s.
The two countries nuclear programs are differently
constructed and might even be considered complementary, with
the French having a more advanced propellant and missile
capability, while "Britain's indigenous nuclear submarine
and warhead technology is ahead of that of France." [Ref. 5:
p. 64] Secretary Pym states, however, that:
another possibility, considered at an early stage, was
a European solution. Collaboration in the European
context would have been of considerable oolitical
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significance. But it soon became apparent that this
option had a number of disadvantages, in particular
related to cost.
. .
the Government therefore sees no
adequate basis on which such an option could now have
been pursued. [Ref. 1: para 48]
The idea of an independently developed and produced
British ballistic missile is certainly within the realm of
technical feasibility, but as Neville Trotter points out
"the cost would be very great as we should be starting almost
from scratch on a very complex project." [Ref. 26: p. 122]
In addition to the costly, technical problems a British
ballistic missile would present in development terms, Britain
does not possess any of the infrastructure necessary to
support a major nuclear development and testing program, such
as telemetric ranges, tracking stations and communications
facilities.
If Britain chose, for its own reasons, to go it alone
in developing a fully functional independent nuclear capa-
bility, at whatever cost, it would be surprising if this did
not generate a reassessment of Britain's 'special relationship'
with the United States in the area of nuclear cooperation,
and would probably result in greatly loosened ties between
the two countries, and added costs to an already expensive
British undertaking. Peter Nailor underscores some of the
important facets of this argument when he says "Britain has
been able to save both time and money through her cooperative
links with the United States... To maintain the American
connection is to save the cost of re-creating a specialized
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industry to produce particular types of rocket motors and
ancillary equipment, and that of establishing testing ranges."
[Ref. 30: p. 9] Nailor goes on to underscore an even more
vital and fundamental theme on this subject when he comments:
If for some reason the British government came to believe
that nuclear v/eapons had assumed a new level of signifi-
cance, sufficient to justify a separate national investment,
it would be difficult to relinquish the American connection
without implying that some fundamental reassessment of
the British-American relationship had taken place.
[Ref. 30: p. 9]
Conversely, a positive decision by the British to maintain
the strongest and closest possible ties to the United States
in the area of nuclear weaponry, reaffirms and reinvigorates
that 'special relationship' which has existed between the two
countries since the dawn of the nuclear age. Maintenance of
a commonality in weapons systems also minimized the interface
problems that exist in the joint targetting scheme presently
established at SAC Headquarters in Omaha and insures a
maximum integration of alliance deterrent functions at all
levels of command.
While continued close US - UK cooperation has
guaranteed British access to state-of-the-art nuclear weapons
technology, it has done so at the expense of the infrastucture
which originally made Great Britain a nuclear power. James
Bellini and Geoffrey Pattie emphasize this point in their
comments on the Polaris Purchase Agreement which resulted
from the 1962 Nassau Conference between U.S. President Kennedy
and British Prime Minister Macmillan:
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The Polaris arrangement insured for Britain the continu-
ation of a British nuclear capability. But it guaranteed
at the same time that a large measure of control over
its use would pass into American hands, not least because
taking the U.S. -built Polaris system made it inevitable
that Britain would not maintain the research capacity
to produce a viable successor. [Ref. 49: p. 21B)
Bellini and Pattie go on to say that today Britain "is at best
a proxy nuclear power of minor status without an adequate
technological ability for a new generation of nuclear weapons"
and that "Nassau encouraged a certain habit of mind:
essentially, that deterrence was cheap." [Ref. 49: p. 218]
The point that Bellini and Pattie argue is that
although the 'special relationship* with the United States
has guaranteed Britain advanced nuclear technology and systems,
it is a false capability that unsupported would wither away.
They point out the impact that US - UK cooperative
weapons agreements have had on the British Polaris replacement
question:
The nature of the Nassau Agreement was such that Britain
abandoned a large degree of independence in the production
of strategic missiles. The loss of missile technology
contrasts starkly with French experience over the 1960s
as France built up its own deterrent. It leaves France
today far better placed to develop, for example, a
credible cruise missile system. [Ref. 49: p. 218]
While there is more than an element of truth in the
statements of Bellini and Pattie, they are also slightly over-
stated conservative reactions to what, for the British, have
become the political and economic realities of the situation.
The Polaris Improvement Program, codename Chevaline, revealed
the extend to which the British were concerned with the
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maintenance of their technical proficiency in the nuclear
area. As Lawrence Freedman explains:
The virtues of Chevaline did not lie in its strategic
rationale but in the fact that it appeared to be the
minimum required to keep Polaris up-to-date... the
aim was to keep a nuclear capability in being. This
involved more than maintaining the quality of the
Polaris fleet. It was also necessary to maintain an
adequate design capability for new weapons. [Ref.
5: p. 53]
Freedman goes on to point out that without a major focus such
as Chevaline, which was both a guidance system and warhead
modernization, the talents and morale of a specially qualified
design team would lapse over time and this expertise and
experience would be lost and virtually impossible to reassemble
for new and demanding projects.
It is clear that Britain has been concerned with
maintaining a solid technological base in nuclear research and
development and has shown an excellent capacity to do so in
the areas of guidance and warhead design, as evidenced by the
success of the Chevaline project. VJhile British reliance on
American delivery systems has left a substantive gap in its
own technological capabilities, this factor has been very much
dictated by the economic realities of British politics.
Freedman says "the nuclear force has kept its place in the
defence budget over the years because it has not been
especially burdensome... the nuclear strategic force does not
appear exorbitant, considering the relative punch it packs."
[Ref. 5: p. 79] The French have claimed a nuclear triad
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capability since the early 1970s, but it has taken 20-25% of
their defense budget to build and maintain it. This compares
to the British primary deterrent capability, its Polaris
SSBN force, whose costs have averaged about 2 1/2% of the
British defense budget and which is at least as credible as
the French deterrent force.
In announcing the choice of Trident as the preferred
alternative for replacing Polaris, Francis Pym covers the
subject of British ballistic missiles as follows:
It would not be impossible for British industry to
develop and build ballistic missiles for strategic
use. We have however had no major capability in this
field since the 1960s, and to re-acquire it would be
very expensive, take a long time and involve much
uncertainty. This cannot be an attractive option.
[Ref. 1: para 44]
It should be noted that the 'uncertainties' which underlie
any developmental undertaking of this magnitude are both very
real and very expensive. Chevaline costs grew from an estimate
250 million pounds to around 1000 million pounds because of
problems associated with the front-end guidance mechanism.
[Ref. 5: pp. 52-55] For a country such as Britain, with a
particularly thin margin of deterrent credibility, based on
a single strategic weapons system, the uncertainty of this
research and development process could easily spell the end
of that deterrent's effectiveness.
Having rejected for reasons of economy and politics,
the development and production of a British ballistic missile,
either alone or in concert with another European nation, "it
was not," as Lawrence Freedman says:
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inevitable that Trident would be the preferred system.
As the need for a new force was caused by the decline
of the submarines rather than the missiles, in principle
the existing Polaris A- 3 missile, or some modified version,
could have been kept going, buying up the American stocks
when they took Polaris out of service. [Ref. 5: p. 76]
Freedman makes a crucial point in this debate over
the replacement question when he says "for British needs
Polaris should remain quite adequate for some time, and the
country has recently spent considerable sums devising and
producing a new warhead." He goes on to say "the difficulty
lies in holding on to a 19 60s technology well into the next
century. Maintenance, spare parts and, most of all, compati-
bility with the technological environment in which one is
operating would make life increasingly difficult and expensive."
[Ref. 5: p. 76]
Speaking on this subject. Secretary Pyra states that
"the present Polaris missiles could be kept and fitted into
new submarines. They would need new motors, produced from
restarted production lines." He continues that "removing
equipment from the present boats and fitting it into the new
ones might not be cheap or easy, and would entail major
problems in maintaining continuous operational capability
during the transition." [Ref. 1: para 45] The conclusion
that Pym presents is that "a force based on the existing
missiles in new submarines would not be cheap and perhaps
not highly reliable. Nevertheless, it would be cheaper
initially than an entire new force in capital cost." [Ref. 1:
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para 46] "The difficulty" that Secretary Pym sees with this
approach "is that the resulting force would be of uncertain
value and short life. For operational reasons a force based
on Polaris - even with Chevaline. . . would be able to maintain
a high deterrent assurance in the later 199Cs, let alone
beyond that, only if advances in Soviet ability to counter it
proved unexpectedly modest." [Ref. 1: para 46] He implies
that such an approach would be "seriously irresponsible" on
the part of the British government, [Ref. 1: para 46]
The Conservative Government of Mrs. Thatcher also
considered various methods of upgrading the basic Polaris
missile, "mainly by the use of more modern and powerful rocket
fuels to give more range and payload as an insurance against
improved Soviet capabilities." [Ref. 1: para 47] This option
was rejected, however, because the research, development and
procurement costs would have fallen entirely on Britain and
the resulting "missile system costs could well be twice those
of Trident, for a smaller and less assured capability."
[Ref. 1: para 47]
The Poseidon missile was also rejected as a delivery
vehicle for any new deterrent force for reasons of cost
effectiveness. The Poseidon was developed for the United
States Navy as a replacement for the A-1 and A- 2 versions
of the Polaris missile. It was designed to ensure penetration
of the Soviet Galosh BMD around Moscow by means of multiple




The Royal Navy had knowledge of the Poseidon missile project
as early as 1966 and seriously considered the possibility of
converting the British deterrent force to the Poseidon SLBM
as early as 1972. The basis of their preference was for
"keeping up with Americans in the line of its force development,
rather than staying with a missile which had been superceded
by a newer and better model, and a belief that the cost would
not be exhorbitant. " [Ref. 5: p. 45] The procurement of the
Poseidon missile at this time was rejected because of both
technical and political considerations that adjudged the
benefits to be gained greatly outweighed by the projected
costs in monetary and political capital.
Lawrence Freedman indicates the Posdidon's technical
problems centered around its warheads. He says that "apart
from the ability to carry a much more sophisticated warhead,
and some benefits in range, Poseidon had few advantages over
Polaris that were worth the expenditure of a few million
pounds per copy." [Ref. 5: p. 39] The problem was that the
warhead on the Poseidon was MIRVed and Britain would have to
produce her own because this indigenous industrial capability
was one which she had decided was critical to maintain and
also because it was unlikely the United States would provide
it. As Freedman points out:
It was not that Britain could not have made a MIRVed
warhead. The research teams at Aldermaston understood
the technology. In fact, Britain had helped the
American programme by advising on areas of this
technology where it had the lead. But there was no
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need for high missile accuracy. The only interest was
in the penetration of ABMs , for which a more sophisticated
version of the existing warhead could well be sufficient.
[Ref. 5: p. 39]
A British request for Poseidon would have required a
more public and therefore visible political decision which
would have attracted more attention than other alternatives
which were available. Even though "the Americans felt the
British lacked ambition in rejecting Poseidon, staying with
an intermediate technology and so losing the full benefits of
MIRVs/' [Ref. 5: p. 49] Freedman implies that American
political difficulties contributed as well. In commenting
on this question, he says the American Secretary of State,
Henry Kissinger, suggests "the problem. . .was more that Congress
was in an awJcward mood on this sort of issue and was likely
to refuse to countenance the transfer of this particularly
advanced piece of American technology." [Ref. 5: p. 46] The
British, in deploying the Polaris SLBM, had reached a point
where "the nuclear program was no longer a major political
issue. There was a quiet and essentially bi-partisan con-
sensus on maintaining the force and not moving to Poseidon."
[Ref. 5: p. 50] Freedman notes that "a move to Poseidon would
have been politically controversial," and that as the Labour
Party was publically opposed, "it would have been dif f icult. . . to
avoid a commitment to scrap it if and when it (Labour) returned
to office." He concludes that "if Poseidon was adopted and
then cancelled, the liklihood was that the deterrent would be
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abandoned altogether, or at least allowed to die slowly."
[Ref. 5: pp. 50-51]
The alternative the British chose to follow in place
of Poseidon v/as the Super-Antelope project which eventually
became the 1000 million pound Chevaline Polaris Improvement
Program. Although the cost of the proposed Poseidon puchase
rose over time, the growth of the selected Chevaline program
was even more dramatic. Freedman comments:
a programme that involves a large amount of new development
work and is only to be produced in a limited number of
units is extremely vulnerable to cost-escalation. This,
in fact was what happened - to the extent that it is
arguable that it would have been less expensive to opt
for Poseidon. [Ref. 5: p. 49]
In spite of the fact that Poseidon had previously
been rejected in the 19 70s, arguments were considered for
adopting it as the eventual successor to the Polaris SLBM.
Secretary Pym says that "Poseidon would be an effective sys-
tem, but particularly because of its shorter range it would
offer less long-term insurance than Trident against improved
Soviet capabilities." [Ref. 1: para 50] It is worth noting
that if Poseidon were selected as the Polaris replacement
system, it would be coming into service in the Royal Navy about
1990, just as or after it had been phased out of active
service in the U.S. Navy, in favor of one of the Trident
versions. These circumstances are similar to those which were





the initial purchase price would be lower, but several
factors offset this. The age of the missiles and
related equipment would mean higher maintenance costs,
and almost certainly a major re-motoring programme
before long. We would have to bear all the continuing
support costs for a system no longer in United States
service. We should also have to undertake a very
extensive British warhead development and testing
programme and perhaps further work to adapt the missile
system to our warheads. [Ref. 1: para 50]
In speaking of and rejecting the Poseidon as a viable
replacement alternative, Secretary Pyra concludes "in all,
it is unlikely that the cost would be lower (than Trident)
,
and the system would be less good." [Ref. 1: para 50]
It is noteworthy that, in rejecting the Poseidon,
the Secretary of State for Defence did not address its MIRV
capability, which had previously been considered a deterrent
liability by the British. This fact is important because it
leads to an examination of the change in British targetting
doctrine which will apparently result from the decision to
replace Polaris with Trident.
3. Targetting Considerations
The British strategic ballistic missile submarine
force is designed to deter the Soviet use of nuclear weapons
against the NATO alliance, Britain herself and those assets
considered vital to the protection of British national
sovereignty. By inspiring a realistic fear in the Soviet
Union of unacceptable social and political devastation
inevitably resulting from an assured British nuclear retali-
atory response to a Soviet nuclear attack, the likelihood of
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such an attack is significantly reduced. The value of the
deterrent is measured solely in its ability to prevent such
an attack. The technical "credibility" of the deterrent is
measured in terms of its effectiveness, reliability,
penetrability and survivability; traits which have already
been discussed. How well the British deterrent force can
carry out this mission depends to the degree which the Soviets
perceive it as being capable of sufficiently threatening
those supreme values which are of critical importance to
their regime's continued existence.
Since the adoption of the submarine- launched bal-
listic missile as the primary delivery vehicle for its
strategic deterrent force, British targetting doctrine has
been based on a counter-value rather than a counter- force
concept. Briefly, this means that the British, in joint
targetting coordination with the United States at Omaha, have
chosen to threaten targets of chiefly political and social
significance to the Soviets, while generally disregarding
the Soviet strategic forces. The reasons are two-fold and
relate to the size and technical quality of the British
deterrent.
The British four-boat SSBN squadron, armed with
sixteen Polaris A-3 missiles each, could threaten no more
than 64 separate Soviet targets when fully deployed. This
constitutes only a fraction of the total strategic strike
capability which the Soviet Union is able to field. In any
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realistic nuclear scenario, it is unlikely that the British
would be able to get all their SSBNs to sea in a timely
fashion. The baseline credibility of the British deterrent
is therefore the maximum number of targets which can be
reliably threatened by the single British ballistic missile
submarine currently maintained as the minimum on constant
operational patrol. Given the normal factors of attrition
and reliability ascribed to the Polaris missile, it is
generally accepted that the British deterrent force can
successfully threaten a minimum of twelve separate Soviet
targets.
This capacity clearly does not constitute a serious
threat to the strategic strike capabilities of the Soviet
Union as the Soviets would be left with well over 9 5% of
their delivery vehicles untouched even under circumstances
most favorable to the British. Although Britain would
probably be acting in concert with the United States and the
other nations of the Atlantic Alliance in the event of a
Soviet attack, the validity of her deterrent capability vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union must be based on 'last resort'
circumstances in which she were acting alone. Given these
criteria, it is obvious that Britain could not hope to
attack the Soviet Union's strategic forces, but must rather
seek to influence the minds of their leaders by promising
retaliation aimed at Soviet cities, industry and population;
its societal structure and values, rather than its military
forces - thus a counter-value strategy.
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As the size of the Britain nuclear arsenal dictates
a countervalue strategy, so does the type of equipment
currently deployed. The Polaris missile, in all versions,
never had the combination of accuracy and destructive power
necessary to be an effective counterforce weapon and it was
never touted as such. The British Chevaline program was
designed to maintain the ability of the delivery vehicle to
penetrate to its target in the face of potentially more
effective ballistic missile defenses and did nothing to
up-grade its ability to attack 'hard' targets. The Chevaline
modernization was required to maintain the 'Moscow criteria,
'
the ability to successfully attack the seat of Soviet power
and government in any retaliatory strike, a subject which
has been previously considered. The fact that Britain's
deterrent force is sea-based inherently complicates its
guidance problems and further adds to the cumulative errors
that are the final deteirminants of accuracy.
Writing in 1977, Ian Smart comments on the accuracy
required for a counterforce strategy in this manner: "a
very great deal depends on the accuracy with which a nuclear
weapon can be delivered on its target. . . it also demonstrates
that, with any accuracy currently available, 'hard' military
targets in the Soviet Union are very unattractive to a small
deterrent force." Smart goes on to say that "given a plausible
accuracy of . 3 nautical miles CEP (circular error probable),
a single Polaris A3 warhead (200KT) has, in fact, only a 34%
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chance of destroying a 300 psi missile silo - of which the
Soviet Union has some 1500." [Ref. 4: p. 41] This counter-
force estimate was provided by Smart before the deployment
of Chevaline which is no more accurate than the Polaris A3
and, in fact, may be less so because of its corkscrew manuever,
It reportedly also carries smaller warheads than the A3 and
is thus even less capable of attacking the main targets of
the Soviet strategic strike force. Speaking of the future,
Smart concludes:
new guidance systems may make it possible for cruise (or
ballistic) missiles to be fired with much more accuracy. .
.
even then, however, the number of weapons which Britain
would be likely to deploy would hardly be large enough
to merit their commitment to attacks on individual 'hard'
targets in the Soviet Union. [Ref. 4: p. 41]
Nonetheless, the ability of the British ballistic
missile submarine force to inflict damage on the Soviet
societal structure i s considerable, primarily because the
explosive power of thermonuclear weapons is tremendous and
totally out of proportion to the number which one deploys.
The British SSBNs currently maintained on operational patrol
are credited with the ability to deliver some 23-33 EMT
(equivalent megatons) in a retaliatory second-strike on the
Soviet Union. (EMT is a descriptive term developed by
strategic analysts to scale the effectiveness of various
nuclear weapons for comparative purposes. 1 EMT expresses
the damage effectiveness caused by a 1 MT weapon). [Ref. 4:
p. 35] While the total British EMT is relatively small when
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compared to the U.S. and Soviet arsenals, it still represents
a tremendous destructive capacity equivalent to 150-250 times
that directed towards Hiroshima and Nagasaki together in 1945.
[Ref. 4: p. 36]
Ian Smart emphasizes the fact that "it represents a
threat to a substantial part of the Soviet population and
industry." [Ref. 4: p. 38] He goes on to say:
Using the basis of calculation developed in the US
Defense Department under Mr. McNamara, it can be
estimated that the delivery of 33 MTE on Soviet urban
areas might kill 6-8% of the Soviet population. . . and
at the same time destroy up to 25% of Soviet industrial
capacity. Whatever else that may be, it is not
apparently trivial. [Ref. 4: p. 38]
It has always been difficult to ascertain from the
British Government specific information on sensitive defense
subjects like strategic nuclear targetting priorities.
General assumptions, however, can usually be developed that
approximate the governmental position or policy. In the case
of the British Polaris force, it is generally assumed that
it will be used to threaten the maximum number of Soviet
urban complexes, thus inflicting maximum losses on the Soviet
population and disruption on its industrial complexes and
societal structures. But as Robin Ranger points out:
How many Soviet cities and people the British force
could, or should, kill is not usually discussed,
certainly not with the precision of U.S. debates on
U.S. -Soviet nuclear capabilities. This avoids dis-
cussion of the sensitive issues of which targets the
U.K. wants to hit, when, and with what nuclear
forces— strategic, theatre or battlefield. [Ref. 7: p. 7]
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Ian Smart goes beyond the ambiguity usually
associated with British targetting strategies when he says:
"the interesting point is that even a relatively small British
force could, in fact, launch a highly effective attack on
not only 'soft' civilian targets (as is often assumed) but
also on 'soft' military and 'semi-hard' military and civilian
targets. That range of choices includes such very sensitive
targets as ABM or air defence early warning and control
radars, hydro-electric or thermal generating stations, heavy
industrial complexes, military airfields and naval ports."
[Ref. 4: pp. 41-42] In discussing targetting priorities.
Smart considers possible changes in future British deterrent
forces:
One implication of this is strategic: that a new
British deterrent force might usefully include amongst
its potential targets a range of critical military
and civilian assets going well beyond civilian
population alone. Another implication is technical:
that, if Britain is to procure a new deterrent missile
system, there is much to be said for investing in the
accuracy with which its missiles can be delivered, in
order to pose a more credible threat to 'semi-hard'
as well as 'soft' targets. [Ref. 4: p. 42]
The British Secretary of State for Defence, Francis
Pym, addressed this same subject in his statement announcing
"The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent." Pym
said "one practical approach to judging how much deterrent
power Britain needs is to consider what type and scale of
damage Soviet leaders might think likely to leave them
critically handicapped afterwards in continuing confrontation
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with a relatively unscathed United States." [Ref. 1: para
10] He goes on to discuss the uniquely different point of
view of Soviet leadership: "the Soviet Union is a very large
and powerful state, which has in the past demonstrated great
national resilience and resolve. Its history, outlook,
political doctrines and planning all suggest that its view
of how much destruction would constitute intolerable disaster
might differ widely from that of most NATO countries." [Ref.
1: para 11] Speaking of the Trident decision and targetting
priorities, Pym concludes:
Successive United Kingdom Governments have always
declined to make public their nuclear targetting
policy and plans, or to define precisely what
minimum level of destructive capability they judged
necessary for deterrence. The Government however
thinks it is right now to make clear that their
concept of deterrence is concerned essentially with
posing a potential threat to key aspects of Soviet
state power. There might with changing conditions
be more than one way of doing this, and some
flexibility in contingency planning is appropriate.
It would not be helpful to deterrence to define
particular options further. [Ref. 1: para 12]
Ian Bellany's comments on British nuclear doctrine
are particularly relevant at this juncture. He points out
that:
strategic doctrine is a living thing, the product of
a kind of dialogue between what the planners would
ideally like and what weapon manufacturers trying to
meet planners' requirements are able to come up with.
Since we do not in this country (Britain) have a
strategic delivery vehicle (ballistic or cruise)
manufacturing capability we do not have a strategic
nuclear doctrine in the true sense either. Rather,
when we purchased Polaris A3 we purchased at the
same time a definition of what our strategic nuclear
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force was for - a counter-city force, since it was too
inaccurate to be anything else, and a force of retali-
ation since it was too inaccurate but also too small
credibly to be otherwise. [Ref. 29: p. 13]
Addressing himself to the Trident C4 ballistic
missile which the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher
has chosen as a replacement for Polaris, Bellany continues
"accurate MIRV front-ends have multiplied warhead- to- target
ratios to such a degree that even a five boat Trident C4
force could be assigned a mixture of military and civilian
targets. In purchasing C4 we should be purchasing not a
ready made role but for the first time in a long time the
necessity of choice as to role (similar considerations,
clouded somewhat by certain unknowns as to performance, also
apply to the cruise missile)." [Ref. 29: p. 14] Bellany
speaks of the implications of this fact when he says:
If we are successful in obtaining C4... or even one of
the several varieties of cruise missiles under develop-
ment by the United States, we shall be faced with the
novel and possibly unwelcome problem of deciding
precisely how we are going to use it. Polaris A3 can
only be used to hit cities. C4 has the accuracy, and
in a five boat fleet perhaps the warheads too, to
enable us to be more selective in nuclear targetting
than we have ever known how. [Ref. 4: p. 15]
The discussion of possible new British targetting
options focuses primarily on the alternatives presented by a
replacement force deploying the Trident I (C4) missile, a
three-stage solid propellant, inertially guided, submarine-
launched ballistic missile, designed to carry up to eight
independently- targettable warheads to a maximum range of
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about 4000 to 6000 nautical miles, depending on the pay load.
[Ref. 1: p. 28] William Siuru, in the Air University Review,
describes the Trident as follows:
The Trident I missile is designed to fit the same missile
tubes as the Poseidon but achieve almost twice its
range. . . in order to get more than 40 00 miles range. .
.
the Navy has done many things. First, a third class
stage has been added. Second, more energetic and denser
propellants are packed into all stages to provide more
efficient use of the propellant load. Finally, many
of the missile components have been made lighter so that
weight saving can be applied to increasing range.
[Ref. 50: p. 28]
Trident I uses more compact and lighter microelectric circuits;
graphite epoxy materials in the place of aluminum; a nose
made of Sit]<a spruce wood; and has an aerospilce which pops
out of the nosecap during flight and at supersonic speeds
forms a shocJ: wave that drastically reduces the drag on the
blunt, ogive-shaped missile. [Ref. 50: p. 28]
Lawrence Freedman declares that a major advantage
in buying Trident I is that it is both modern and proven:
"Trident has been designed with American rather than British
needs in mind. This is most evident in its range of 4000 nm.
Polaris' 2500 nautical miles gives Britain adequate target
coverage." [Ref. 5: p. 77] Freedman finds "the most
significant change in moving from Polaris to Trident lies in
the warhead. The British will produce their own warhead.
It may well be tempted to follow the American design. . . which
\\;ould result in a MIRV front-end... a major leap in





but here again the cost of not following the
American line of development may result in lower quality for
greater price." [Ref. 5: p. 77] This is in obvious reference
to the British decision to build Chevaline rather than buy
Poseidon in the 1970s.
Arguments have been advanced that the decision on the
missile is inconsequential because "the main cost of the
system will lie with the submarines rather than the missiles."
[Ref. 5: p. 76] Others argue that, although submarines are
the best basing mode for a strategic deterrent force, other
more attractive alternative launch platforms exist besides
the present and the proposed 16-missile SSBN. Chief among
these is the Shallow Undersea Mobile (SUM) as conceived by
Drs. Garwin and Drell and advocated by Farouq Hussain. He
says the "deployment of many small submarines armed with a
small number of missiles permits a much more flexible and
controlled response than would be available from larger
submarines armed with many missiles whose vulnerability to
detection or destruction increases significantly following
the launching of one missile." [Ref. 27: p. 10]
Freedman agrees that "the waters around Britain are
not congenial for Soviet anti-submarine activities, while
the range of the Trident is such that there is no need to
stray far from home." [Ref. 5: p. 78] He sees little
enthusiasm for this solution, however, "because of the
reluctance of naval architects to resist an opportunity to
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produce the most advanced submarine possible.
. . it may reflect
the phenomenon we have already noticed: the reluctance to
experiment in a program with only slight margins for error."
[Ref. 5: p. 78]
The main objection to a new submarine- launched ballistic
missile seems to be the total cost of the system, which in-
cludes missiles, spares, support facilities and the submarines
themselves. Ian Smart puts the question in perspective when
he says:
if Britain is to deploy only one kind of weapon as a
strategic nuclear deterrent for the 1990s - which seems
over\^^helmingly plausible - the rationale choice is
likely to be between a new force of submarine- launched
ballistic missiles and a force of submarine- launched
cruise missiles. In terms of individual delivery
vehicles, the former option, taking reliability,
penetration and effect into account, has a clear
advantage. . . that disadvantage can be off-set, in each
case, by deploying a larger number of cruise missiles.
The question, therefore becomes one of cost... which,
in fact, would cost less to develop, produce and
operate? [Ref. 4: p. 50]
The most commonly quoted price tag for a Trident I equipped
force of five new British SSBNs is between 5500 and 6500
million pounds spread over a ten - fifteen year period.
[Ref. 29: p. 131] This subject will be more fully explored
in the section dealing with the domestic implications of the
British replacement decision.
Ballistic missiles are the front-running candidates
in the Polaris replacement sweepstakes; which one and for
what reasons are still matters under consideration. They
are the most survivable alternative when linked to a submarine
161

as a launch platform. They have excellent traits of
reliability, penetrability, and effectiveness and are
particularly well-suited to a nation with a small deterrent
force like Great Britain; which cannot afford to invest in
a diverse and varied number of nuclear capable strategic
systems. Whether the apparent choice of Trident I missile
by the Thatcher Government remains the best choice remains
to be seen. Before the announcement of the decision Jonathan
Alford commented that "it is becoming clear that the British
Government is very interested in acquiring the Trident C4
missile from the United States. Such a missile would clearly
increase Britain's capability substantially even if only
deployed in the same numbers as Polaris A3." He goes on to
say "it is doubtful whether Britain needs to be able to
deploy more warheads of substantially increased accuracy on
missiles with close to twice the range. . . the Polaris A3 will
remain an adequate missile even if new platforms have to be
built to carry it. . . aging of this missile will remain a
matter for concern, but there do not as yet appear to be any
absolute barriers to prevent Britain from taking the necessary
steps to assure the reliability of the system into the next
century." [Ref. 30: p. 36]
Lawrence Freedman underscores the political strength
of submarine-based ballistic missiles when he comments:
The incentive to follow the previous system in all
respects is strong. It reduces problems of basing,
training, and general infrastructure costs. It is
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safer, if less exciting and bold, to follow familiar
technologies and concepts rather than experiment with
a bright idea that could go terribly wrong. If this
programme fails it is unlikely that there will be
the political will or available money for another try.
[Ref. 5: p. 78]
SLBMs remain very much the first choice for a British strategic
nuclear deterrent force. It has become, however, a matter of
balancing the alternatives available to achieve the political
and strategic consensus that can be sustained in the face of
the serious economic and political realities facing the British
nation and its defence strategists.
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IV. THE TRIDENT DECISION
The decision of the Conservative Government to purchase
the Trident I (C4) submarine- launched ballistic missile from
the United States as a replacement for the Polaris A3 SLBM
in the 199 0s was announced by the British Secretary of State
for Defence, Francis Pym, on 15 July 19 80. Released along
with Pym's statement were the text of letters exchanged
between British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and American
President Jimmy Carter and their respective Defense Ministers
detailing some of the specifics of the transfer.
In her request the British Prime Minister states that
"the Government has concluded that the Trident I weapon system
best meets the need to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent
capability into the 21st century." [Ref. 1: Itrs] The request
becomes more specific as follows:
The United Kingdom Government would wish to purchase
sufficient missiles, complete with multiple independently
targettable re-entry vehicles and less only the warheads
themselves, together with equipment and supporting
services, on a continuing basis and maintain a force of
4 British submarines (or 5 if the United Kingdom
Government so prefer) . . . the successor to the Polaris
force will be assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, like the Polaris force; and except where
the United Kingdom Government may decide that supreme
national interests are at stake, the successor force
will be used for the purposes of international defence
of the Western alliance in all circumstances... the
objective of the United Kingdom Government is to take
advantage of the economies made possible by the
cooperation of the United States in making the Trident
I missile system available in order to reinforce its
efforts to upgrade its conventional forces. [Ref. 1: Itrs]
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The Economist trumpetted the announcement with headlines
that said "It's Trident, it's American, and it's a Bargain."
[Ref. 51: p. 26] The article noted that there were two
surprises in the British decision, the first that "the number
of submarines to be constructed is not five, as had been
forecast, but only four - with an option to order a fifth
within two or three years." [Ref. 51: p. 26] This seemed
to indicate a lively debate within the ministry itself, be-
cause five is more cost-effective and provides a greater
degree of flexibility in maintaining a 'credible' strategic
deterrent. The second surprise was the missile's dominantly
American warhead. It had been believed that the British
would buy only the missile and would build the entire war-
head itself. As the Economist article points out, however,
"Britain. . . will buy the entire Trident rocket, guidance
system, nose cone, dispenser and all - from the United States,
Only the nuclear re-entry vehicles - the actual bombs - will
be made in Britain." [Ref. 51: p. 26]
The total procurement cost of the program will be between
4500-5000 million pounds for a four boat force and up to
6000 million pounds if a fifth boat is added. Of this about
30% will be spent in the United States for the missiles and
their associated MIRV systems. [Ref. 52: p. 1] The DMS News-
letter reports that the submarines will be designed so that
they can be retrofitted with the larger Trident 2 missile if
the UK subsequently decides its adoption is necessary, [Ref.
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52: p. 1] Secretary Pym discusses the Trident II as a larger
SLBM that would give still greater range and pay load, but at
a higher cost. He indicates, however, that "the US
Government. . . is not expected to decide for another two or
three years whether to proceed with Trident II. Our own
choice could not be made dependent on uncertain possibilities
like this." [Ref. 1: para 53] The proven, flight- tested
capability of Trident I, gave it a particularly strong
advantage over competing vehicles (cruise or other ballistic
alternatives) in the case of Britain's small national
strategic forces whose 'credibility' is the sole measure of
their deterrent effectiveness.
The financial arrangements between the United States
and Britain for the Trident purchase follow the general
pattern of the Polaris Sales Agreement of 19 6 2 and levy a
flat 5% surcharge on the British as their portion of the
research and development costs incurred. Additionally, the
British agreed to assume manning requirements of the Rapier
air defense positions at USAF bases in the United Kingdom.
[Ref. 1: Itrs] Other less publicized costs are also assumed
to have been exacted by each side and probably include the
continued use of Holy Loch, Diego Garcia and other 'joint'
installations; continued technical and material exchanges
in areas of mutual interest; and the stationing of 160 GLCMs
in the United Kingdom as part of NATOs intermediate-range
nuclear force (INF) modernization.
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The reasons for the British Government's decision to
continue their strategic nuclear capability into the 21st
Century have been previously enumerated in some detail.
Briefly, the international landscape is seen as still as
unsettled and troubled as at any time since the advent of
atomic weapons. The United States' nuclear predominance
has gradually given way to equivalence with the Soviet Union.
There is no doubt expressed about the validity of the U.S.
nuclear guarantee to protect Western Europe, but just in
case, there is everything to be gained and nothing to be lost
by Britain's keeping her strategic nuclear deterrent force
intact and credible, to have the capacity to influence
uniquely perilous situations where British national values
or interests are at issue. Without a compelling reason to
give up this significant capability which has been maintained
without fail, for over a quarter of a century, there is little
likelihood that it will be given up, unless the economics
become totally unmanageable.
Having chosen to maintain their nuclear capability, the
British are inclined to submarine- launched weapons because
of their extensive experience with them and because of the
superior survivability factors associated with this particular
type of launch platform. In the judgement of the Thatcher
Government, the other potential launch platforms all suffer
varying higher degrees of vulnerability. This is unacceptable
to a medium nuclear power such as Great Britain where the
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inviolability of its strategic retaliatory force is often
the principal determinant of its deterrent effectiveness.
While the cost of any submarine-based system is considerably
more than that of other alternatives, this is accepted as a
necessary price to pay to preserve the integrity of the
deterrent threat posed.
Ballistic missiles were considered the best choice for
the British deterrent because of their reliability, pene-
trability and effectiveness. Cruise missiles were viewed as
an interesting and potentially quite promising development,
but one which was still unproven and upon which it would be
of questionable wisdom to base the ultimate guarantee of
the vital interests and national sovereignty of Britain.
The prime attribute which cruise missiles offered was their
relative cheapness vis-a-vis ballistic missiles. Even this
supposed advantage, however, was of questionable value when
survivable launch platforms and the large numbers of cruise
missiles needed to achieve the same effect as ballistic
missiles were factored into the equation.
Several ballistic choices were available for the British
to follow in replacing Polaris, but after evaluating the
cost and cost-effectiveness of the various alternatives over
the projected life of the deterrent force, the Conservative
Government chose to purchase the Trident I system from the
United States. Secretary of State for Defense Francis Pym
describes the choice in the following manner:
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the MIRV capability and long range give excellent
margins of long term insurance against further
advances in Soviet ABM and ASW capability; and
improved techniques give better accuracy than
earlier systems offered. The Trident system is
likely to remain in United States service for
many years to come, during which all the
economies of commonality will be available to
us. [Ref. 1: para 51]
Writing in the Guardian following the announcement of
the Government decision to proceed with the Trident purchase,
Lawrence Freedman says the "two criteria - of survivability
and penetrability - have governed the choice of the Polaris
replacement. " He discusses the other principal alternative
in these words: "the cheapest and simplest option for a
successor would have been ground- launched cruise missiles...
they failed the test of both survivability. . . and pene-
trability." [Ref. 53: p. 11] He goes on to indicate that
the British Government chose the safest option available;
although five submarines would have been the preferred choice,
the slumping British economy dictated that four would have
to do, at least initially.
Freedman points out that it has been "suggested that
going for the MIRVed, long-range Trident with its eight
individual warheads is far in excess of British needs and
that something simpler would have been sufficient. Technically
this is true but it is by no means the case that a simpler
system would have been less expensive. This is because
Britain is now inextricably linked to the pattern of United
States missile development. The virtues of Trident were not
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so much its capabilities as the fact that it was the most
modern and proven American system available. By taking it,
Britain avoids expensive development costs and makes some
savings through shared support costs. This financial benefit
could not have been achieved with most other options, even
adopting older American missiles or putting the Chevaline
front-end on Trident missiles." [Ref. 53: p. 11]
Following the Trident decision, the Sunday Times headlined
another analysis by Lawrence Freedman wondering "Trident:
will it still work in 2020 A.D.?" Freedman' s contention is
that one of the most powerful arguments behind the decision
is the influence of the past; "more specifically, the
experience with the Polaris missile, which has clearly
reassured the defence establishment." [Ref. 54: p. 17]
Freedman discusses the Trident decision in this manner:
I^at Tuesday's decision reveals first... is a
preference for continuity. There is to be no
experimentation with novel systems, such as hover-
craft-based Cruise missiles, nor any attempts at
innovation in strategic doctrine. [Ref. 54: p. 17]
Freedman goes on to comment that "this continuity in system
reflects more the success of the Polaris programme than a
judgement on Britain's strategic and political environment."
[Ref. 54: p. 17]
Freedman outlines clearly a number of basic assumptions
made by the military and political strategists in arriving
at the Trident decision. These include the assumption that
the strategic environment will change in detail and in degree
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but not in fundamentals; that there will be no major break-
throughs in the techniques of anti-submarine warfare; and
that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty will continue to
be effective. [Ref. 54: p. 17] In fact, the only major
change which Freedman sees the Trident decision anticipating
is the development of substantial Soviet defenses to Cruise
missiles. He says that "the Ministry of Defence argues that
defences designed to cope with American Cruise missiles
would cause immense problems for any British Cruise missile
force which would have been smaller." [Ref. 54: p. 17]
Freedman does, however, underscore the fact that "if the
expected Soviet air defences do not in fact materialize,
Britain's rejection of the Cruise option will, of course,
look less convincing." [Ref. 54: p. 17]
Robin Ranger's analysis of the British Government's
decision-making process regarding the Trident purchase is
somewhat more pointed and cynical than those of most defense
observers. He says "Mr. Pym's view appears to be that the
Russians are bad chaps, so defence is a good thing and, since
Trident is a good system. Trident is a good thing." [Ref.
7: p. 5] The fact that should not be discounted is that
after all the nuances of strategic doctrine have been examined,
this simplistic 'gut' rationale may not be too far removed
from the mark.
David Fairhall depicts the Trident decision in much the
same vein as Freedman when he says "the essential characteristic
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of the Trident deterrent system. . . as a replacement for
Polaris is that it resembles its predecessor in almost
everything but the scale of destruction it can guarantee to
bring down upon Soviet cities." [Ref. 55: p. 4] It is
interesting to note that the increased destructiveness of
the MIRVed Trident over the other strategic alternatives
considered has not received a great deal of emphasis in
public arguments and analysis. From a strategic perspective,
the capacity to inflict a significantly higher level of
retaliatory punishment is a major gain in terms of the
political will and determination necessary to establish the
credibility of a second-strike deterrent. Trident provides
this ability and more in full measure.
According to Fairhall, "Ministry of Defence officials
regard the. . . package as highly satisfactory. But the
Trident programme's immense expense relative to the remote
contingency for which it is designed, is nevertheless the
most controversial aspect." [Ref. 55: p. 4] The announce-
ment indicated that the capital cost of Trident "is unlikely
to absorb more than 3 per cent of the total budget between
19 80 and 199 5" and "that such sums could be found within the
defence budget without cutting into other weapons programmes
and our contribution to NATO's conventional defences."
[Ref. 55: p. 4] Fairhall views these claims with skepticism
and cites the fact that on the day before Pym's Trident
statement, the British announced their decision to proceed
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with the acquisition of Challenger tanks for the army rather
than develop a completely new and more costly MBT design for
the late 19 80s. Funding, as well as tactical considerations,
was a determining factor.
The problems associated with Polaris replacement and the
maintenance of strategic British nuclear deterrence into the
21st Century have confronted British political and strategic
planners for over a decade. The resulting decision on Trident
is thus a strong affirmation that a political consensus has
existed through several British governments of varying
persuasion about the importance of maintaining a British
nuclear retaliatory capability. When the Labour Party of
Harold Wilson came to power in 19 74, it was faced with the
decision whether to proceed with the Chevaline development.
Lawrence Freedman says "the decision was taken, as usual,
by a small group - Harold Wilson, Denis Healey, Roy Jenkins,
James Callaghan and Roy Mason" to proceed with the Chevaline
front-end update to "preserve targetting capabilities."
[Ref. 5: p. 52] This is in keeping with traditional British
political practice of a "a decision taken by a very small
circle of officials and senior cabinet ministers. . . (it) is
profoundly undemocratic, but accords with the British
tradition of secrecy, and of informing the public, and
Parliament, not consulting them." [Ref. 7: p. 8]
Freedman speaks of this practice when he mentions that
the Chevaline project was almost cancelled in 19 77 because
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of escalating costs, but because this would have been
interpreted as a lack of governmental resolve and since "this
was not the Government's intention... so the line of least
resistance was to let the programme run its course." [Ref.
5: p. 54] He further comments that "the tradition of secret
and bipartisan policy-making, with its emphasis on continuity,
was one reason why the Conservatives chose Chevaline in 19 73
and why the programme survived in 1977." [Ref. 5: p. 54]
Robin Ranger outlines the Government's position on the
Trident decision when he says that "it was taken in accordance
with British Parliamentary traditions. The Government made
the decision and laid it before Parliament for debate and
approval. More public discussion would have been desirable
but impossible, given the security problem and the sensitivity
of the issues." [Ref. 7: p. 9] Ranger's analysis of the
Government's reasoning is that "provided security" is under-
stood as a synonym for "political sensitivities," this state-
ment is surprisingly truthful. A prolonged, informed, public
debate would raise all the awkward issues indicated...
vis-a-vis the U.S. and Britain's Nato-Europe allies. It
would also stimulate public opposition in the U.K. to the
British deterrent and to the stationing of U.S. GLCM in the
UK." [Ref. 7: p. 9] In the commenting on the Trident
decision. Ranger emphasizes what he considers to be the
inherent arrogance built-in to the so-called British
democracy when he says:
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"since the British Establishment had decided the
decision to its satisfaction, this was, in its view,
sufficient: what can outsiders... add... ? Nothingl"
[Ref. 7: p. 9]
The question of Polaris replacement was first surfaced
publicly with Ian Smart's articles, but Lawrence Freedman
tells us that in the middle of 1977, the Ministry of Defence
also suggested coincidentally that the problem required
consideration. Freedman indicates that "as normal in these
matters, the Prime Minister convened a small, private ad hoc
group to consider these studies. This was outside the formal
cabinet structure (it even lacked a Gen number, used for
subcommittees in Labour Cabinets) . The Committee was composed
of Prime Minister Callaghan; Denis Healey, Chancellor of the
Exchequer; David Owen, Foreign Secretary; and Fred Mulley,
Defence Secretary. [Ref. 56: p. 4]
This Cabinet 'committee of four' established two working
parties in Whitehall which began to inquire into the Polaris
replacement in January 1978. One, headed by Sir Anthony Duff,
the Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, concerned
itself with the military and political implications of a
successor for Polaris. The second, a technical group chaired
by Professor Ronald Mason, Chief Scientific Advisor to the
Ministry of Defence, studied the alternative delivery systems
available. Peter Hennessy indicates that the Cabinet committee
had reached no firm conclusions by the time Parliament was
dissolved for elections in 19 79, but several things had
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become clear: "The intention was to proceed to a third
generation despite the 1974 Manifesto commitment (and)
the need for any Polaris replacement to be submarine borne."
[Ref. 56: p, 4]
The 1974 Labour Party Manifesto referred to above, re-
jected new deterrent systems, saying in part: "We shall
maintain its effectiveness. We do not intend to move to a
new generation of strategic nuclear weapons." [Ref. 5: p. 55]
Hennessy indicates that one of the results of the "highly
secret ratiocination" of the 'committee of four' was the
compromise wording on the deterrent that Prime Minister
Callaghan managed to insert into the Labour Party's 19 79
Election Manifesto:
In 19 74, we renounced any intention of moving towards
the production of a new generation of nuclear weapons
or a successor to the Polaris nuclear force; we
reiterate our belief that this is the best course for
Britain. But many great issues affecting our allies
and the world are involved, and a new round of
Strategic Arms Limitation negotiations will soon begin.
We think it is essential that there must be a full and
informed debate about these issues in the country before
any decision is taken. [Ref. 56: p. 4]
Even though no ministerial decisions were taken on this
matter by the Callaghan Government before the 19 79 election,
"the possibility that a replacement would be necessary and
that if so, it would require American help, was sufficient
to allow Mr. Callaghan, whose instincts were in favour of
replacement, to raise the issue tentatively with President
Carter during the Guadeloupe summit of early January 1979."
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[Ref. 5: p. 61] The fact that the Labour Government had not
ruled out a replacement for Polaris was made clear by Defence
Secretary Fred Mulley in a Parliamentary debate on election
eve when he remarked: "I could not say today that in no
circumstances would I be in favour of moving towards a new
generation. I accept that the arguments for and against are
very finely balanced. The answer depends a lot on what happens
in the next year or two." [Ref. 57]
The Conservative victory in British elections in May 1979
brought to power a Government committed to the maintenance
of an effective nuclear deterrent. Peter Jenkins, a
commentator for the Guardian remarks that "there has never
been the slightest doubt that the Thatcher Government would
replace Polaris and go for the Trident. That choice was
effectively made in opposition. The Mandarinate had deter-
mined upon a replacement in the same class as the Polaris
and made sure the decision was not pre-empted by a lame-duck
Labour Government." [Ref. 58: p. 13]
One of the first subcommittees set up by the new Govern-
ment was MI3C 1 , whose first priority was dealing with the
British nuclear force. It consisted of Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher and Home Secretary William Whitelaw,
Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe and the Defence
and Foreign Secretaries, Francis Pym and Lord Carrington.
[Ref. 5: p. 62] This committee was able to move rapidly
forward because it had available to it the studies of Duff
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and Mason which had been rev/orked with "new tops and tails."
[Ref. 56: p. 4] Lawrence Freedman implies that MISC 7 moved
rapidly "to a position that the Polaris force should be
replaced in the early 1990s by a new submarine- launched
missile system." [Ref. 5: p. 63] This plan apparently had
the support of the Chiefs of Staff, under the chairmanship
of Admiral Sir Terrence Lewin, although some worry was
expressed about the budgetary consequences for conventional
forces.
Initial 'soundings' as to the American willingness to
continue the 'special relationship' which had provided
Polaris were made by Secretary Pym when he met with the U.S.
Secretary of defense Harold Brown in July 19 79. This meeting .
laid the ground work for Mrs. Thatcher to ask President
Carter for assistance when they met in December 19 79. When
American officials began to consider appropriate responses,
they "concluded that a request should be treated positively,
not as an act of charity but because of wider political and
strategic benefits." [Ref. 5: p. 66] Freedman points out
"the American Defense Department report of January 19 80
contains, for the first time, a positive endorsement of the
British force: "The close US cooperation with this capability
reflects our judgement that the British force, which is
committed to NATO, contributes to our mutual defense interests."
[Ref. 5: o. 67]
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The communique resulting from the Thatcher-Carter summit
noted agreement "on the importance of maintaining a credible
British strategic deterrent and US/UK strategic cooperation'
and that the two countries 'should continue their discussions
of the most appropriate means of achieving these objectives
for the future." [Ref. 5: p. 6 7] Having agreed to cooperation
in principle, the British, despite claims to the contrary,
were kept waiting by the Americans for the most opportune
time for a formal British request. President Carter's
political fortunes were in flux; the invasion of Afghanistan
had raised questions about SALT II and detente; and there was
some question as to the financial aspects of the Trident
deal. All of these questions had an impact on the announcement
date.
Ian Mather tells us that the actual British commitment
to purchase 100 Trident missiles was made on Friday, 13 June
19 80, when Michael Quinlan, Deputy Under-Secretary of
Strategic Programs (MOD) and ^la.lt Slocombe, U.S. Deputy
Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning signed the
required letters of exchange on the 'boot' (trunk) of a car.
[Ref. 59: p. 3] The announcement of the purchase had
originally been scheduled for July 4th, but was delayed
because West Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was on a
trip to Moscow and such an announcement could have opened
him to private and public criticism from the Soviets which
would have been politically harmful in the West Germany and
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possibly devisive within the Alliance. Gilbert Lewthwaite
reports that the U.S. welcomed the British Trident decision
strategically, economically and politically. He goes on to
say that "officials denied that the timing of the adminis-
tration's announcement was influenced by the Republican Party
convention in Detroit, and asserted that it was keyed to
the return of Congress next v/eek, and to the British Parlia-
mentary timetable." [Ref. 60: p. 1] The Trident announcement
was made the day before Ronald Reagan was formally nominated
as the Republican presidential candidate and may have been
an attempt by the Carter administration to strengthen the
President's image on defense.
Ian Mather notes that "Callaghan (the former Prime
Minister) had decided in principle to buy the Trident missile
from the United States. Three senior sources connected with
the American negotiations that ended in the deal announced
last week told me that Mr. Callaghan was strongly supported
in his decision by the then Defence Minister Fred Mulley.
After commissioning intensive studies, the two men decided
to 'bite the bullet' and buy Trident if Labour won the
election." [Ref. 59: p. 3] With the Conservatives coming
to power and dedicated to the continuation of the strategic
nuclear deterrent force, there was no need for the Labour
hierarchy to come to public grips with their apparent private
conclusions that the Polaris force needed to be replaced.
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Two issues resolved only at tJie end of the protracted
negotiations between the United States and Britain concerned
the v/arhead chosen and the total cost of the American
equipment. The British had initially wanted to develop their
own warhead to maintain the high level of technical expertise
at Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE)
which had been achieved in the Chevaline programme. Ad-
ditionally, some opposition developed in the U.S. State
Department to the sale of multiple independently targettable
reentry vehicles (MIRV) because of their possible impact on
future arms limitation negotiations. [Ref. 59: p. 3] Mather
tells us that this "led to a brief British flirtation with
the idea of fitting an improved warhead system (Chevaline)...
on its Tridents." He goes on to say:
the Chevaline-Trident idea was quickly dropped. .
.
because of the huge costs to the British of testing
it at Cape Canaveral and because the American Government
genuinely wanted Britain to buy the full Trident, since
its greater range of 4000 miles and multiple warhead
capacity adds to the Western Arsenal facing Russia.
The issue of cost was resolved by following the 5%
surcharge descended from the original Nassau formula developed
in 196 2. The Carter Government apparently wanted to make
the sale price as cheap as possible to enhance its
attractiveness to the British, but was forced "to mollify
Congressional opposition to any sale which did not make the
purchaser pay a fair share of the research and development
costs." [Ref. 59: p. 3] The 5% extra tacked on for R&D was
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thus a compromise position acceptable to both sides. The
British, in fact, were quite pleased with the terms of the
purchase agreement, which were much better than had generally
been anticipated. The reason was obvious, of course, the
Americans really wanted the British to buy Trident for
reasons of strategic interest and they were prepared to make
the agreement sufficiently attractive to virtually guarantee
British participation.
The Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher was
firmly committed to the Trident purchase, but its ability
to shephard that decision through to fruition remains a
matter of future political resolve. One of the principal
reasons the Government had for committing itself quickly to
the Trident was to get the programme well under way before
there was a real likelihood that future Labour governments
might overturn the decision. Ian Bellany remarks on the
decision that:
the arguments for and against proceeding to a new
generation of strategic nuclear force are so finely
balanced that historians may come to say, uncharac-
teristically, that the deciding factors in 19 80 were
of a haphazard kind: the personality of the British
Prime Minister, the personality and fortunes of the
American President and his relations with the Senate'
and the state of Soviet-American relations.
[Ref . 29: p. 9]
Bellany goes on to say that "these haphazard elements have
conspired to create a window of opportunity for a British
approach to the United States for a successor to Polaris."
[Ref. 29: p. 9] It was through this window that the British
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Government reached and secured Trident as the mainstay of
its strategic nuclear retaliatory force of the 21st Century,
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V. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS
The British strategic deterrent force is designed to
influence the minds and actions of potential aggressors by
threatening an unacceptable level of nuclear retribution if
British interests are jeopardized or attacked. The strategic
deterrent force which is the guarantor of this punishment
is chiefly a political rather than a military instrument and
despite the focus on technical aspects which has dominated
the Polaris replacement debate, the crucial question for the
decision's durability is v/hat political effects will result.
The deployment of a British Trident force will have a
major politico-strategic impact on Western defenses, as did
the decision to seek such a capability and the abilities of
the governments involved in such a momentous decision to
carry it through to fruition. Each of these actions carry
with them political im.plications outside the sphere of their
technical competence. Each affects and is affected by the
internal politics of the countries involved.
In the case of the British Trident decision. Presidents
and Prime Ministers come and go and political parties change
power. All have different philosophical goals and methods
of achieving them. In the harsh reality of the political
marketplace, where righteousness and principle are too often
measured in dollars and pounds sterling, the ability of any
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controversial policy or program to survive a 10-12 year
acquisition period is slim indeed. It demands a strong
resolve and a continuing political consensus that rises above
politics. The Polaris program, by virtue of its economy and
lack of political visibility, enjoyed a unique degree of
national political support. The requirement for a continued
British strategic nuclear deterrent apparently remains
publicly and politically supported throughout Britain.
Whether this general acceptance can be translated into a
deployed Trident capability depends a great deal on whether
or not this program can equal the success of Polaris in not
'rocking the domestic political boat.'
NATO has been the prime bulwark against Soviet aggression
and adventurism in Western Europe since its inception in 1950.
The British military withdrawal from East of Suez has
resulted in NATO becoming the central focus of British defense
efforts. Despite the excellent levels of strength, cooperation
and stability that have been achieved within the alliance's
military command, domestic and international strains continue
to pull at the political fabric of the various nations
involved. This turmoil can only be expected to increase as
the political requirements of each country develop in their
own uniquely national manner. The British decision to build
and deploy Trident missile- firing submarines will affect the
cohesiveness of the alliance, as well as its ability to
respond to or deter Soviet military aggression. VJestern
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European stability and political resolve in successfully
meeting the international and political challenges that will
confront NATO in future, v;ill determine to a large degree
the political wisdom of the British choice for a new
strategic deterrent force.
The Daily Telegraph headlined the British Government's
decision to purchase the Trident SL3M as "Top-Grade Deterrence."
[Ref. 61: p. 16] Ian Bellany remarks that "the cruise missile
is unlikely to be matched, as a technological tour de force,
in either France or the Soviet Union by the mid-1990s. . . the
Trident C4, on the other hand, will be unmatched by anything
the Soviets or the French have before the turn of the century."
[Ref. 29: p. 12] But despite the general consensus that it
is a good idea for Britain to maintain an effective,
credible strategic deterrent, the choice of Trident has not
met with unanimous approval. Ian Ilather, the Observer's
defence correspondent, comments that:
critics of the Trident are not all pacifists or
unilateral disarmers. A fascinating feature of
recent defence seminars has been the number of
'experts' voicing doubts about the decision. Most
of the argument revolves around cost. [Ref. 62: p. 13]
The Trident decision and its manner of implementation
were immediately criticized by William Rodgers, then chief
spokesman for the Labour Party on defense matters, "the
figures Mr. Pym has given, (the decision) raises difficult
financial matters... with limited national resources at a
time of no or slow growth, this program will preempt a large
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Slim of money which might go toward more worthy programs."
[Ref. 63: p. 24] Rogers also went on to criticize the lack
of discussion in the cabinet and debate in Parliament on the
decision to adopt Trident and concluded by saying: "In these
circumstances, many of us are deeply skeptical about the
decision. We believe the case for buying Trident has not
been made out and I believe we simply cannot approve it.
"
[Ref. 63: p. 25] David Brown reports that "the Liberal Party,
smallest of the three major political parties in Britain,
also opposed the sale on the grounds that Britain did not
need any independent nuclear deterrent force." [Ref. 63: p. 25]
One of the more interesting features of the public dis-
cussion that preceded the formal selection of the Trident
missile as the Polaris replacement was a series of letters to
the Times by notable defense experts, arguing the merits and
demerits of the situation. Field Marshal Lord Carver, former
Chief of the Joint Staff, whom Lord Gladwyn, defense corres-
pondent for the Daily Telegraph, calls "the odd man out in
Service circles," [Ref. 64: p. 3] is opposed to the renewal
of the British 'strategic' deterrent on the grounds that he
cannot conceive of any situation in which its independent use
would seem justified. Carver says:
I can conceive of no circumstances in which it would be
right, reasonable or realistic for the Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom to authorize the use of British
nuclear weapons, when the President of the United States
was not prepared to authorize the use of any US nuclear
weapons; nor do I believe that the Russians would believe




Lord Carver does not follow the logic of what he calls
unilateral nuclear disarmers. He believes in the reasons
successive British governments of different political per-
suasion have maintained a nuclear capability and he does not
desire to alter this arrangement because of the "profound
political impact it would have - in this country, among our
allies, on our potential enemies and in the world at large."
[Ref. 65: Itrs] What he does advocate is the use of nuclear
weapons in theater warfare roles. This he argues is
financially affordable and will not affect the vital re-
equipment programs needed by the three services as much as
would the construction of a Trident SLBM-equipped strategic
deterrent squadron. Dr. Hew Strachan emphasizes a key point
when he says "as Lord Carver has so rightly pointed out, if
NATO is the cornerstone of our strategy, there is no logical
case for an independent strategic deterrent." [Ref. 66: Itrs]
Lord Carver's arguments are countered by Marshal of the
Royal Air Force Sir Neil Cameron who says that the question
is really about deterrence, or the ability to influence the
adversary. In advocating the retention of theater nuclear
weapons. Lord Carver is, in reality, talking about a nuclear
warfighting capability. A strategic nuclear deterrent force
is designed around a war-deterring mission. Additionally,
without a strategic deterrent to back up theater systems, the
latter would be impractical to use against the Soviet Union
because of its ability to escalate the level of violence
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higher than can the British. [Ref. 67: Itrs] Sir Neil
favors continuing the present strategic force in the form
of Trident, not only because of its deterrent effect, but
also as an offset to French nuclear and German conventional
dominance on the continent. [Ref. 64: p. 3]
Jonathan Alford of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies addresses several subjects affecting the
Trident decision in a letter to the Times . One of these
concerns is cost, about which he says that it "seems
abundantly clear that the decision to go for Trident will
have a profound impact on Britain's conventional capabilities."
He says further that:
what Sir Neil Cameron does not point out is that 7 per
cent of the budget (Trident estimate) amounts to almost
12 per cent of the money set aside for equipment pro-
curement as a whole and no less than 26 per cent of the
amount set aside this year for the production of new
equipment. Something big will have to go in order to
absorb a Trident programme. . . there are alternatives
available - either the run-on of Polaris or a cruise
missile variant - which are undeniably less up-market
than Trident but which will do the job while still
allowing us to maintain our conventional capabilities
more or less unimpaired." [Ref. 68: Itrs]
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Hill-Norton, another former
Chief of the Defence Staff and Chaiinnan of the NATO Committee,
advocates acquisition of the Trident SLBM along the same lines
as Sir Neil Cameron. He comments that "Sir Neil has rightly
pointed out that without the strategic weapons we might as
well give up our so-called theatre and nuclear battlefield
weapons too... despite what Lord Carver has said about
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retaining a tactical nuclear capability... he is, in effect,
proposing that we should, unilaterally give up all nuclear
weapons." [Ref. 69: Itrs] Summing up his feelings, Hill-
Norton says:
I prefer, and so does Sir Neil, to continue the policy
wisely followed by her Majesty's Government, of both
political parties, for the last 27 years, which enables
us to protect our vital interests against threats of
blackmail, or the actual use of force, against both
our European allies and this realm. [Ref. 69: Itrs]
Lord Caccia, the former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence
Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, argues persuasively for
the Trident missile on the grounds that we cannot predict
what will happen to the international order during the pro-
jected life of the new strategic deterrent. Although Britain
is securely tied to NATO as the cornerstone of its national
security, no one can possibly know what will be the condition
of that alliance as we move into a new century. Caccia
believes that the British Government should retain "the
largest feasible number of options to provide for the
unpredictable." Trident is seen as being the best system to
do that. [Ref. 70: Itrs]
Lord Greenhill of Barrow, writing to the Times the
following day, made the same argument, that in a world of
uncertainties, Britain should value a credible deterrent
force to protect against the unknown day when its security
might be threatened in a world far different than the one
presently existing. [Ref. 71: Itrs]
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The civil experts, as documented above, end up on both
sides of the Trident decision. Except for Lord Carver, there
seems little disagreement that the maintenance of a strategic
deterrent is a good thing, the question revolves around
whether Britain needs or can use the leap-step jump in
capabilities that Trident brings and whether or not she can
afford them without some other crippling curtailment. One of
the most knowledgeable experts on the dollar/pounds sterling
costs of the Trident purchase and its impact on British
military planning is David Greenwood whose analysis "The
Polaris Successor System: At What Cost?" is the most
comprehensive treatment of the subject.
Writing in the Sunday Times following the Thatcher
Government's announcement of the Trident deal. Greenwood
analyzed the cost question as being divided into two parts:
is the 5000 million pounds sterling estimate realistic; and
given the answer to the first part, can the government buy
Trident without damaging the rest of the defence programme
and the budget? Greenwood estimates that given the large
number of unknowns in the strategic equation at the time of
the announcement, "the Government will be hard-pressed to
hold the cost of a four-boat Trident force at 5000 million
pounds." [Ref. 72: p. 17] Among these unknown variables
are the submarine design; the probable expansion of submarine
construction and support facilities; upgraded communications
and any additional costs associated with warhead design
information and weapons-grade material that might be required.
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Greenwood is more emphatic in addressing the second part
of the question he posed, as he remarks:
Unless the Defence Minister, Francis Pym, has discovered
a way to have his military cake and eat it, something
in the current defence programme and budget will have
to give up to 'make room* for the Trident expenditure.
[Ref. 72: p. 17]
He goes on to note that the "Government maintains it can buy
Trident without prejudice to the country's 'all-round
contribution to Allied deterrence and defence'" and therefore
the Government must intend to make room by "piecemeal
diminution in the scale of spending on conventional forces."
[Ref. 72: p. 17]
Greenwood sees the services having to tolerate "over-
stretch, and undernourishment... with further effect on
reduced combat effectiveness and morale. Such degradation
and dilution of the quality of the conventional forces seems
inescapable as time goes by, at least for so long as there
is an insistence on keeping up the appearance of an 'all-round
contribution to the Alliance.'" [Ref. 72: p. 17] Ian Mather
quotes Greenwood as saying the "chance other new conventional
weapons will have to be sacrificed is high." [Ref. 62: p. 13]
Mather goes on to say "Greenwood postulates two ways in which
Trident could be accommodated. Both involve huge cuts,
perhaps in Britain's naval contribution to NATO in the
Atlantic, or in British forces in Germany." [Ref. 62: p. 13]
In his major work on the subject Greenwood himself concludes:
"
'the price' in terms of the alternative defence provision
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that will have to be foregone is the abandonment of the
notion that the United Kingdom should make a balanced
contribution to the Atlantic Alliance and that it should
sustain balanced forces." [Ref. 29: p. 138]
Lawrence Freedman refers to the cost issue's future
impact: "when the crunch comes in the 19 80s, Ministers,
whether Labour or Conservative, will be looking for cuts -
and bang in the middle of their expenditure programmes is
going to be the nuclear force. Whereas it has managed to
escape in the past it is not going to avoid cost-cutting
scrutiny in the future, because by then it will be one of the
chief current spending programmes." [Ref. 29: p. 156]
Freedman goes on to say:
In the end I find myself in agreement with Greenwood
not because of the absolute cost of the programme but
because of the likely pressure on resources in the
British economy over the next decade. It is sheer
irresponsibility for the Secretary of State for Defence
to say that 4000 to 5000 million pounds can be spent
without effect elsewhere, because as Greenwood argues,
in the end you cannot have your cake and eat it.
[Ref. 29: p. 156]
David Brown reports that the fact that the bulk of the
Trident funding will be spent over a 15-year period was a
major reason for the selection of Trident as Polaris'
replacement. He says "the ability to spread the cost of the
Trident over this relatively long period of time, with the
bulk of the cost coming several years into the program, is
one of the major reasons the Trident was selected." [Ref.
63: p. 24] Brown further reports that about 70% of the cost
19 3

of the Trident program will be spent in Great Britain.
Unofficial estimates are that the program will provide as
many as 200,000 jobs during its lifetime, mostly in the ship
building industry, but also in a number of small supplier
firms, especially in electronics areas, scattered around the
country. This should help deflect the criticism that the
Conservative Government has been taking about unemployment
and make it harder for future Labour governments to tamper
with. [Ref. 73: p. 44]
Still the question of British ability to pay for Trident
remains very real, especially in terms of its impact on the
country's conventional military posture. Peter Jenkins
comments that "Britain is not economically fit enough to
attempt the strategic over-stretch upon which Conservative
governments usually insist. As a national deterrent of last
resort the Polaris would have done for awhile yet. The
Trident is too elaborate and expensive for that purpose;
what other purpose it is intended to serve is not yet clear.
Its relevance to NATO is limited and may impair Britain's
contribution to the redress of military balance in Europe
where it really matters." [Ref. 58: p. 13]
The impact of the Trident decision on Britain's con-
ventional forces may be even larger than anyone has predicted,
Former U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Elmo Zumwalt,
writing with Worth Bagley, a retired four-star admiral, has
said that "under current plans, Britain will spend about
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$20 billion" on the Trident program. [Ref. 74: p. 21]
Zuittwalt goes on to accuse the United States of abetting "a
nuclear ally - the United Kingdom - which is giving priority
to modernizing its submarine ballistic force at the penalty
of weakening its non-nuclear forces." He goes on to say
"the return for the United States is a costly U.K. national
nuclear force that contributes little to NATO's or to
America's safety and causes a reduction of 20-30 percent in
Britain's conventionally armed Army and Navy." [Ref. 74: p. 21]
Leonard Downie, Jr., a staff writer for the Washington
Post, in announcing the Trident decision reports that
"although the United States is making unspecified concessions
on the price of Trident, there are fears among military
experts... that its cost may force Britain to make cuts in
its still large contribution to NATO's non-nuclear forces."
[Ref. 75: p. 1] Downie adds that "the cost of Trident in
particular is likely to embolden the opposition Labour Party
and a growing anti-nuclear weapons lobby to campaign against
this expensive modernization of Britain's military forces
while the country's postwar welfare state social security
programs are being whittled down. " He summarizes the unique
danger that this opposition highlights when he says: "although
the Labor Party cannot stop Thatcher from going ahead with
Trident, it could reverse her decision if it replaced the
Conservatives in government before the system was in operation."
[Ref. 75: p. 1]
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In commenting on the Thatcher Government's Trident
decision, Col Jonathan Alford of IISS says the Trident program
will "substantially increase Britain's nuclear capability
when it doesn't need to do so." Arguing an "admittedly
Gaullist" line, Alford feels that a deterrent independent of
NATO control - although one not as costly as Trident - is
needed to give Britain "a bargaining position vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union." [Ref. 76: p. 5]
An editorial in the Times poses the question, "rather
than spend billions of pounds on acquiring and maintaining
a weapon which is unlikely ever to be used, should we not
concentrate our limited resources upon conventional equipment?
If NATO's forces showed themselves well able to defend the
West against an offensive by conventional means, then would
not the nuclear threshold be raised - and indeed the threat
of war altogether removed." [Ref. 77: p. 12] No real
answer is given, but the point is emphasized that the first
priority must be an informed public debate on the issues
involved.
In terms of domestic implications, one of the most serious
questions raised has been the general veil of secrecy that
was maintained over the Conservative Government's decision
to purchase Trident. The Economist , in an editorial entitled
"Dumb Defence," was vigorously raising the issue of secrecy
when Chevaline was announced. [Ref. 78: p. 18] The editorial
goes on to say "the government's latest decision about
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Britain's nuclear deterrent is right. Silence about its
reasoning is wrong." The point is emphasized that only a
political leadership and a public opinion, familiar with, and
largely convinced by, the arguments for a strong, and changing
nuclear deterrence would be able to muster the political will
and resolve needed to complete a multi-year weapon acquisition
program. [Ref. 78: p. 18]
Hugo Young in the Sunday Times comments "my point is that
such a judgement, which we are all entitled to attempt, cannot
be reached sensibly in a regime of secrecy, not to say
calculated deception, and in the context of closed debate."
[Ref. 79: p. 22] The Manchester Guardian comments on the
choice of the Trident missile as a replacement in an
editorial entitled "Settling for Trident - a Contemptuous
Scurry." [Ref. 80: p. 4] It goes on:
After a bare minimum of discussion (and that still
inconclusive) the Government has committed Britain
to the most adventurous and most expensive of the
options open to it in replacing the Polaris missile
system. That the decision is, in our opinion, the
wrong one on grounds of both cost and strategic
purpose is almost less regrettable than the way the
decision was taken. [Ref. 80: p. 4]
The crux of this argument is that the Trident decision
by virtue of its expense and qualitative step increase will
continue to be very controversial. Without genuinely well-
informed public support, the program may not survive the
political changes likely to occur during its construction and
deployment, yet this seems to be a factor neglected by the
Thatcher Government. [Ref. 79: p. 22]
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Henry Stanhope discusses the "opportunity-costs" and
conventional arms impact of the Trident purchase in the
following manner; "the equipment programmes of all three
services are likely to be affected by the Government's
decision to invest in the Trident I missile system as a 5000
million pound replacement for the Polaris in the 1990s. This
is despite the confidence of both the Cabinet and the Ministry
of Defence that Britain can accommodate the additional cost
without severely damaging its conventional forces." [Ref, 81:
p. 3] Stanhope mentions that the RAF ' s plans for a Jaguar
replacement aircraft will probably be tabled. The Royal Navy's
hunter-killer submarine program will almost certainly be
affected by Trident as the Vickers yard at Barrow-in-Furness
is now the only shipyard capable of building nuclear sub-
marines and their will undoubtedly be some delays and juggling
of schedules to accommodate the required Trident construction
program. [Ref. 80: p. 3]
Peter Hennessy, writing in the Times , headlines a
potential problem with the Trident replacement program in
discussing the capabilities of the Atomic Weapons Research
Establishment at Aldermaston, Berkshire. Recruitment of
sufficient numbers of qualified health scientists is lagging
way behind requirements and will impact any attempt to
handle the scope of operations expected to increase with the
Trident warhead program. [Ref. 82: p. 9] This is partially




The increased MIRV capabilities of Trident with its eight
reentry vehicles present a serious challenge to British stock-
piles of nuclear material. The Polaris ballistic missile
force, even with the Chevaline update, never required more
than a total of 192 separate warheads. The new Trident system
could deploy over 500 individual warheads at any single time.
The requirement to find enough material to produce the bombs
will stretch British resources to the limit and, in fact,
will probably require U.S. assistance or reduction of other
British nuclear stockpiles, especially in the area of theater
weapons.
If the technical adjustments needed to support the Trident
deployment are considerable, the political risks associated
with the Labor Party and its anti-nuclear position are even
greater. At the 1981 party conference in Brighton, the Labor
Party "reaf fiinned. . . its commitment to unilateral nuclear
disarmament and voted to remove all nuclear military bases
from Britain soil." [Ref. 83: p. 7] The motion adopted by
the Labor Party also called for "substantially" cutting
defense spending and in the area of nuclear weapons said it
supported the shutdown of: all nuclear bases, British or
American, on British soil or direct contribution to the
creation of a European nuclear weapon- free zone and as a
powerful British initiative in the wider process of nuclear
disarmament. [Ref. 83: p. 7] This action by Labor Party is
awkward because previous Labor Government's have supported
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only multilateral disarmament and, under Prime Ministers
Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, actively maintained an
independent national nuclear deterrent and supported the
stationing of both British and American nuclear weapons under
the auspices of NATO.
^"Jhat the outcome of the party conference also highlighted
is the growing estrangement between the moderate and left
wings of the Labor Party. As an example, the Labor shadow
defense spokesman, Brynmor John, a moderate, was prevented
from speaking on the nuclear question by Alex Kitson, the
conference chairman and an outspoken leftist. Significant
differences also exist between party leader Michael Foot and
deputy leader Denis Healey. Foot has long advocated unilateral
disarmament, while Healey, as defense minister in the Wilson
government, was in favor of maintaining an independent
nuclear deterrent as long as the Soviets continued to build
up their strategic strike forces. [Ref. 33; p. 7]
Several questions remain to be answered about whether a
future Labor government would dismantle Britain's independent
nuclear deterrent. Suffice it to say that a government truly
dedicated to unilateral disarmament would be more likely to
do so than one not quite so rabid. The future of the Labor
Party also remains open to conjecture. The positions of the
various wings of the party are becoming increasingly isolated
from one another, as devisive issues like nuclear weapons
arise. This may act as a counterweight to the Labor
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position and make it that much more difficult for the party
to come to power.
The Trident weapons system is the best one of its kind
presently in existence. Its acquisition would vastly increase
the weight and accuracy of nuclear weapons with which Britain
could threaten the Soviet Union. Against the backdrop of
domestic political constraints and financial limitations,
however, it will require some real political manuevering and
dogged determination on the part of the Conservative Party




VI. REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In examining the strategic and political implications
surrounding z.he British Government's decision to acquire and
deploy the new American Trident I (C4) submarine- launched
ballistic missile, Lawrence Freedman attempts to offer a
realistic perspective about the decision by asking his
readers to imagine a harried Royal Air Force commander taking
time, during the Battle of Britain, to reflect on the possible
strategic environment forty years hence, in 19 80, and to then
sanction production of a single system that would be the
final, sole guarantee of British national sovereignty during
that period. [Ref. 54: p. 13]
The analogy in not as far fetched as it might at first
seem. With a currently deployed capable and credible
strategic national nuclear deterrent force, only recently
upgraded at substantial expense to insure high probability of
target penetration, the British have made the political and
technical decision to commence procurement of a new system
designed to remain effective to about the year 2020. Just as
the RAF commander would have had no concept of the military
or strategic conditions existing today upon which to base his
decision, the analysts, strategists and politicians who opted
for Trident are faced with the same set of unknowns. Despite
the degree to which current operations analysis and other
computer-oriented prediction systems have been refined over
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recent decades, it would be few leaders indeed who would
conmiit the fate of their nation to such predictions of the
probab le future
.
To a nation with the proud traditions of the United
Kingdom, the ability to independently chart its own course
of action has always been paramount. Having to rely on the
United States to provide the technically sophisticated
equipment necessary in the current strategic arena to maintain
an effective, 'independent' national deterrent may be a sour
pill fo^ the British to swallow, but it is a realistic
acceptance of the political, military and economic conditions
existing and a directed effort on their part to use these
factors to their maximum advantage.
The primary driving force behind the British decision
to buy Trident was the practical necessity to stay reasonably
in step with the Americans. Britain's political leadership
felt unable to deploy more than a single type of strategic
nuclear weapon. With unique requirements for deterrent
survivability and penetrability, the submarine- launched
ballistic missile appeared the only choice, hence Trident.
The initial British attempt at acquisition of a major American
strategic system, the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile,
resulted from their inability to develop the capability
indigenously within the fiscal constraints imposed by a
weakened economy. Polaris became British almost by accident,
as a political expedient. Its purchase has proven remarkably
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successful from almost every British point of view. It has
been relatively cheap, reliable and politically invisible.
If the British needed further convincing of the correctness
of their strategic reasoning, it was provided by the Polaris
Improvement Program, or Chevaline. Technically successful,
this 'major rework of the missile front end' was economically
a disaster. Costing around 1000 million pounds sterling,
Chevaline exceeded its initial cost estimates over two-fold.
Even allowing for inflation, this represented a significant
increase which under different circumstances might very well
have led to cancellation of the program. To avoid sending
out the wrong political-strategic signals about Britain's
political resolve to the Soviets, the program was carried
through to a technically successful conclusion. It did create,
however, a strong and vivid reminder, to British strategists
considering the Polaris replacement question, of the unknown
difficulties associated with the research, development and
testing of any new strategic system, difficulties which are
all too quickly translated into money demands on an already
overstretched national treasury.
With the Chevaline 'bad experience' fresh in their minds
and just barely having begun Chevaline 's deployment on sub-
marines of the Royal Navy's Polaris squadron, British
politicians moved quickly on to the issue of a successor
system to Polaris. This action was undoubtedly quickened by
the victorv of the Conservative Party in 19 79 which brought
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to power a government already dedicated to upgrading British
prestige and military readiness, especially in the area of
nuclear weapons. The cruise missile option was never seriously
considered in the final decision because it was not yet a proven
system; because it has significant range limitations in its
current versions; and because it would not be any cheaper than
Trident, if deployed on submarines in the numbers needed to
achieve the effectiveness of the current deterrent force.
Other ballistic options besides Trident were considered,
including Poseidon, an up-graded Polaris, as well as possible
collaboration with the French. All were rejected for the
simple fact that at some point they would all require
improvements to maintain their reliability and effectiveness;
and the cost would have to be borne wholly by the British,
an alternative viewed as especially unattractive in the wake
of the Chevaline experience.
Trident was the 'best' system available and the United
States was prepared to offer it to the British under ex-
ceptionally good financial terms, much better, in fact, than
many of the British analyses of the question had thought
possible. The fact remains that the best deal was still
enormously expensive, abosrbing at best estimate, at least
25 percent of the military budget allocation for new equipment,
over the period of years of heaviest expenditure, roughly
1985-1990. The ability of the British economy in general,
and military allocations specifically, to absorb this
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significant expense is open to question. It is unlikely that
all the planned conventional armaments programs could be
carried through as conceived, given the normal chops and
changes that have characterized British defense planning in
the post-war period. To overlay this large additional require-
ment of at least 5000 million pounds on the military budget,
is to ask for almost certain spending cuts that will limit,
reduce or eliminate many currently planned conventional capa-
bilities. This will, in one manner or another, lower the
threshold for conventional aggression in the European theater,
unless British allies are able to pick up the military slack
which will be created.
The British strategic nuclear deterrent is designed around
the 'Moscow criteria', that is to be able, in a situation of
last resort, to attack the center of the Soviet power structure
successfully and impose societal, rather than military, damage
of unacceptable proportions to the Soviet political leadership.
This is in some ways an arbitrary and artificial criteria
established by military planners, as tremendous societal damage
to the Soviet political control structure could be achieved
by attacking industrial and population centers which are
undefended by ABM systems. If we use the 'Moscow criteria'
as the minimum level of deterrence acceptable to British
strategists, there is still a real question as to why they
are acquiring the Trident missile system.
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If the British SLBM's are launched as a component of a
massive allied retaliation, their problems of penetrability
are minimized because of the magnitude and scope of the task
that would confront Soviet defenses, wherever they might be
installed. If the credibility of the British deterrent is
established by its ability to threaten Moscow in extreme
circumstances, then that ability is not significantly enhanced
by the choice of Trident over the Polaris with Chevaline
up-grade. If the Soviets can successfully defend themselves
against a British Chevaline attack, then it is likely that
they can do the same against any national British attack,
unsupported by the United States. If they could not accomplish
this active defense, then the effectiveness of the MRVed
Polaris would continue to be as generally excellent as it is
considered today. The deployment of the Trident missile
system would increase the total number of warheads a British
strategic submarine force could and also their accuracy and
total equivalent megatonnage (EMT) , but this is a capability
which has not been previously considered necessary by British
planners. Certainly, even with Trident I, the British could
never hope to individually pose a counterforce threat to the
Soviets. As part of a coordinated allied attack, their
contribution in this regard would prove more useful.
The basic question that must be answered is whether the
British can successfully absorb the political and financial
opportunity-costs of the Trident purchase. It is quite
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possible that they cannot and will not unless subsidized to
even greater extent by the United States. Polaris escaped
emasculation at the hands of the Labour Party, despite their
rhetoric to the contrary, because it was relatively inexpensive.
No matter how favorable a deal Trident is, it will not be
cheap. The political visibility it acquires will be turned
into political controversy which may very well threaten its
actual deployment. This will be helped by the undoubted
growing dissatisfaction of the three services whose con-
ventional capabilities will be significantly and negatively
affected by the Trident purchase. The French devote a much
larger share of their military budget, around 20 percent, to
nuclear weapons. Unless the British are increasingly prepared
to accept this sort of commitment, the deployment of the
Trident missile force will become increasingly difficult to
support militarily and politically. I don't believe the
British or their European allies are willing to accept the
degradation that will almost surely take place in British
conventional forces. At the same time, and given the social
and economic difficulties existing throughout Britain, it is
unlikely that a larger percentage of the British budget can
be devoted to defense to cover the extra expenses that Trident
will entail.
The Trident I is designed to come into active service in t±ie
Poyal Navy in the early 1990 's, when it is scheduled to be withdrawn fron
use by the U.S. Navy in favor of the larger and even more
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accurate Trident II (D5) missile. Many of the support
difficulties which the Britain see as handicapping the Polaris,
Poseidon and other existing ballistic missiles will then
confront the British Trident. A squadron of Trident missile-
firing submarines will deploy a range of significant new
capabilities that the British have never possessed in a
ballistic missile before; longer range; greater throw-weight;
and higher accuracy. The point to be made is that the British
never possessed these capacities before and yet managed to
deploy a 'credible' deterrent. It is not that the capabilities
of the Trident are not worth while, it is a matter of how
much Britain can afford. My judgement is that the British
may pay more than they can, for more than they need.
If there is one feature of the strategic environment
which is likely to change during the projected lifetime of
the British Trident, it is the ability of anti-ballistic
missile systems. With the effort that is being expended in
the areas of laser and particle-beam technology and the
potential of space for weapons system employment, there is
perhaps greater long-term probability of a significant break-
through in this area than in ASW. In the medium-term, current
BMD technologies could probably be more rapidly exploited by
the USSR than the United States. The ability of increasingly
sophisticated and supersonic cruise missiles to penetrate
Soviet defenses will likely increase at a faster rate than
the effectiveness of those defenses. In either case, there
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may be a slow, steady shift away from ballistic missiles
toward cruise missiles in terms of strategic efficiency and
political opportunity-costs. Cruise missiles have the
additional advantages of accuracy, which makes them more
effective and employable in strategic conventional and theater
nuclear roles, and flexibility, since they can be deployed on
a number of potential launch platforms as the tactical
situation and strategic environment requires.
The expense of Trident will not stop with its purchase
and initial deployment. It would be foolish to imagine the
strategic environment remaining static for the duration of
Trident's life. Updates and modernizations will be required
to keep the system effective and credible, just as Chevaline
was considered essential for Polaris. The costs of these
will have to be borne by the British to maintain their own
deterrent effectiveness. The impact these costs will continue
to have on the British conventional forces will result in a
lower threshold for Soviet aggression and very well might
become a divisive force in the Western alliance.
The Trident I (C4) SLBM is the best missile presently
available to the British, but its acquisition by them would
distinctly not be the best possible strategic alternative
possible. The British should explore ways of keeping their
strategic deterrent force effective and reliable. New
operational procedures should be considered to extend the
service life of the Resolution class SSBNs, including inshore
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operating patterns. Admirals Zumwalt and Bagley suggest an
interesting concept when they propose SLEPing U.S. Poseidon
boats as they are withdrawn from service and selling them to
the British for use with either Trident I or an up-dated
Polaris/Poseidon to maintain the effectiveness of the British
deterrent into the 21st Century. This Service Life Extension
Program (SLEP) could just as easily be carried out in British
shipyards as in American and would thus help the strained
British economy. [Ref. 74: p. 13]
At the same time the British could buy or work with the
Americans on establishing their own cruise missile force,
perhaps initially deployed in the GLCM version on trucks
throughout the United Kingdom. With the continued effective-
ness of the British deterrent force insured with SSBNs at
sea in the 21st Century, there is time to acquire and build
up the requisite skills for an indigenous cruise missile
production capability which will stand both the U.S. and the
British in better strategic stead as time goes on. Additionally,
the costs will likely be considerably less than that demanded
by the deployment of the Trident missile system as presently
contemplated.
An extension of the current ballistic missile deterrent
capability of the British through any of the means previously
considered, combined with a directed attempt to acquire, in
concert with the Americans, a realistic cruise missile force
and production capacity, would provide an effective and
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credible deterrent force to meet the immediate needs of the
British and may prove over the long run to provide more
strategic flexibility than any version of the Trident.
Militarily such actions would have less impact on the con-
ventional forces which the British deploy and which remain
the first line of readiness to prevent any Soviet aggression
from reaching a situation of last resort.
Politically, a combined Polaris-extension/cruise missile
force is likely to create less controversy and opposition
than the more costly, visible Trident. The ability to gain
popular political support is the key to insuring the viability
of any military weapon system chosen over its projected
service life. A nuclear deterrent force is the same. If
the cost is too heavy in both pounds sterling and political
capital, it will not be successful. The Trident is not and
Britain does not have the economic wherewithal to make it
work through the decades as will the United States. The
question that the British themselves must answer is whether
they are in fact seeking with Trident to continue their
strategic deterrent capability or buying it because it is
the best. If it is the last resort capability they seek,
there are better, more cost-effective ways of guaranteeing
it. If it is the best they seek. Trident must be the choice.
But the British face the very real prospect of failing to
bring the attempt to fruition because of domestic political
opposition and economic weakness. Such a choice, because
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of the neglect and under-funding of the conventional forces
of the three military services, will only serve to increase
the likelihood of the conditions which the British strategic
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